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This thesis argues that to understand why bilingual education did not achieve its aims, the 
program must be analysed within an urban history context of residential and school 
segregation in Phoenix. When passed by Congress in 1968, the Bilingual Education Act (BEA) 
was considered the signature civil rights achievement for Latinos of that era. Ten years later, 
bilingual education was increasingly considered ineffectual and failed to effect a meaningful 
change in the attainment gap between Latinos and their Anglo classmates, as was the main 
objective of the BEA 1968.  
 
By focusing upon Phoenix, Arizona between 1968 and 1982, this thesis argues that bilingual 
education and the place of Mexican Americans in the southwest was fundamentally contested 
in ways that historians have not fully captured in previous works. This thesis contributes to 
knowledge by showing that unlike in other Sunbelt locations, in Arizona bilingual education 
was opposed by conservative politicians throughout this period and its survival remained 
uncertain. Although hopes for accessing the opportunities granted by Great Society legislation 
were curtailed by this opposition, it was a series of urban development, school site selection 
and school desegregation policies which undermined the effectiveness of Phoenix schools in 
ways that bilingual education could not remedy. These policies created an unequal 
metropolitan landscape that was reflected in the increasingly racially imbalanced enrolments 
in Phoenix schools. Ultimately, they caused the closure of inner-city high schools and, by 1982, 
the creation of a thirty square mile radius without a school. 
 
This narrative of underlying discrimination against Mexican Americans also contributes to 
knowledge by challenging the contemporary marketing of Phoenix as a modern, racially 
tolerant city. In many cases, Mexican Americans were subject to many of the same prejudiced 
practices that African Americans were subject to in other Sunbelt cities. Yet, some Mexican 
American public figures were able to escape the worst excesses of racism. This thesis, 
therefore, examines the complex environment in which Mexican American racial identities 
evolved during this period, as the community attempted to navigate the challenges of race-
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making state practices and the opportunities that the introduction of bilingual education 
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It is often said that Arizona has become ground zero in contemporary battles over 
immigration, nationhood and citizenship.1 An increase in the Latino population, who 
constituted 31 per cent of the state’s inhabitants by 2014, has made Latinos so prominent as 
to provoke continual speculation about a possible change to the state’s political orientation 
in presidential elections.2 This is juxtaposed against recent hostilities in the state’s politics 
over immigration and control of the border, one flashpoint being Arizona’s Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighbourhoods Act of 2010, otherwise known as SB 1070. Amongst 
the Act’s provision was a requirement that police check the immigration status of people they 
reasonably believe to have entered the country illegally.3 Critics of the Act, including President 
Obama, argued that it enabled large scale racial profiling of Latinos in Arizona, regardless of 
immigration or citizenship status, and encouraged abuses of police powers.4 Another 
flashpoint occurred in 2012. Tom Horne, Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction 
intervened to eliminate a Mexican American Studies program in Tucson Unified High School 
District, an action that, according to the U.S. District Court Judge who heard subsequent 
litigation, was ‘motived by racial animus’.5 These perceptions of Arizona were solidified in 
2017 by President Donald J. Trump’s decision to hold a political rally in Phoenix to escape 
intense criticism of his response to the murder a woman in Charlottesville, Virginia, by a far 
right extremist.6 
 
                                                        
1 A recent selection includes: ‘Can Donald Trump Win? These Battleground Regions Will Decide’, New York 
Times, 29/05/2016’; ‘Is This the Year Arizona Turns Blue?’, The Atlantic, 28/09/2016; ‘The Myth of the Latino 
Vote’, The Atlantic, 01/09/2012; ‘Can Latinos Swing Arizona?’, The New Yorker, 01/08/2016; ‘Raging Arizona’, 
The New Yorker, 28/05/2012. 
2 ‘U.S. Latino Population Growth and Dispersion Has Slowed Since Onset of the Great Recession’, Pew Research 
Center, accessed: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/08/4-ranking-the-latino-population-in-the-states/;  
3 Of the Bill’s four provisions, the Court struck down three because they infringed upon the federal 
government’s responsibility for immigration policy. The controversial ‘show me your papers’ element, which 
required police to arrest and detain anyone who they believe has committed a crime and who they think is in 
the country illegally, until their immigration status could be verified, was upheld. Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387 (2012).  
4 ‘On the Campaign Trail, Obama and Romney React to the Justices Decision’, New York Times, 25/06/2012. 
5 Gonzalez v. Douglas, 410 U.S. 623 (2017); ‘How One Law Banning Ethnic Studies Led to Its Rise’, The Atlantic, 
19/07/2015. 
6 ‘At Rally, Trump Blames Media for Country’s Deepening Divisions’, New York Times, 22/08/2017. 
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Some scholars have interpreted the above events, amongst others, as evidence that the U.S. 
is in a state of national ‘White Backlash’ against Latinos.7 These analyses typically trace a 
coarsening of the climate for Latinos to the resurgence of anti-immigrant political campaigns 
in the early 1990s. The election of Sheriff Joe Arpaio as Sheriff of Maricopa county - the county 
in which Phoenix is located and, which, according to the 2010 Census, had a population of 
3,800,000 - initiated a hard line approach to law enforcement that was often 
disproportionately targeted at Latinos. Arpaio was first elected in 1992.8 Two years later, Pete 
Wilson won a Gubernatorial Election in California with a campaign that contained virulently 
anti-immigrant themes. A Ballot Initiative that year restricted undocumented people from 
accessing public services. These events underscored the perennially contested place of 
Latinos in the U.S. Since the nineteenth century, Latinos have been subject to discriminatory 
practices that questioned their citizenship, limited their voting rights and access to public 
services, and confined them to deprived neighbourhoods. In the chapters that follow, this 
dissertation will show a jagged trajectory of progress for Latinos, in which moments of 
advancement were often preceded and followed by reversals. These trends suggest that the 
backlash thesis has events in the incorrect order. Moments of progress, such as the federal 
Bilingual Education Act of 1968, were rare exceptions in contrast to an ongoing history of 
marginalization as a result of state action.  
 
Whilst media attention was consumed by skirmishes over immigration enforcement in 
Arizona, a little noticed report by researchers at Arizona State University highlighted the 
continued achievement gap between Latinos and white pupils in the state’s schools. The 
report noted that 69 per cent of Latinos graduated from high school in 2009 after completing 
four years of study. The corresponding number for white students was 83 per cent. Between 
2000 and 2011, Latino students had scored approximately 50 points lower in the SAT mean 
scores compared with their white counterparts.9 The underachievement of Latino children 
                                                        
7 Marissa Abrajano and Zoltan L. Hajnal, White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
8 United States Census, (2010), QuickFacts Maricopa County, accessed: 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/maricopacountyarizona/PST045217 
 
9 Bill Hart and C.J. Eisenbarth Hager, ‘Dropped? Latino Education and Arizona’s Economic Future’, Arizona State 
University Morrison Institute for Public Policy (Apr., 2012), pp. 1-38. Accessed: 
https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/sites/default/files/content/products/Dropped_2012.pdf p. 24-25. 
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had concerned politicians and policymakers during the 1960s, eventually prompting action. 
Members of the U.S. Congress introduced legislation that would enable school districts to 
fund bilingual education programs, the preferred pedagogical method for reducing disparities 
between Latinos and Anglos. State politicians in Arizona introduced a local version of the Bill, 
widening the opportunities for schools to introduce bilingual education programs. The failure 
to eradicate the Latino education gap was based upon a myriad of factors, not least the 
eventual outlawing by plebiscite in 2000 of bilingual education in Arizonan schools. Whilst 
recognising the difficulties of pursuing educational equality and the limitations of bilingual 
education as a pedagogical method, this thesis will argue that the desired effects of the 
Bilingual Education Act were not realised because many Mexican Americans in Arizona were 
not able to access new opportunities granted under the legislation.  
 
The central contribution of this dissertation is to analyse the issue of Latino educational 
achievement within the full context of its surrounding urban environment. In particular, this 
thesis demonstrates the effects of municipal development policies that have previously been 
considered separately, upon the pursuit of educational equality in Phoenix. As a result, 
although bilingual education programs were surprisingly resilient at a federal level - surviving 
beyond the initial Great Society period and expanded under more conservative 
administrations - they were unable to remedy the unequal standing of Latinos and Anglos in 
the classroom. This was because of the deeply entrenched levels of metropolitan inequality 
in Phoenix caused by decades of discriminatory urban development policies. Yet, at a time 
when historic injustices were being addressed through legislation, court orders, and remedial 
measures, policymakers in Phoenix introduced a series of policies that remade inequality in 
the post-Civil Rights era. These interventions included policies that governed where new 
housing could be built, the selection of sites for new schools, and school finance regulations. 
Alongside these, education officials refused to take action to reduce levels of segregation in 
Phoenix’s schools. The combined effect was to fuse white, middle class economic interests 
with racial discrimination against non-whites, to prioritize suburban neighbourhoods over 
inner city areas, and to subordinate the demands of non-whites for school desegregation 




There are, however, scholars who have presented alternative theories to explain why 
bilingual education did not reduce educational inequality. One such scholar is Jennifer 
Hochschild, who highlights the importance of class in explaining why education failed to 
equalise opportunities for students from different racial backgrounds. By this argument, 
‘sustained and serious disagreements over educational policy’ could not be resolved due to 
the ‘fundamental paradox’ inherent within the American Dream which pitted the interests of 
the privileged few against the collective good of all students.10 Whilst in theory this ideology 
promoted the right of everyone to pursue success, in reality, those who succeeded tended to 
belong to the middle and upper classes. It was these students whose parents could afford 
houses in areas with better schools or could use their resources to improve the schools in 
their neighbourhood. These advantages provided the recipients with a head start, whilst 
‘other children [fell] behind through no fault of their own.’ According to Hochschild, this 
disparity made it difficult to equalize opportunities across generations as some were 
committed to using their wealth or power to secure the individual success of their children. If 
ever there was a choice between the individual success of their offspring or wider community 
improvement, parents often chose their own children. More than any other factor, the ability 
of affluent Americans to utilise the benefits of class to secure further advantages for their 
children represented ‘almost insurmountable barriers’ which explain the limited effectiveness 
of efforts to achieve educational equality.11  
 
The impact of class can also be seen in other urban changes in this era.  For example, 
Hochschild suggests that issues with the integration of new immigrant groups into 
contemporary U.S. society could have stemmed from a lack of opportunities to progress 
socially. As immigrants struggled to accumulate wealth and status, they became increasing 
less able, or willing, to assimilate with a city’s way of life. 12  Others have argued class as a 
factor drove the increased stratification of Phoenix; this resulted from its post-war business 
elite crafting a new political economy prioritising high-skilled manufacturing over service 
                                                        
10 Jennifer Hochschild, The American Dream and the Public Schools (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Jennifer Hochschild, Facing up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 233 – 236. 
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industries, which may have attracted low skilled immigrant labour.13 Further, in many of the 
debates around housing development and school finance, there is evidence that affluent 
residents in suburban Phoenix sought to protect the advantages of their community at the 
expense of a more equal distribution of wealth and opportunity across the city.  Yet, class 
alone, or as the primary explanation, cannot account for the wide-ranging and systematic 
manner in which opportunities for Mexican Americans who lived in urban Phoenix were 
circumscribed by the use of municipal and state power in the period this thesis encompasses. 
Nor does class fully capture the manner in which the geography of the city had become 
imbued with racial associations by the mid-1970s. Therefore, by situating bilingual education 
within a broader metropolitan history spanning multiple areas of public policy, this study 
highlights the social costs of development, education and school administration policies 
within Phoenix. As a result, this thesis argues that race was central to the remaking of 




When the federal Bilingual Education Act was signed into law by President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson, it was uncontroversial and had attracted significant bipartisan support. Kenzo Sung 
asked how bilingual education obtained the support of both Johnson and his successor 
Richard Nixon, particularly ‘during an era most often remembered for highly politicized 
divides over both federal education and civil rights policies?’14 He argued that the answer lay 
in Derick Bell’s theory of issue convergence. The late 1960s was a time when policymakers of 
both political parties and Latino activists coalesced around the issue of reducing rates of 
poverty amongst Latinos. Bilingual education was not, at that time, imbued with conflicts over 
race and culture, which enabled ‘policymakers and Latino activists [to focus] . . . on the 
economic struggles of Latinos who were moving into cities and, unable to find jobs, falling 
into poverty.’15 Others such as Ruben Donato, Guadalupe San Miguel Jr., and Maritza De La 
                                                        
13 Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) p. 1 – 17. 
14 Kenzo K. Sung, ‘”Accentuate the Positive Eliminate the Negative”: Hegemonic Interest Convergence, 
Racialization of Latino Poverty, and the 1968 Bilingual Education Act’, Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 92, 
No. 3 (Jun., 2017), pp. 302-321. p. 303. 
15 Ibid., p. 308. 
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Trinidad, have emphasised the importance of Latino activists who organised within the 
southwest and caught the attention of legislators who wanted to seem responsive to social 
movements.16 Others have questioned the influence of Latino activists as an explanation for 
the passage of bilingual education legislation. Gareth Davies argued that the main reason for 
President Nixon’s support was an opportunistic calculation about the electoral potential of 
adding Latinos to the Republican coalition in the southwest. John D. Skrentny made a similar 
argument, highlighting a letter that Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) sent to President Nixon in 
January 1969 to urge that the President appear responsive to Latino concerns because their 
votes were available to the GOP.17 
 
Once the policy was established, it was surprisingly resilient, enduring throughout the Nixon 
Presidency and expanded by Congress in 1974. Davies argued that bilingual education’s 
survival and subsequent expansion was in large part a result of ‘bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship’ at the Office for Civil Rights. Director Stanley J. Pottinger’s 1970 memo to 
school districts with more than 5 per cent national origin minority group students was an 
example of this concept in action. Pottinger issued new regulations to combat ‘common 
practices which have the effect of denying equality of educational opportunity to Spanish – 
surnamed pupils’.  The memo was issued to over a thousand school districts responsible for 
the education of 3.7 million children. It stipulated that affirmative steps must be taken to 
rectify language deficiencies if they are prohibiting national origin-minority group children 
from effective participation in classes. The provisions of the memo were upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme court in the landmark Lau v. Nichols case of 1974, which affirmed the rights of 
language minorities to access bilingual instruction programs. Davies argued that the memo 
showed that ‘the administrators at OCR were setting the pace for the judges, rather than 
                                                        
16 Ruben Donato, The Other Struggle for Equal Schools: Mexican Americans During the Civil Rights Era (New 
York City, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997); Guadalupe San Miguel Jr., Contested Policy: The Rise 
and Fall of Federal Bilingual Education in the United States, 1960-2001 (Denton, TX: University of North Texas 
Press, 2004); Maritza De La Trinidad, ‘Mexican Americans and the Push for Culturally Relevant Education: The 
Bilinugal Education Movement in Tucson, 1958-1969’, History of Education, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp.316-338; Maritza 
De La Trinidad, Collective Outrage: Mexican American Activism and the Quest for Educational Equality and 
Reform, 1950-1990. PhD Dissertation (The University of Arizona, 2013). 
17 Gareth Davies, See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan (Lawrence, KS: The 
University Press of Kansas, 2007); Gareth Davies, ‘The Great Society after Johnson: The Case of Bilingual 
Education’, The Journal of American History, Vol. 88, No.2. pp.1405-1429; John D. Skrentny, The Minority 
Rights Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2002) p. 1. 
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responding to their rulings (as the Johnson administration had responded to desegregation 
guidelines)’. 18 
 
Much less is known about the implementation of bilingual education at a local level, and its 
fate into the 1970s. Natalia Mehlman Petrzela argued that bilingual education had bipartisan 
support in California. Conservative figures such as the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
Max Rafferty, and Governor Ronald Reagan were enthusiastic about the program and 
oversaw its introduction.19 Conversely, Mark Brilliant has argued that Reagan supported 
bilingual education because the program required concentrations of language minority 
students and, therefore, its potential to circumvent desegregation measures.20 However, 
Petrzela found that support for bilingual education dissipated as it became associated with 
radical politics following the Mexican American school protests in Los Angeles. Opposition to 
the program solidified during the mid-to-late 1970s as critics of the programs questioned its 
educational effectiveness and criticised it as an example of big government frivolity. Petrzela 
indicates that the experience ‘on the ground’ in California was mixed. Bilingual education 
engendered fierce opposition, which she argued was an important factor in the success of the 
Proposition 13 tax limitation referendum. Evidence that the program was improving the 
educational performance of Latinos was also inconclusive. Yet, she argued, ‘[t]his opposition 
notwithstanding, Latino children in 1970s California clearly benefitted from an energetic and 
evolving policy framework’, much of which was the product of organic innovation by local 
educators.21 On the other hand, Ruben Donato’s study of the implementation of bilingual 
education in California, stressed how white parents organised grassroots resistance to the 
bilingual education classes, which they considered to be a threat to their children.22  
 
                                                        
18 Gareth Davies, ‘The Great Society after Johnson: The Case of Bilingual Education’, The Journal of American 
History, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Mar., 2002), pp.1405-1429, p. 1420-1421. 
19 Natalia Mehlman Petrzela, Classroom Wars: Language, Sex, and the Making of Modern Political Culture 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
20 Mark Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in 
California, 1941-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
21 Natalia Mehlman Petrzela, Classroom Wars, p. 78. 
22 In his study, Donato anonymised his data and source material, referring to the location as ‘Brownfield’, a 
fictional place. Individual actors are also not referred to by name, limiting the book’s use for connecting the 
experiences of different school jurisdictions’ trying to implement bilingual education. Ruben Donato, The Other 
Struggle for Equal Schools: Mexican Americans During the Civil Rights Era (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1997). 
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The question of whether bilingual education was an effective method for reducing the 
attainment gap between Latinos and Anglos has been also been taken up by other scholars 
such as Jennifer Hochschild. In particular, she questions whether the program’s pedagogical 
method of teaching students in separate classrooms based upon language ability was 
‘educationally best for students’.23 Ultimately, she concludes that separating students on 
these grounds created barriers between them, reduced classroom diversity and stymied 
opportunities for mutual learning experiences. This type of schooling ‘also too easily turns 
into second-class education for some, as it did in the case of racial segregation’.24 The second 
chapter of this thesis will build upon these interpretations and expand the historiography of 
bilingual education by chronicling the policy history of bilingual education at the state and 
local level. It will show that although new rights to language education were granted by the 
federal government, students in Arizona relied upon strong state funded bilingual provision 
to access classes. Ultimately, what was a fiercely contested political and policy conflict in the 
late 1960s became well established in the educational infrastructure of the state.  
 
Although seemingly a pedagogical intervention of limited scope, the introduction of bilingual 
education ignited wide ranging debates about the position of Mexican Americans in U.S. 
society. These encompassed not only the importance of bilingual instruction to educational 
attainment, but also issues such as cultural pride, Spanish language use, and the opportunity 
to obtain more visible political positions. Some public figures celebrated the introduction of 
bilingual education, and the corresponding removal of English-Only laws, because it 
represented a fundamental change to a polity that had circumscribed the lives of Mexican 
Americans. Other supportive interventions focussed on the merits of bilingual education as a 
pedagogical tool for improving educational performance. These Mexican American public 
figures praised it as an overdue program for reducing poverty amongst Latinos. 
 
Yet, as the first two chapters demonstrate, these opinions were not universally held. The 
events, speeches, articles and letters through which this discourse took place reveal there 
were differing views, and often significant divisions, amongst Mexican Americans to a far 
                                                        
23 Ibid., p. 2; p.135. 
24 Jennifer Hochschild, The American Dream, p. 135. 
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greater extent than previously recognized. These events exposed divisions about the efficacy 
of bilingual education as a strategy for achieving progress on economic and civil rights.  
Despite previous perceptions of unity amongst Mexican Americans, the experience in Phoenix 
demonstrates that many were sceptical of bilingual education, and an emerging Chicano 
politics, arguing instead that civil rights progress would only be attained by assimilating more 
fully into American society, rather than through what they considered to be separatist 
methods. Dissenting opinions were not confined to the margins of debate or Mexican 
American communities. In Arizona, they were expressed most notably by Eugene Marin, a 
member of the Republican Governor’s administration and arguably the most powerful 
Mexican American in the state at that time. 
 
Despite initial enthusiasm that the program would reduce the disparity between Mexican 
American and Anglo students, by the early 1970s, some who had previously supported the 
policy began to highlight its flaws. Mexican American critics were disappointed that the policy 
had not met their expectations as a remedy for the attainment gap. Others cited arguments 
similar to those made by Marin about bilingual education placing students at odds with 
mainstream U.S. society. Yet supporters remained, with some even advocating for the 
introduction of a wider and more radical, bilingual-bicultural method. Collectively, these 
debates complicate our understanding of Mexican American politics in this period, indicating 
that old arguments about assimilationism versus Chicano politics remained, as well as newer 
ones about the methods of achieving educational equality.  
 
Whilst this dissertation highlights the negotiation of identity by Mexican Americans in the late 
1960s and 1970s, it mainly focuses on the extent of the state’s power to circumscribe and 
racialize Mexican Americans through municipal political decisions. A prominent method for 
interpreting conflicts over Spanish language use and the representation of Mexican cultures 
is Renato Rosaldo’s and William Flores’s formulation of ‘Cultural Citizenship’. They defined 
the concept as demands by Mexican Americans for the rights of full citizenship whilst 
maintaining a cultural difference from the Anglo mainstream.  In particular: 
 
‘The right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect to the 
norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one’s right to belong, in 
16 
 
the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes. The enduring exclusions 
of the color line often deny full citizenship to Latinos and other people of color. From the point 
of view of subordinate communities, cultural citizenship offers the possibility of legitimizing 
demands made in the struggle to enfranchise themselves. These demands can range from 
legal, political and economic issues to matters of human dignity, well-being, and respect.’25 
 
Yet, as Aihwa Ong argued, Rosaldo’s formulation of cultural citizenship ‘gives the erroneous 
impression that cultural citizenship can be unilaterally constructed and that immigrant or 
minority groups can escape the cultural inscription of state power and other forms of 
regulation that define the modalities of belonging.’ Ong stated that greater emphasis needed 
to be placed on the subject-making capacities of the nation state and civil society, in contrast 
to Rosaldo’s over-reliance on self-making processes of constructing cultural citizenship.26 Eric 
V. Meeks applied Flores’s and Rosaldo’s formulation in his study of minority groups in Arizona, 
with some effort to reconcile Ong’s criticisms. Meeks highlighted some instances of the state’s 
subject-making powers in Arizona, as well as the methods of resistance Mexicans and Indians 
developed in response. He argued that Indians and Mexicans were ‘border citizens’ both 
because of their positions at the margins of the polity and because they were redefining what 
it meant to be a member of the U.S. nation state in the borderland. Meeks charts a general 
trajectory of racial identities being fluid at the start of the 20th century but calcifying over the 
course of the century.27 Whilst this thesis is broadly in agreement with that trajectory, the 
sections that discuss urban development, school finance and school construction apply these 
theories to new policy areas. As a result, these chapters add detail to the theories of Flores, 
Ong and Meeks by showing the depth of the subject making power of the state, even at a 
municipal level, and that the consequence of many municipal policies was to define Latinos 
as a racialized non-white Other. 
                                                        
25 Renato Rosaldo and William V. Flores, ‘Identity, Conflict and Evolving Latino Communities: Cultural 
Citizenship in San Jose, California,’ IN: Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights, ed. 
William V. Flores and Rina Benmayor (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1997) p. 57. 
26 Ong addresses her criticisms to an earlier article by Renato Rosaldo but one in which she makes the same 
argument. Aihwa Ong, ‘Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrant Negotiate Racial and Cultural 
Boundaries in the United States’, Current Anthropology, Vol. 37, No. 5 (Dec., 1996), pp. 737-762. p. 737-738; 
Renato Rosaldo, ‘Cultural Citizenship in San Jose, California’, PoLar: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 
Vol. 17, No.2 (1994), pp. 57-63. 
27 Eric V. Meeks, Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona (Austin, TX: The 





The postwar history of Phoenix was a microcosm of several important trends that 
transformed national politics and society in the U.S. These included exponential population 
and residential growth, which enabled the city to be a popular destination for people 
relocating from the urban north and Midwest to the Sunbelt southwest. This was 
accompanied by the pursuit of a new model of political economy that prioritised high tech 
and high wage industries over a traditional manufacturing base. These trends were evident in 
other Sunbelt metropolitan centres such as Charlotte and Atlanta, where historians have also 
chronicled extensive discrimination against African Americans. Phoenix is distinctive because 
it provides an opportunity to examine these trends but in a location with a large Mexican 
American population, in addition to a small number of African American inhabitants. 
Examining these trends will enable this thesis to make distinctive contributions not only, as 
indicated above, to the historiography of education policy but also those of Sunbelt 
metropolitan development, and Mexican American racial formation. 
 
In the early years of the twentieth century, Phoenix was a small railroad town, with an 
economy composed mainly of agriculture, mining and tourism. By the 1930s, Phoenix had 
become the second largest city in the southwest but it was in the post-war years that the city 
became a major metropolitan centre of national significance. In 1940, Phoenix had a 
population of 65,000 residents, by 1960, it had reached 440,000 and by 1980 it had reached 
780,000.28 In the two decades following World War II, Phoenix’s economy was transformed 
into a major centre for defence industries, modern electronics, and research and 
development. The city’s boosters were able to persuade corporations such as Motorola and 
Sperry Rand to open plants. Historian Elizabeth Shermer has shown that it was these boosters, 
or ‘grasstops’ as she called them, who made the city’s growth possible. They were a cohort of 
local businessmen who were hostile to the expansion of the state under the New Deal and 
interested in attracting new industry to Phoenix, diversifying the local economy beyond an 
agricultural and mining base.  This generation of businessmen, lawyers, financial services 
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workers, and media men organised through the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce to challenge 
the burgeoning New Deal state in Arizona.  
 
Perhaps the most significant means through which ‘grasstops’ exerted their influence upon 
Phoenix was via the Charter Government Committee (CGC). The Committee was created in 
response to the maladministration, corruption and factionalism of Democratic Party leaders 
in Phoenix City Council. In response, CGC selected a slate of candidates for the 1949 municipal 
elections in Phoenix and dissolved thereafter. Their reforms included the introduction of an 
at-large voting system that elected the Mayor and the Council based on citywide returns. The 
new voting system reduced the power of non-white residents in pockets of the city who could, 
under a district system, elect a candidate to represent their interests. The CGC was 
resurrected approximately three months before each election to Phoenix City Council for the 
next twenty years. They chose candidates from professional occupations to enact an 
ostensibly non-partisan agenda of the city’s best interests rather than pursue partisan favour 
or advantage. CGC-backed candidates were mostly white males who resided in the north 
Phoenix suburbs. The CGC was the dominant force in Phoenix politics between 1949 and the 
early 1970s; none of the candidates it endorsed were defeated. Several influential politicians 
such as Barry Goldwater migrated from the CGC to leading roles in the Arizonan GOP and 
national Republican Party politics. As Phoenix was the state capital, it also served as the centre 
of state Republican politics. Under the direction of these men, the city expanded by 170 
square miles, which meant that by 1960, two thirds of the county’s population lived within 
Phoenix’s jurisdiction, up from one third in 1940. Similar to other municipalities, the city’s 
expansion was achieved through an aggressive annexation policy of incorporating 
surrounding areas.29  
 
CGC politicians and other private sector boosters worked hard to market Phoenix as a modern 
city that was distinctive to other Sunbelt metropolitan centres. This perception was reflected 
in one contemporary account that remarked that ‘Phoenix proclaims itself, with the glare of 
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chrome and glass, new and contemporary.’30 Similarly, Elizabeth Shermer wrote that Phoenix 
boosters comprising ‘retailers, bankers, lawyers, and newsmen began a concerted effort to 
transform Phoenix into a modern metropolis’.31 This model of modernity was based entirely 
upon technological and economic progress, without an accompanying social or racial 
liberalism that Richard Florida later observed in ascendant metropolises.32 State and 
Municipal leaders remained committed to pro-business policies of low rates of taxation, 
limited regulation and reducing the power of organized labour, while expressing limited 
interest in the Great Society’s racial justice agenda.  
 
By the 1960s, CGC candidates retained a firm grip on the institutions of political power in 
Phoenix and the ideology established by grasstops in the 1940s remained pre-eminent.  As 
Shermer argued, a central element in the ascendancy of Barry Goldwater and Phoenix 
grasstops was opposition to the expansion of the state under the New Deal. This politics was 
more complex than a simple, anti-statist rejection of government spending. Instead, they held 
a more nuanced view of the state as a facilitator of a business-friendly environment to attract 
private sector investment. Their view of the role of state was further complicated by its 
expansion in size despite the rhetoric commitments to the contrary by grasstops.33  
 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, these views appear to have hardened. Accompanying the 
rejection of the Great Society racial justice agenda, was a deeper anti-statist opposition to the 
use of government funds for social programs aimed at the poor and racial minorities. Later 
chapters of this thesis show that, by the 1970s, opposition to government social programs 
became deeply ingrained and created barriers for social reform. Initially, this anti-statism was 
evident in the hostility towards bilingual education exhibited by conservative politicians who 
opposed its introduction, sought to narrow its scope and later lobbied for its curtailment. Yet, 
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anti-statism was also a barrier to reform in other policy areas, such as urban development, 
school finance and school construction. The effect was to narrow the contours of debate 
without consideration of alternative policy proposals that may have reduced, rather than 
remade, metropolitan inequality in the decade after 1968.  
 
This thesis argues that the main Great Society program targeted at Latinos, bilingual 
education, was contested by Republicans in Arizona, a contrast from other states in the 
southwest, where GOP politicians were more accommodating. Several historians have 
considered the relationship between Republicans in Arizona and local Mexican Americans. 
Michaela Ann Larkin in particular argued that GOP politicians sought the support of local 
Mexican American voters by displaying posters written in Spanish and adopting election 
platforms that were most attentive to Mexican American concerns.34 It is, however, important 
to distinguish between electioneering and the policies pursued by Republican politicians in 
Phoenix. This study examines the consequences of policies pursued by Republican politicians 
and their effects over the course of a decade to avoid the often misleading focus on election 
cycles occurring every four years. As a result, the following chapters challenge Larkin’s notion 
that the Arizonan GOP was hospitable to Mexican Americans, instead showing that the state 
remained politically conservative on racial issues. These chapters will also argue that 
Republican politicians consistently enacted policies that aimed to maintain the advantages of 
Anglo inhabitants at the expense of Mexican Americans. These trends were particularly true 
in housing and urban development policy, as later chapters will show.  
 
Between 1950 and the early 1960s, several trends reshaped the landscape of metropolitan 
Phoenix. Housing stock was remade entirely as 67,000 homes, encompassing 85 per cent of 
new housing construction, were built in outlying areas.35 Nicholas Di Taranto stated that 
31,000 homes were built in North Phoenix, backed by Federal Housing Association (FHA) 
loans, agreed on terms that excluded African Americans and Mexican Americans. These 
trends also altered the distribution of the population: fully 80 per cent of the city’s residents 
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lived north of Van Buren St., the line of demarcation between north Phoenix and the inner 
city. During the same period, the density of neighbourhoods in Phoenix decreased from 6,000 
to 2,000 people per square mile, precipitating the hollowing out of the inner city.36 However, 
by the late 1960s, the CGC’s power had begun to wane and the forces that had propelled the 
CGC to unbridled success were dissipating. For example, as the city’s population expanded to 
581,000 in 1970, the at-large voting system became untenable. Divergent interest groups 
demanded different priorities from the Council and increasingly visible minority rights groups 
challenged the ability of elite political actors to impose their will on non-white groups whilst 
remaining unresponsive to their demands.37  
 
Despite analyzing the growth of the city and the political forces that enabled it, historians 
have yet to fully capture the social costs of Phoenix’s development model. Andrew Needham 
highlighted the environmental costs of the city’s need for cheap electricity to power air 
conditioning units, without which Phoenix would have been an altogether less appealing 
location for prospective residents. The growth of metropolitan Phoenix required inordinate 
quantities of coal reserves and coal plants on the Navajo Reservation, north of the city. Power 
plants and distribution lines disrupted the reservation, mining techniques polluted the lands 
and Navajos lived in poverty, all in the service of consumers in Phoenix.38 Although Pete Dimas 
examined how the decision to expand Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport effected residents of the 
Golden Gate Barrio in south Phoenix, he did not capture the range of ways planning decisions 
adversely impacted Mexican Americans.39  
 
Both African Americans and Mexican Americans were excluded from new housing 
developments in north Phoenix; borrowing for home improvements was restricted by the 
assumptions of private sector lenders who refused to grant loans to inner city applicants. Yet, 
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boosters in Phoenix often contrasted the city with other metropolitan centres in the North 
and Midwest such as Chicago or Detroit. Unlike these regions, Phoenix was not beholden to 
a patronage based political machine or political commitments to working class 
neighbourhoods with heavy industries. Phoenix boosters marketed themselves, and sought 
to attract new corporate investment, on the basis that it was a modern Sunbelt centre. 
Shermer argued that boosters ‘never publicly declared themselves against investment that 
relied on an immigrant, low-skill, or low-wage labor pool’. Instead they designed their model 
of political economy to appeal to Anglo suburban families who shared the elite’s 
predilections. ‘This kind of industrial recruitment also protected their reputation for 
moderate civil rights policies, even in a city with well-defined color lines.’40 
 
How did this fit with regional patterns? One set of observers of U.S. politics remarked at the 
time that ‘Phoenix is one of those instant cities that lie in what Kevin Phillips calls the Sun 
Belt.’41 Recent works in the field of metropolitan, and political history have expanded our 
understanding of the Sunbelt and its significance to U.S. political trends in the post-war era. 
Elizabeth Shermer argued that several metropolitan areas across the south and southwest 
exhibited similar characteristics, justifying their categorization as a single Sunbelt region. 
 
‘The Sunbelt was at one time a distinct region, which included those southern and 
southwestern metropolises that transcended their region’s old commodity-based economies 
and traditional power structures. Such cities included Atlanta, Austin, Charlotte, Dallas-Fort 
Worth, Denver, Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham, 
Reston, San Diego and San Jose.’42 
 
Historians have, however, disputed the analytical utility of the concept of a Sunbelt for 
understanding the transformation of U.S. politics in the post-war years. The title of a recent 
review asked Is There a Sunbelt After All? And Should We Care? 43 The idea of a ‘Sun Belt 
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Phenomenon’ was introduced into the popular and scholarly lexicon by Kevin Phillips in his 
1969 book The Emerging Republican Majority. Phillips had worked on Richard Nixon’s 1968 
presidential campaign and following Nixon’s victory he analysed what the results meant for 
the future of American politics. Phillips argued that a realignment was underway that would 
end the electoral potency of the New Deal Order, replacing it with a coalition of the white 
middle-classes who had moved from the Northeast and Midwest to live in the suburbs of the 
‘Florida-California Sun Country.’ This pattern of migration would create ‘a new conservative 
political era in the South, Southwest and Heartland.’44 Drawn to the warm climate, low cost 
of living, employment opportunities in high tech industry and commerce, a significant number 
of the American middle class relocated to the south and southwest, a geographic region that 
Phillips defined as ‘best exemplified by California, Arizona, Florida, and Texas’.45  
 
In recent years, scholars have resurrected the idea of a Sunbelt to explain the emergence of 
a new model of political economy, which reshaped modern U.S. politics and society.46 Others, 
however, have disagreed. For example, Andrew Highsmith argued that ‘[i]n reality, though, 
neither the Rust Belt nor the Sunbelt has ever been a coherent geographic region.’47 This 
dissertation accepts that the Sunbelt has limitations as an analytical concept. Despite the 
differences between individual metropolitan regions, there was a governing ethos and 
attributes that marked cities of the south and southwest as distinctive from those in the urban 
north. On the question of race, the differences between the Sunbelt and other areas are less 
clear. Despite the marketing of several cities as being free of racial tension - in the case of 
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Atlanta, as Kevin Kruse has shown, this was based upon the phrase ‘the City Too Busy to Hate’ 
- racial segregation was prevalent throughout the U.S.48  
 
There is an absence in the Sunbelt literature, and metropolitan history more broadly, of 
studies that examine the experiences of Mexican Americans. Apart from a small number of 
exceptions, Sunbelt histories have focused upon segregation, desegregation and resistance, 
defined by a division between a white majority and African American minority.49 Recent works 
that have placed Phoenix in a Sunbelt regional context have largely overlooked the 
relationship between the city’s model of political economy and the city’s largest racial 
minority group, Mexican Americans.  Yet, perhaps the economic dynamism of Phoenix and 
the perception that it was a modern place because it developed an economic model based on 
hi tech industries, masked the social and racial inequalities in the city. Despite a voluminous 
Sunbelt literature, there has been little historical consideration of Mexican American 
experiences and how municipal administrations in the Sunbelt governed metropolises with a 
significant Mexican American population. 
 
The position of Mexican Americans in the southwest had been fluid and uncertain since the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Under the terms of the Treaty, anyone living in the 
ceded or annexed territory could remain a Mexican citizen or become an American citizen 
after a year. Laura Gomez argued that the collective naturalization of Mexicans meant that 
they were legally defined as white citizens.50 Yet, Mexicans and Mexican Americans were 
socially constructed as a non-white race and subject to discriminatory practises. In his study 
of Mexican Americans, African Americans, and poor whites in the central Texas cotton 
industry, Neil Foley demonstrated the ambiguity of Mexican Americans’ racial status, and the 
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racial formation processes that shaped it. Mexican Americans, he argued, ‘walked the color 
line’. A large number were recruited to work in the agricultural sector but were viewed by 
Anglos in Texas as being non-white and not able assimilate into mainstream society. Over 
time, Foley observed that many Mexican Americans were situated in a middle ground, not 
considered white enough to be equal with Anglos but spared the worst abuses of the Jim 
Crow south.51 Being classified as legally white, whilst simultaneously being subject to 
processes of racialized exclusion, has complicated historical perceptions of Mexican 
Americans’ lived experiences. Whether Mexican Americans were subject to de jure or de facto 
segregation is unclear, something that the experience of Phoenix typifies. For example, in 
1909, the school board introduced a policy of educating African Americans at a separate, 
segregated, institution. The policy was upheld by the Arizona State Supreme Court in 1912; in 
their ruling the court cited the prevailing ‘separate but equal’ standard of the time. Eastlake 
and Ninth Avenue elementary schools served all African American enrolments. Arizona law 
stipulated that once a high school had more than 25 students of ‘African descent’, a district 
could vote to establish a separate school for them to attend. Phoenix decided to introduce 
segregated high schooling, beginning with an annex on the campus of PUHS in 1925, and then 
a separate institution, George Washington Carver School, from 1926. These conditions 
persisted until 1953, when the Arizona Supreme Court ordered schools to desegregate.52 
Mexican Americans were often educated in separate classrooms and sometimes separate 
buildings during this period, although this was based more upon informal methods than 
established legal doctrine. Bradford Luckingham has shown that Mexican Americans in 
Phoenix were also segregated in theatres, swimming pools and restaurants. Local lending 
institutions refused to grant loans to Mexican Americans, whilst ‘[f]ederal policies and loans 
also failed to encourage decent single-family housing development in poor neighborhoods; 
the government preferred to invest in new suburban house construction.’53 As a result, many 
Mexican Americans lacked the mobility to relocate to other areas of Phoenix. In 1970, there 
were 81,239 Mexican Americans in the Phoenix metropolitan area, although many were 
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agricultural workers residing in the open spaces at the city’s periphery.54 The majority of 
Mexican Americans who lived within the urban core, resided in some of the city’s most 
deprived neighbourhoods with the highest rates of poverty. Inner city and south Phoenix 
areas were often chosen as sites for heavy and polluting industries by political and business 
elites who wished to keep suburban areas free of unseemly environmental practises. This led 
one group of scholars to argue that ‘[s]ocio-spatial discrimination against Latinos was more 
pronounced in Phoenix than other Southwestern cities in the region that originated as 
Spanish colonial and Mexican settlements.’55 
 
In the 1970s, politicians in Phoenix blamed continued residential segregation and disparities 
between Mexican Americans and Anglos on de facto segregation. However, recent works by 
historians have questioned whether de facto segregation emanated from the natural 
functions of private housing markets and whether a meaningful distinction can be made 
between events in the south from events elsewhere. The notion of de facto segregation 
originated in discourse during the civil rights era to distinguish between segregation in the 
south, considered to be de jure, and that of other regions, considered de facto. Education 
officials in Phoenix, similar to their counterparts in the north, utilised this defence, arguing 
segregation was derived from individual actions in private markets such as housing. This was 
in comparison to de jure segregation, which was formally enshrined in law. A distinction 
between two types of segregation was reinforced by the U.S. Congress in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. The Act stated that ‘desegregation shall not mean the assignment of students to 
public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.’56 The Supreme Court supported this 
premise in the 1970 case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg County. Matthew Lassiter 
argued that the emergence of a  
 
‘race-neutral defense of segregated neighborhood schools, in combination with the political 
backlash against the open-housing movement, exposed the hard truth that a national 
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consensus for substantial racial integration had never existed, beyond the difficult enough 
struggle to intervene against the worst excesses of Jim Crow in the South.57’ 
 
This powerful national mythology that de facto segregation was an unavoidable consequence 
of free markets, enabled education officials and policymakers in Phoenix to avoid meaningful 
action to reduce racial inequality in the city. 
 
One starting point for this thesis is Lassiter’s critique of de facto segregation. A rich 
scholarship has since taken up Lassiter’s call to deconstruct the de facto / de jure framework, 
which he argued was a social and political construct that did little to identify the state action 
that shaped private markets.58 Historians have identified a myriad of intentional public 
policies that segregated neighbourhoods, whilst restricting non-whites ability to access 
housing in suburbs throughout the U.S. Similar to metropolitan areas throughout the U.S., the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) subsidised housing construction in Phoenix. Their 
regulations caused segregated neighbourhoods to proliferate by prioritizing the construction 
of single-family dwellings in suburban areas, as opposed to funding renovations or the 
construction of multi-unit properties, more likely to be found in urban areas. The FHA lending 
manual discouraged the underwriting of loans for properties in integrated areas on the basis 
that racially mixed neighbourhoods were a threat to property valuations. 59 In American 
Babylon, Robert Self argued that historians should analyse urban and suburban areas 
together, and the ways they shaped each other, as part of a metropolitan framework. Other 
historians have followed, highlighting that patterns of relocation considered to be white flight 
were often motivated as much by pull factors offered by the suburbs as much as push factors 
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away from urban areas.60 Yet, until recently, this literature largely overlooked the role of 
schools in metropolitan development, which ensured the persistence of several inaccurate 
understandings about the relationships between schools, housing and segregation. Ansley 
Erickson argued that although the notion of de facto segregation in housing has been 
dispelled by scholars, it remained influential in how scholars understood the causes of 
segregation. Erickson argued that this obscured the relationship between schools, housing, 
and segregation. As a result, scholars have failed to understand the importance of issues such 
as school site selection and the drawing of attendance boundaries to deepen both 
neighbourhood and school segregation.61   
 
Several recent works have begun to integrate schooling into metropolitan histories, 
demonstrating as Andrew Highsmith argued, that ‘segregation in the modern United States 
has virtually always proceeded from some combination of statutory and legal requirements, 
the discriminatory administration or implementation of public policies and programs, and 
popular forces.’62 In her book, Making the Unequal Metropolis, Erickson demonstrated that 
discussions about school desegregation remedies focused upon appeasing white interests. 
She concluded that ‘local school and municipal officials alongside federal officials and judges 
repeatedly made choices about desegregation that privileged suburban, usually white schools 
and communities and undermined urban, usually black schools and communities.’63 
 
In combination, the scholars mentioned above have created a sophisticated body of literature 
that has vastly expanded historical understandings of metropolitan areas, the processes of 
segregation that made these places unequal, and contests over desegregation efforts. 
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However, scholars have typically examined locations where discrimination has been 
perpetuated by a dominant white population upon an African American minority. There is no 
extensive study that has applied these methods and insights to a population centre containing 
a high number of Mexican American inhabitants. Although several studies of Mexican 
Americans published in the early 1990s can be categorised as urban histories, they mostly 
explore the early twentieth century.64 Yet, these studies are bereft of the new methods such 
as Ansley Erickson’s identification of the importance of schools to local economic and political 
interests. These are important innovations for the study of education in metropolitan regions, 
and applying these methods to Phoenix will provide a more sophisticated understanding of 
the lived experience of Mexican Americans in the city. This study also demonstrates how the 
methods that circumscribed the lives of African Americans in places such as Detroit, Oakland, 
Atlanta, Charlotte, and Miami, amongst others, were utilised in Phoenix, despite efforts to 
market the city as being distinct from the south and urban north. The experience of Phoenix 
in the 1970s also brings greater clarity to the idea of Mexican Americans as a racial group 
situated in between African Americans and whites. Mexican Americans were, to adapt a term 
from Aihwa Ong, subjected to browning processes that distinguished them as a non-white 




This thesis utilises different historical methods to understand the politics of education, urban 
history and the racial formation of Mexican Americans in Phoenix during the 1970s. All of the 
following chapters deploy, at least in part, methods conventionally associated with political 
and policy history to understand the development of bilingual education. These are most 
prevalent in the first two chapters but as the first chapter also discusses internal Mexican 
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American political thought it draws from methods developed in the fields of racial and ethnic 
history. One of the main arguments that this thesis makes is that studies with a singular focus 
upon bilingual education have not captured the range of forces that influenced Mexican 
American educational attainment and, therefore, deliver an incomplete assessment of the 
policy. The third chapter of this study introduces methods from urban history to highlight how 
metropolitan development in Phoenix was orchestrated through a combination of state 
action in Phoenix City Council and non-state actors such as real estate brokers. In 
combination, they shaped the composition of neighbourhoods and in turn the composition 
of school enrolments. Urban history methods are expanded in chapter four, to include a 
discussion of school site selection. Similar studies of a particular metropolitan region have 
focussed upon the actions and policies of a single institution of state power. This is often a 
municipal body such as a City Council, sometimes with analyses of how it interacted with the 
institutions of the surrounding county. This study differs from the model used by scholars of 
metropolitan histories. Instead, it adopts a holistic approach that simultaneously examines 
multiple institutions that shaped the lives and experiences of Mexican Americans. Moving 
between decisions made at federal, state, and local levels enables a comprehensive 
understanding of how a policy initiative such as bilingual education was both enhanced and 
undermined by different institutions of state power.  
 
The first chapter begins by focusing upon the actions of the federal government, whose 
imprint upon this study is apparent in two ways: firstly, through its enactment of a federal 
Bilingual Education Act; secondly, through guidelines it published about where schools should 
be constructed, which were highly influential upon municipal decisions about the location of 
new schools. Although these actions were years apart, and by different branches of the 
federal government, both were catalysts for change in state and local institutions. As a result, 
this thesis then examines the role of the state government of Arizona and the Arizona 
Legislature, both of which were critical elements in the introduction of bilingual education 
programs to more than just a handful of students in Arizonan public schools. Within Arizona, 
there is a diffuse structure of governance with multiple bodies responsible for the different 
elements of public policy that this study examines. For example, decisions about the 
resources available for schools to implement language instruction were taken by state level 
authorities; spending appropriations by the Arizona Legislature and administration decisions 
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by the Arizona Department of Education. Under the Arizona Constitution, the Governor has 
little executive authority, meaning that its occupant was required to rule through consensus 
or the bully pulpit. In the case of bilingual education, both Governors Williams and Castro 
could only express an opinion on the policy because they had no power to unilaterally 
introduce the program in Arizonan schools. The implementation of bilingual education was 
also influenced by a number of state and local education bodies. This study also examines the 
importance of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of Education 
to the implementation of bilingual education. To fully understand other decisions that shaped 
the lives and educational performance of Mexican Americans, this study examined decisions 
made by municipal level institutions such as Phoenix City Council and Phoenix Union High 
School District (PUHSD). The Council’s decisions had a significant impact upon where housing 
was developed and where schools were constructed. The PUHSD Board made decisions that 
curtailed the influence of educational remedies that could have equalized the effects of 
discriminatory neighbourhood construction policies. On occasion, this study also examines 
the actions of individual school boards, especially PUHS. To fully understand the effects of 
bilingual education, its limits, and the continued attainment gap between Mexican Americans 




Examining different institutions presented significant evidentiary challenges. The state of 
Arizona has weak laws governing the collection and archiving of government documents. This 
means that the official archives in the state capitol are less than comprehensive and records 
of the Arizona Legislature are extremely limited. Although there are significant records from 
Phoenix City Council up until 1965, information on the period that followed is partial. In order 
to understand the forces that shaped the city’s politics between 1968-1980, required a 
piecing together of records held across different archival collections. The chapters that follow 
are based on archival materials from the Arizona State Archives, multiple archives at Arizona 
State University, and the Arizona Historical Society. As a result of limited information about 
the internal deliberative processes of Phoenix City Council, this thesis can rely only on the 
Council’s eventual decisions and its publications. This makes motive difficult to discern and 
means that the chapter that focuses extensively on Council urban development policy draws 
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conclusions from the nature of the Council from the content of its decisions. Analyses of the 
PUHSD and The State Board of Education are based upon materials drawn from the papers of 
Governor Jack Williams in the Arizona State Archives and the unprocessed collection of 
Carolyn Warner papers at Arizona State University. Although these materials provide an 
incomplete account of the PUHSD Board, they do provide an important insight into the 
decisions of a highly influential institution at a time when decisions about educational 
remedies were made. Where necessary, this thesis has used newspaper accounts to fill the 
gaps left by incomplete archival records. Often PUHSD decisions were taken at public 
meetings or arguments about its future were made as part of public discourse, meaning that 
there are substantial records of public remarks by key figures. In particular, chapter 5, which 
considers the PUHSD board’s approach to the policy questions of busing and open enrolment, 
makes significant use of newspaper sources from the Arizona Republic. 
 
A theme of every chapter in this thesis is to highlight the depth of discrimination against 
Mexican Americans and its prevalence as a force in Phoenix politics. It is, however, important 
to define the type of racial discrimination that the following chapters chronicle. There is little 
evidence of political figures or policymakers expressing overtly prejudicial statements. 
Although there were some instances of public officials and newspaper editorials expressing 
the kind of racial panic about a changing of American demographics or culture, it was not a 
common component of the city’s political discourse. Instead, this thesis argues that public 
policy, and the private real estate practices they shaped, prioritized Anglo interests and 
sought to maintain the advantages they had accrued over previous generations. Yet, it was 
no less insidious than the visceral racism which has attracted much scholarly attention.66 
 
As a result, this thesis is not focused upon correcting mistaken historical interpretations but 
connecting previously the separate historiographies of bilingual education, urban 
development and school segregation, to show their relevance to each other. Scholars in these 
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fields, many of them cited in subsequent paragraphs discussing historiographical 
interpretations, have produced seminal works that this thesis does not seek to dispute. It aims 
instead to take the historiographies of education, urban development and race, particularly 
as it relates to Mexican American racial formation, in new directions by considering source 
materials in a particular political and geographic context that scholars have not previously 




With regard to terminology, I follow Natalia Mehlman Petrzela’s formulation of using ‘white’ 
interchangeably with ‘Anglo’, which has a regionally specific meaning in the southwest. I 
mainly use ‘Mexican American’, but sometimes intersperse with ‘Latino’, as Latinos in Arizona 
were almost entirely of Mexican origin. ‘Spanish-surnamed’, ‘Spanish-speaking’, and ‘Spanish 
American’ are used only when contemporaneous actors used them. ‘Chicano’ was a self-
conscious political identity and I use it only when historical actors did so to refer to 
themselves. The term ‘Hispanic’ was created by U.S. Census. I use it sparingly and only when 
individuals did so themselves. I am sympathetic to recent efforts to adopt the term ‘Latinx’ or 
‘Latin@’, as a means of challenging the gendered nature of the Spanish language. However, I 
do not use them in this dissertation. Instead, I adhere to the terms ‘Mexican American’ and 
‘Latino’, to ensure both clarity and continuity with the historical subjects examined in my 
work.67 Where a distinction between Mexican Americans and other racial groups is not 
possible or the subject matter is relevant to both, I use ‘non-white’. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
This dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter one examines the debates amongst Mexican 
Americans in Arizona about bilingual education ignited by federal legislation and protests at 
PUHS. The chapter shows that these debates became wider ranging than discussions about 
the pedagogical benefits of teaching Mexican American students in Spanish. For some, 
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bilingual education became a method of resisting and overturning over a century of Anglo 
domination that circumscribed the use of a language native to the area. The precursor to 
bilingual education was a strict English Only policy that prohibited the use of Spanish in public 
schools. This chapter argues that debates over the use of Spanish in schools should be 
understood not simply as an early skirmish in the burgeoning culture wars, but within a 
lineage of ‘racial nationalism’ that disciplined those constructed as non-white citizens until 
they were deemed worthy of inclusion into the polity. Its removal was, therefore, more 
significant than previously thought. Yet, Mexican Americans in Arizona were not a monolithic 
group of uniform opinion. Prominent individuals such as Eugene Marin challenged an 
emergent Chicano politics, complicating historical understandings of Mexican American 
politics and identities during the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
Chapter Two examines the policy history of bilingual education in Arizona, beginning with its 
passage and continuing through the first ten years of its implementation. It shows that new 
rights and opportunities granted under the federal Bilingual Education Act were difficult to 
access for all but a small number of Mexican Americans in Phoenix. The main consequence of 
the Act was to end the State Legislature’s inertia on the matter and pass state legislation that 
would enable thousands of Mexican American students to obtain language education. Unlike 
in California or in the U.S. Congress, there was limited bipartisan support for the program. It 
was contested throughout its drafting, and its survival beyond its first two years was 
uncertain. Governor Jack Williams and Superintendent of Public Instruction, Weldon Sofstall, 
both Republicans, delivered warm words about the program but little meaningful action in 
the face of a worsening Mexican American education attainment gap. Their decision to demur 
on expanding the program or introducing any other policies to remedy inequalities in 
education challenges the notion that the Arizona GOP took the Mexican American political 
agenda seriously during this period. Yet, the program became entrenched in the state 
education bureaucracy and expanded throughout the 1970s, by the decade’s end serving over 
20,000 Mexican American students in the state. 
 
Scholars have argued that the federal Bilingual Education Act obtained bipartisan support in 
the U.S. Congress because of ‘issue convergence’ between liberal and conservative politicians 
on the challenge of reducing rates of poverty amongst Latinos. The experience of Arizona 
35 
 
questions the extent to which there was a convergence and how long it lasted. However, 
subsequent chapters of this thesis explore the barriers to reducing rates of poverty amongst 
Latinos in Phoenix, the ways that systemic inequality was created, and how interventions by 
the organs of municipal government remade that inequality during the early 1970s. Chapter 
three begins by explaining Phoenix City Council’s urban development policy during the late 
1960s and 1970s.  It demonstrates that the end of the 1960s and early 1970s was a period of 
uncertainty in which Phoenix politicians and policymakers sought to retain the way of life the 
city had cultivated since the 1940s. They did so through a number of planning documents that 
indicated the Phoenix City Council Planning Department’s preferences for development 
between 1970 and 1990. Despite clear evidence of substandard housing, high rates of 
poverty, and poor educational attainment in the inner city and south Phoenix areas, the 
Council continued to prioritise development in outlying areas of the city.  Scholars have 
documented the wave of suburbanization during the 1940s and 1950s that reshaped urban 
areas across the U.S.  Phoenix conformed to these patterns. But the remaking of inequality in 
the 1970s challenges the perception that these trends were limited to that period and 
highlights how policymakers were committed to preserving the Anglo advantages accrued 
over generations. In the post-war years, the City Council had been able to pursue its model of 
political economy and urban development by preventing interest groups or electoral 
coalitions from challenging the dominance of a business and political elite. This chapter 
argues that by the mid-1970s the consensus within the city about the benefits of growth and 
the ability of elite political figures to contain dissenting opinion had waned. Over subsequent 
years, members of the City Council struggled to negotiate the opposing forces of Anglo 
homeowner populism and minority rights groups who became increasingly vocal. 
 
The development of the urban landscape created the general context for schooling, 
entrenching non-white populations in deprived neighbourhoods and reducing the revenue 
raising opportunities for inner city schools. Chapter Four examines two issues that had a 
significant impact on educational inequality in Phoenix; how schools were financed and where 
they were built. Schools in Arizona were funded in the most part through levies on local 
property owners in a school district. This model created significant disparities between 
districts, but this chapter argues it was the threat of Anglo homeowner populism that 
motivated the Arizona State Legislature to act. Debates about proposed reforms to school 
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finance focused on the need to reduce tax burdens on residents in suburban neighbourhoods, 
not the longstanding complaints of educators that the existing school finance regime caused 
urban schools to be at a significant disadvantage to those in outlying areas. The reforms that 
the Legislature eventually passed increased the role of the state government in the funding 
of local education, reversing longstanding doctrines about the importance of limited state 
intervention in education. The second half of the chapter demonstrates the instrumental role 
of the municipal government in decisions about where to build schools in Phoenix. Drawing 
upon earlier federal guidelines that prioritised the building of new schools in suburban 
settings, planners in Phoenix expressed preferences for future school construction to occur 
away from the inner city. These decisions were made in spite of evidence of overcrowding in 
south Phoenix and the inner city, in addition to schools in these areas being some of the oldest 
in PUHSD, often in a state of disrepair. This chapter shows that the experience of Phoenix 
aligns with Ansley Erickson’s findings in Nashville, Tennessee. It concurs with her argument 
that the issue of school construction demonstrates how municipal government figures were 
influential in causing families to relocate away from the inner city, not simply responding to 
trends in the private housing markets. The result was to undermine inner city and south 
Phoenix schools, causing a funding and racial integration crisis by the end of the 1970s. 
 
Chapter five considers debates in Phoenix about possible remedies to alleviate the increasing 
concentration of non-whites in inner city schools, in contrast to the overwhelmingly white 
north Phoenix suburbs. The chapter will demonstrate that education officials were forced to 
consider methods to reduce the concentration of non-white students in PUHS, North High 
and East High. PUHSD officials refused to countenance the use of busing to achieve racial 
balance. Instead, they introduced a policy of open enrolment, which removed a previous 
requirement that students attend the high school closest to where they lived. Open 
enrolment was initially supported by parents of non-white students at PUHS on the basis that 
it would provide the option to attend a superior school. Their support was contingent upon 
PUHSD funding the cost of transportation. Yet, when PUHSD announced the introduction of 
the policy they refused to transport of students who wished to change their enrolment. The 
result was to accelerate the movement of white students away from inner city schools, 
creating greater imbalances in the distribution of PUHSD’s non-white population across its 
schools. This was apparent within two years of the policy’s introduction but PUHSD refused 
37 
 
to amend open enrolment, again prioritising the demands of Anglo parents over those of non-
white residents. The result of these decisions was a school closure crisis in which PUHSD 
officials were forced to shut inner city schools to address an ever increasing budget deficit. 
Ultimately, it was only the intervention of a federal court judge that ended the open 
enrolment program, as part of a package of reforms that included the closures of PUHS and 
East High. This incident, in combination with the issues discussed in preceding chapters, 
shows that bilingual education failed as a remedial measure to improve the educational 
attainment of Mexican Americans. This thesis argues that it failed because it was hampered 
by concurrent policies concerning urban development, school construction and finance, and 


























Internal Mexican American Debates 
 
In September 1969 Mexican Americans in Phoenix arranged a series of demonstrations to 
protest about the conditions at PUHS. Students of PUHS at that time, the largest high school 
in Phoenix’s only high school district, were likely to be non-white or poor, often both. Fully 
half of the enrolment was Mexican American which meant that, in combination with African 
Americans, the minority enrolment of the school was almost 88 per cent of students. The 
school’s attendance boundaries encompassed the mainly deprived South Phoenix 
neighbourhoods. This created challenges for the school administration. The Principal of PUHS, 
Robert Dye, believed that more than 50 per cent of the enrolment was from families living 
below the poverty line.68 The deprivation of local neighbourhoods was such that many of the 
students attending PUHS struggled even to meet the costs of attending school. Such was the 
financial need that PUHS had been soliciting private contributions to a student welfare 
program, which by 1969, had received $12,000 in donations. The program provided student 
aid grants for bus tickets, lunch money and the cost of books. Robert Dye estimated that 
approximately 200 students needed lunch and/or transportation money. To serve the needs 
of students drawn from poverty-stricken neighbourhoods, PUHS required $30,000 in 
donations.69 According to several different metrics, the education outcomes for Mexican 
American students were inferior to their white peers. The number of Mexican American 
children who entered the first grade but did not graduate from high school was estimated to 
be at least 50 per cent. Less than one per cent of Mexican American children beginning the 
first grade would go on to obtain a college degree.70 At the time of the 1960 census, the typical 
Mexican American above the age of 25 had completed 7.1 years of schooling. Mexican 
Americans between the ages of 14 and 24 had typically completed 9.1 years of schooling. This 
was similar to the number obtained by African Americans (9.0 years), but both trailed Anglos 
who completed 12.1 school years on average. The Arizona Department of Education was also 
concerned about the problem of ‘mental drop-outs’, a categorization that applied to 
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approximately one fifth of Mexican American children. These were students who ‘attend 
school physically’ but ‘they have not achieved nor are they presently achieving a quality of 
education that will in all likelihood significantly improve their socio-economic condition.’71 
 
This was a local manifestation of a far more general challenge. Recognising that challenge, 
the liberal Democrat Senator Ralph Yarlborough (D-TX) introduced the federal Bilingual 
Education Act of 1968 as a solution to Mexican American under-attainment in schools. The 
effects of the Act were, however, somewhat underwhelming, as Congress appropriated a 
relatively small amount of funds to the program - $7.5 million initially, which rose to $75 
million within four years. Yet, as Historian Natalia Mehlman Petrzela has argued, it contained 
important symbolic meaning as the first federal commitment to language minorities in the 
U.S.72 Whilst U.S. Senators debated the provisions of the Bilingual Education Act, Mexican 
Americans in Arizona considered the measure and its possible impact upon their standing 
within the state’s politics and society. The debates raised four main arguments. The first was 
that bilingual education was one element in a larger strategy of enhancing bilingualism in 
general as a means of encouraging greater cultural and historical pride amongst Mexican 
Americans. Some proponents of this argument believed that bilingual instruction represented 
an important challenge to the state’s long history of restricting Spanish use as a means of 
control and ensuring the dominance of English. Some of the contributors from Arizona to a 
study of the condition of Mexican Americans in the Southwest believed it was important for 
Mexican Americans to pursue the truly bilingual-bicultural society that had been curtailed by 
colonial conquest. This chapter argues that English Only should be considered as more than a 
narrow pedagogical technique. It was, instead, an instrument of a racial state that 
circumscribed the lives of language minorities similar to other regulations that structured 
labour markets, voting rights, and immigration laws. In turn, Mexican Americans in Arizona 
who made the above arguments demonstrated that education policy, in contrast to David 
Gutierrez’s findings in southern California, was the formative element in shaping Mexican 
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American identities and defining internal debates. 73 A second group made an argument most 
closely associated with the intentions of those who drafted the Bilingual Education Act: an 
instrumentalist argument that focused on the need to teach Mexican American students in 
Spanish to improve rates of educational attainment and enhance their career prospects.  
 
Thirdly, the public discourse in Arizona surrounding bilingual education and minority rights 
included interventions from vocal detractors. One point of contention was between Mexican 
Americans who believed in a more accommodationist approach to racial progress, and 
Chicano activists who rejected the status quo, which they argued was based upon Anglo 
cultural hegemony. One prominent figure who advocated in favour of a more 
accommodationist approach was Eugene Marin. He rose from a teaching post in the Phoenix 
Elementary School District, which he held for 16 years to being appointed Director of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity in Arizona. His role in the state government made him 
arguably the most influential Mexican American in Arizona at that time. In 1972, Eugene 
Marin went on to serve as the state chairman of the Mexican American Committee to Re-
elect the President, stepping down only after being appointed to a role at Arizona State 
University that precluded political campaigning.74 Yet, the internal debates amongst Mexican 
Americans following the walkout at PUHS complicates some of the long-standing historical 
arguments that have defined this field for decades. One example was the perception that the 
Chicano activism of the 1960s and 1970s was a radical juncture from an earlier Mexican 
American politics of assimilation to Anglo culture and society.75 Just as historians have since 
found that the rupture caused by Chicano political activism was not as dramatic as has been 
assumed and the previous generation were not as accommodating as scholars had previously 
characterized them, the survival of accommodationist thought blurs the notion of a 
generational divide.76  
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To observe Mexican Americans in Phoenix and the emergence of political activism by self-
proclaimed Chicanos, is to see that debates about what it meant to be a Mexican American 
were far from settled.77 Several historians have analysed the causes of the 1969 protests and 
chronicled the events of the walkout.78 Collectively, these scholars have highlighted the 
protests as a seminal moment for Chicanos in Phoenix, which consolidated the local Chicano 
movement. Yet, there is another element to these events that has not been fully examined. 
After the walkout by students at PUHS, internal conflicts about Mexican American identity 
were made public when Eugene Marin wrote a series of articles in the Arizona Republic 
ruminating on the topic. The effect was to force these topics to the forefront of discourse 
about Mexican American racial identity and politics. Marin was a member of the Vesta Club, 
an exclusive group of college graduates within Phoenix. The restrictive entry criteria for 
membership of the Vesta Club and their emphasis upon standards of behaviour suggests that 
social class mixed with a generational divide, in which older Mexican Americans advocated a 
more conservative racial politics than younger Chicanos, to distinguish Vesta from other 
Mexican Americans. Although the two groups had different politics and believed in different 
strategies, they both sought to improve the condition of Mexican Americans in Phoenix. 
Responses to Marin’s articles highlighted that though these questions may have been re-
ignited by the protests at PUHS and broader Chicano activism, they were still topics of 
uncertainty for ordinary Mexican Americans. Some wrote to Marin in response to his Arizona 
Republic articles about the dilemmas they faced in defining themselves, others expressed 
ambivalence. Together, they indicate that any neat categorization along generational lines of 
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questions about what it meant to be a Mexican American is complicated by the experiences 
of Mexican Americans in Phoenix. 
 
The fourth element in Mexican American public discourse during this period was a positional 
politics in which minority spokespersons seek public roles and status by creating agendas 
accentuating minority perspectives. Several of the organisers of the protests at PUHS and 
Mexican American activism in Phoenix subsequently sought elected office to school boards, 
the Arizona Legislature and the U.S. Congress. Yet both vocal organisers at PUHS, in south 
Phoenix, and those who sought elected office articulated a minority politics that was 
distinctive from other Chicano groups in the southwest. In Phoenix, Mexican American and 
Chicano activists challenged the Anglo status quo but they did so in a manner that was shorn 
of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that was central to Chicano activism in Los Angeles.79 
 
Collectively, these arguments present an altogether more complex account of both internal 
Mexican American and Arizonan politics. It was one in which both liberals and conservatives 
sought to make sense of the new rights granted by the U.S. Congress. Yet, Mexican Americans 
and Chicanos involved in the protests at PUHS had to negotiate a contradiction that they were 
seemingly unaware of. Chicanos defined their politics as non-assimilationist, rejecting the 
Americanization programs that they believed previous generations had been more willing to 
accommodate. Instead, they sought to promote Mexican American cultural pride, and 
achieve greater public representations of their histories. Yet, they sought to achieve this 
through the institution of the schoolhouse, which nation states throughout the world had 
utilized as a tool of cultural integration since the early nineteenth century.   
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the context surrounding the PUHS protests in 1969 
and 1970. From there it explains the long history of restrictions upon the use of Spanish in 
Arizona before explaining, sequentially, the four points of debates listed above.  
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Phoenix Union High School 
 
The conditions at PUHS worried education officials, who had observed other U.S. cities 
descend into racial strife and civil unrest throughout the 1960s. Officials were concerned that 
Phoenix might ignite in the event of a sufficiently powerful spark. As a result, leading members 
of the PUHSD Board urged other members to consider introducing reforms to improve 
educational opportunities for minority students and thereby forestall possible discord. When 
PUHS opened for the new school year in the fall of 1967, Superintendent of PUHSD, Howard 
Seymour, explained the pressing need for action to alleviate poverty and educational 
underachievement. He had been unsettled by rioting throughout the summer of 1967 in 
urban settings such as Newark and Detroit. Similar disturbances in south Phoenix had resulted 
in over 200 arrests.80 He declared that ‘It is time for action . . . Words are no longer acceptable. 
Groups of people throughout the nation’s cities are restless, many are unemployed, many 
underemployed.’ Seymour also connected urban civil disorder to educational 
underachievement amongst minority students. ‘The conditions of unemployment, restricted 
housing and inappropriate education constitute the seedbed for violence, unrest, and active 
resistance.’ Concerned about a possible escalation without action, he noted that Phoenix, 
‘although possibly better off than some cities throughout the nation, is equally vulnerable.’ 81  
 
In August and September 1969, when a series of racial incidents occurred on the campus of 
PUHS, causing Mexican American students to organise protests, PUHSD leaders feared that 
the incidents could be a catalyst for widespread disorder. Mexican American parents arranged 
a march through the State Capitol for 15 September to protest the school’s response, which 
the organisers felt had been lacklustre. The protests were organized by Chicanos Por La Causa 
(CPLC), a group of local Mexican American activists committed to achieving progress for 
Mexican Americans through grassroots activism. The PUHS incidents provided the group with 
a much-needed opportunity to publicise their demands, which included more than narrow 
requests related to the recent unrest. At the protest, CPLC presented a list of nine grievances. 
The first two demands, campus security and a better representation of Chicanos within the 
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school security staff, were a response to the acute crisis on the campus. Subsequent demands 
were fundamental objections to the schooling of Mexican Americans at PUHS. These included 
introducing a curriculum which better reflected Mexican and Mexican American history and 
culture; the hiring of more counsellors and teachers of Mexican descent; and the 
implementation of a more comprehensive bilingual education program.82 The protests 
subsided after the PUHSD board issued a statement that re-affirmed their commitment to the 
education of minority students. Yet, CPLC’s support of the student walkout made their 
relationship with PUHSD tense; in the initial months after there was little reconciliation but 
the protests were successful in as much as they forced those issues to be reconsidered. For 
example, once the pressure had dissipated, one consequence of the protests was the 
willingness of PUHSD officials to consult the leaders of the protests about minority student 
affairs. To attempt to resolve problems that had been on-going at the school for months, Dr. 
Richard Seymour, Chair of the PUHSD board, agreed to meet with parents in the winter of 
1969. 83 However, this did little to affect long term improvements at the school.  
 
History of Spanish restrictions 
 
Almost exactly a year later in September 1970, Chicanos at PUHS walked out of classes once 
again and began a boycott of the school that would last for 23 days. Students and parents 
involved in the protest expressed their exasperation at having their requests for meaningful, 
remedial measures to address the underachievement of Mexican American students 
persistently overlooked.84 The second walkout occurred during a turbulent time in Arizonan 
politics, as the Arizona Legislature was debating the introduction of state-funded bilingual 
instruction. The proposed measures would expand the availability of bilingual education in 
Arizonan schools, enhancing the accessibility of the program far beyond the handful of 
bilingual instruction programs funded by the federal government. Taken at face value, it may 
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thus seem odd for Mexican Americans to organise a walkout at PUHS when one of their civil 
rights demands was in the process of being enacted. One explanation for the continued 
political conflict over bilingual education has been to categorize the issue as an early skirmish 
in the burgeoning culture wars.85 Yet the experiences of Mexican Americans in Arizona is not 
wholly consistent with this interpretation. Instead, these demands are best understood as 
part of a wider, more deep-rooted contest over Spanish language use which encompassed 
not only a contest over culture, representation, and identity, but also one of power, 
citizenship and nationalism. When the PUHS protests are examined in a longer historical 
context they appear instead as a one element in a broader dissatisfaction amongst Mexican 
Americans about racial injustice, often orchestrated through the state’s restrictions upon the 
use of Spanish. In turn, this context suggests that the English Only laws that were in effect 
prior to 1968 are better understood as a tool of social control, devised as part of a white 
supremacist racial state. Mexican American demands for the introduction of bilingual 
education appear not only as a tool for improving educational attainment and reducing 
poverty, but also as an attempt to curtail the discriminatory practices of the state that had 
restricted the use of Spanish for generations. 
 
The use of Spanish in the classroom had been regulated since the opening of the first school 
in Phoenix in 1880.86 Language restrictions were later codified into the State Constitution of 
1912.  One passage stated that ‘Provisions shall be made by law for the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be open to all the children of the State 
and . . . said schools shall always be conducted in English.’87 This provision, similar to those 
introduced in other southwestern states, established a legal framework for the pedagogical 
instruction of language minorities known as English-only. The enforcement of English-only 
education meant that it was impermissible to instruct students with limited English 
proficiency in their native tongue, which meant that generations of language minority 
students had been educated in environments they found incomprehensible. In Arizona, the 
effect was to enforce English as the dominant language, impose silence upon the Mexican 
American child, regulate who was permitted to speak and what they were allowed to speak 
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of. The testimony of one Mexican American teacher indicates that violence continued to be 
used to enforce this policy in classrooms until at least 1962.88  
 
Yet English-only education was just one language based measure implemented by Arizonan 
politicians to Americanize Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Language-based restrictions 
controlled access to employment, public services, citizenship and voting rights; another 
declaration in the Arizona Constitution stated that English was the official language of the 
state. Collectively, these measures acted as a mechanism of colonial conquest, denied the 
state’s history of multilingualism, and told Mexican Americans that they lived their lives in a 
land of Anglos. Alongside overt restrictions, Arizona politicians also used the regulatory 
functions of the state to obstruct access to full citizenship. For example, in 1913, the state 
legislature enacted a measure that made passing an English literacy test a requirement of 
registering to vote and required eligible citizens ‘to read the Constitution of the United States 
in English in such a manner as to show he is neither prompted nor reciting from memory.’89 
Since 1921, Arizona Statute had required the state government to provide citizenship classes 
to assist with a naturalization test.90 By 1968 the Immigration and Naturalization Services 
reported that of the 50,000 aliens living in Arizona, 35,000 had been born in Mexico.91 The 
test could only be taken in English and the State government did not offer any classes to assist 
applicants without proficient English language skills.92  
 
That Arizona was one of only three states, by the late 1960s, which did not provide citizenship 
classes for the non-naturalized highlights the extent of the state’s commitment to obstructing 
the full participation of Mexican Americans in the polity. At this time, Arizona was also one of 
only eight states to attach alienage restrictions upon social welfare provisions and the state’s 
fifteen-year residency requirement for welfare was the harshest eligibility criterion in the 
country.93 Collectively, these methods demonstrate the sustained history of state 
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orchestrated marginalization of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Arizona. All are state 
level examples of the racial nationalism that historian Gary Gerstle has argued was a 
distinctive feature of early twentieth century immigration laws and U.S. state-craft. 
Restrictions upon lives of immigrants were devised during a time when the introduction of a 
fixed land border, immigration quotas and the strengthening of deportation procedures 
established racialized patterns of exclusion. In particular, 
 
‘These initiatives, in combination, amounted to an extraordinary effort to reshape the nation 
in ways that would exclude the unwanted, reform those regarded as social and political 
degenerates, and punish those who continued to engage in un-American behavior.’94 
 
Situating bilingual education within this historical lineage, rather than solely as an element in 
the culture wars, clarifies the importance of the program to Mexican American politics and its 
role in the Arizonan polity. One example shows how these questions of nationhood, 
migration, and education often fused. A letter written by Governor Jack Williams in 1967 
highlights how Arizona’s regulations were designed to deter Mexicans from settling in the 
state. A Canadian citizen wrote to him to request an explanation for his unsuccessful 
application to teach in a public school. The Governor noted in response that the ‘statute 
limiting teachers or other public employees to United States citizens has been on the books 
for many years.’ But, he explained, ‘this law originated because of the influx from our 
neighbour to the south, inasmuch as the standard of living in Mexico is below that of Arizona 
and was done to protect U.S. citizens.’95  
 
An apparatus of racial exclusion that was constructed whilst Arizona was a territory and 
consolidated in the early years of statehood endured through generations of Arizonan 
politics. Constant throughout the changes in personnel was a commitment to using the 
instruments of state power to maintain a white supremacist ideology that limited the 
autonomy and opportunities of non-white citizens. Arizona’s adoption of language-based 
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criteria for civic participation and access to public institutions, in conjunction with English-
only education, encouraged Mexicans and Mexican Americans to dismiss or disguise aspects 
of cultural difference and created penalties for non-assimilation. Together, the effect of these 
policies was to demarcate Anglos from Latinos, who were defined as a distinctive non-white 
racial Other. Although both could be U.S. citizens from birth, the heritage of a Mexican 
American child was cast as racially inferior and their relatives depicted as a racialized threat 
to their Anglo classmates.96 Yet, even as the U.S. Congress was expanding the rights of 
language minorities, these laws and regulations remained in place. They created a context 
and background for the debates elucidated in subsequent sections. Mexican Americans had 
contested these practises in varying forms for decades but, by the late 1960s, local activists 
believed that the moment for them to make tangible progress on longstanding civil rights 




As federal and state politicians deliberated on the extension of new rights to language 
minorities, prominent Mexican Americans discussed their meaning and debated a new civil 
rights agenda. This internal discourse amongst Mexican Americans revolved around 
arguments about the importance of bilingual education and its centrality to a broader 
minority rights platform. One argument in favour of bilingual education focused on its 
importance as part of a broader minority rights platform that sought a larger role for Spanish 
in society. An example of this view was evident in the work of the Council on Spanish-
American Work (COSAW); a pan-south west group whose contributors investigated the 
conditions Mexican Americans experienced in education, housing and employment. In 
January 1968, after holding public meetings with Mexican Americans in Arizona, COSAW 
produced two reports documenting the discrimination faced by residents of Mexican 
heritage. The contributors to COSAW argued that the main political priority for Mexican 
Americans was ‘State constitutional revision to overcome Anglo and English language bias’ 
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thereby improving educational opportunities and overturning the exclusionary language 
practices of the state. With regards to education, ‘repeal of state law prohibiting bilingual 
instruction’ was identified as the highest priority. 97 
 
The contributors to COSAW’s reports argued that efforts to overcome the supremacy of the 
English language should not be restricted to education policy. Members of the consultation 
argued that Mexican Americans also needed to challenge the deeper level of exclusion 
surrounding the restriction of Spanish language use by the State government. At public 
meetings, Mexican Americans argued that the government had acted as the facilitator of 
subtler forms of discrimination. The establishment of the English language supremacy by the 
State Constitution and the restriction of Spanish use in the public domain cast it as the 
language of the Other. Yet more than this, such policies meant that even those who accepted 
English as the most practical language of the state, and possessed proficiency in English, still 
suffered discrimination. One Mexican American businessman told COSAW how he had been 
forced to seek additional language tuition because his ‘Spanish intonation and articulation’ 
identified him as an outsider. This, he believed, had limited his opportunity for promotion 
despite having a master’s degree in business administration.98 
 
At a time when Mexican Americans had been recognised as a distinctive minority group, the 
findings of COSAW’s report, and the records of their public events, indicated a consensus 
amongst Mexican Americans about the importance of bilingual education alongside broader 
language policy reform. The authors of the final report believed that a cultural awakening 
amongst Mexican Americans was an essential first step to mobilise Mexican Americans in 
pursuit of their goals. They believed this could be achieved by promoting a better 
understanding of the history and culture of Mexican Americans amongst all Arizonans, 
particularly regarding the acceptance of bilingualism. There was also an indication that some 
were hesitant to express a more strident identity; the contributors frequently alluded to their 
perception that Mexican heritage was considered burdensome by some Mexican Americans. 
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As a result, the ‘improved self-image of Mexican-Americans, lifting up cultural heritage to 
discover better self-cultural identity’ was identified as a co-dependent part of improving the 
community’s condition.99 
 
Others disputed the idea that a cultural awakening amongst Mexican Americans was a recent 
development. Dr Jorge Lera-Braud, Chairman of COSAW’s Strategy Committee, spoke about 
the activities of La Raza Unida and suggested that recent Mexican American activism had 
deeper historical roots and was not simply ignited by the recent Civil Rights revolution. He 
rejected suggestions of a recent ‘awakening of the Mexican American’, instead arguing that 
the ‘first manifestations’ of recent activism ‘began with the period following the Second 
World War’.100 A gradual shift towards more confrontational racial politics was depicted as 
the result of multiple factors: the uncertain place of Mexican Americans within the country’s 
racial hierarchy, the condition of housing available to Mexican Americans, the quality of the 
schools their children attended, the rate of dropouts from high schools and the employment 
opportunities, which were at least as poor as those African Americans experienced. Despite 
this, he argued that the availability of federal funding was limited because spending was 
prioritized on Great Society programs that focused upon African Americans. All of these 
factors, combined with the inordinate burden that Mexican Americans had been asked to 
bear in the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, meant that Mexican 
Americans were no longer prepared to accept substandard living conditions.101 
 
In his speech, Lera-Braud criticized Mexican Americans who obscured their racial identity or 
opposed a more racially conscious Mexican American politics, in the process securing their  
affluent lifestyles whilst a significant proportion of Mexican Americans in Arizona, especially 
in south Phoenix neighbourhoods, lived in dilapidated housing. He argued that ‘[f]or some 
their new status proved an irresistible temptation to over-identify with the Anglo way of life, 
to the distress of thoughtful Mexican-Americans and Anglos alike.’ Other members of 
Mexican American communities had fought for the advancement ‘of their ethnic brethren.’ 
                                                        
99 Idem.  
100 The Report and Findings of the Second Arizona Statewide Consultation on Mexican-American Concerns 





He dismissed the argument that Mexican Americans could attach themselves to the coattails 
of a small number of people who had achieved leadership positions in Arizona. Individuals 
who achieved upward mobility into professional occupations ‘had not really arrived as long 
as the vast majority of their blood kin remained behind.’102 Lera-Braud also interpreted being 
Mexican American as an inherently racial, rather than ethnic, classification, ‘I will always be 
identified . . . as being part of that unfit minority called the Mexican-Americans.’ For him, 
being Mexican American was not a characteristic that could be enhanced or diminished 
according to an individual’s desire to assimilate.103 These arguments for a larger political 
agenda that highlighted the importance of Spanish language use and racial pride to Mexican 
American socioeconomic advancement was just one part of internal discourse underway at 
the end of the 1960s. Yet, those who emphasised the connection of restrictions upon Spanish 
use to broader arguments to the state’s history of racial marginalization were just one part of 
these debates. Others argued that bilingual education was an important civil rights objective, 




Mexican Americans in Phoenix also made arguments in support of bilingual education as a 
pedagogical method which could improve Mexican American education performance and, in 
turn, opportunities in the labour market. Chicanos and Mexican Americans in Phoenix echoed 
arguments made by prominent U.S. Senators such as Ralph Yarlborough as they attempted to 
pass the Bilingual Education Act. He opened hearing on the topic in 1967 by warning of the 
‘profound shock’ that Mexican American children experience when they are ‘made to know 
in no uncertain terms that he may speak no Spanish at school. He must speak English, a 
language which he scarcely knows’. Yarlborough argued that the ‘failure of our schools to 
educate Spanish-speaking students is reflected in the comparative dropout rates.’104 Senator 
Paul Fannin of Arizona was equally supportive of federal bilingual education legislation, 
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without which the country risked a failure to utilize ‘the great reservoir of untapped talent 
that lies dormant among children of Mexican and Spanish descent.’105 
 
After receiving testimonies from Mexican Americans in Arizona, COSAW recognised the 
importance of bilingual education in their final reports. The use of Spanish in the classroom, 
and the adoption of bilingual pedagogical techniques, was the report contributor's desired 
method to improve the educational attainment of Mexican American students.106 It was, 
however, the protesters at PUHS and the emerging Chicano movement that made 
instrumentalist arguments most vocally. Concerns of the Mexican American educational 
outcomes were one of the main grievances that caused Mexican American students to begin 
a protest at PUHS at the beginning of the 1969 school year. Although a small bilingual 
education program, funded by federal money, had been introduced earlier that year, it was 
insufficient to meet either the needs of students at the school or to quell their frustrations 
with the education system. Trouble started when a series of assaults culminated in a violent 
confrontation between African American and Mexican American students, which required the 
intervention of the police. Three days later, on 15 September 1969, an estimated 300 Chicano 
parents and students protested at PUHS. They were frustrated at the school’s failure to make 
progress on longstanding requests to address Mexican American educational needs and for 
additional security measures at the school following the recent disturbances. Several months 
before the protests, Chicanos had confronted the PUHS leadership about the quality of 
education programs at the school. Chicanos sought assurances that ‘the steering committee 
is supportive of a special emphasis program for dealing with minority problems for 
students’.107 Alongside this, leaders of the protests hoped that it would give Mexican 
Americans greater visibility as a minority group and help their efforts to obtain improved 
opportunities in education, housing and employment.108 
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For some of the Mexican Americans involved in organising the walkout, it was a way to 
register their dissatisfaction with the PUHSD administration and the quality of education it 
provided. The organiser of the protests, Joe Eddie Lopez, indicated the primary motivation for 
parents was the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the teaching methods at PUHS and ‘the basic failure of 
the education system’.109 Martha Castaneda, a young adult employed in a pastoral role at 
PUHS known as a monitor, expressed exasperation at the failure of educational officials to 
make progress on Mexican American concerns. ‘It’s the same old hassle, year after year’, she 
said, ‘We present a list of demands, we all go and talk and nothing happens.’110 Castaneda 
believed that these problems were rooted in racial politics, speaking of a ‘white 
administration that says “Conform to our ways, speak English not Spanish, adjust to our 
culture and you’ll come out the doors just like us.”’111 Castaneda’s remarks show that some 
opinions amongst Mexican Americans blurred the distinction between instrumentalist 
arguments and those that emphasised over-turning restrictions on Spanish use as a means of 
redressing the long standing histories of marginalizing non-whites. There was also support for 
the protests amongst Mexican American teachers. The Arizona Association of Mexican-
American Educators (AMAE) voted to support the boycott, ultimately arranging up to 100 
teachers to teach in an alternative educational setting organised by the protest leaders. The 
president of the AMAE publicly stated that the organization ‘seriously questioned the 
integrity’ of PUHS officials’ efforts to address the complaints made by parents during the 
previous fall.112 
 
After the PUHS walk out, the leadership of CPLC continued to advocate for fundamental 
changes to the education system in Phoenix schools. However, when they could not achieve 
their objectives within the PUHSD structure, they sought local solutions to the deficiencies in 
the education Mexican American children received. Many of these initiatives focused on 
grassroots projects, outside recognized public institutions. One example was the barrio youth 
project, a non-profit charitable organization established in south Phoenix, during the autumn 
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of 1969. Participation was not exclusive to CPLC members but Joe Eddie Lopez, and others 
associated with Chicanos Por La Causa, were heavily involved in its creation.  Lopez believed 
that Chicanos were ‘politically powerless’, concluding that the solution was to enable more 
Mexican Americans to obtain college level education.113 The purpose of the Barrio Youth 
Project was to address some of these problems. The founders defined its two main objectives 
as: to ‘develop and implement creative and educational programs for and by “barrio youth”; 
and to ‘engage in research, inquiry, and investigation of the problems that confront and which 
particularly affect the “barrio” youth.’114 The founders were compelled to start the project 
because of dissatisfaction with the education provided within mainstream schooling. Instead, 
they hoped that the Project would be an avenue for Mexican Americans in south Phoenix to 
express the educational, cultural and artistic passions that were stifled in PUHSD classrooms. 
 
The leaders of the Project also planned a program that would be targeted at students aged 
16 and 17 who they believed had been failed by the education system. One proposal for the 
new project included a clear explanation of how the leaders of the Barrio Youth Project, and 
therefore CPLC, interpreted the educational system and the accompanying institutions of 
power that shaped the lives of south Phoenix residents. Substantial numbers of Mexican 
American students, they argued, were being dismissed as lazy, lacking motivation, or mentally 
inhibited. Often these explanations for the attainment gap between Mexican Americans and 
whites portrayed Mexican American children as handicapped by the deficient cultural 
practices that they had inherited in the home. These explanations were being used to absolve 
education authorities in the City of Phoenix of ‘the inability of the school to accommodate 
youngsters that don’t fit the anticipated model the school expects from every students.’ As 
they saw it, the population of Phoenix had changed and now included a growing population 
that had different needs from previous generations of students. The failure of educational 
officials to adapt their pedagogical methods to meet the increased number of Mexican 
American students in Phoenix schools had been the main cause of the difference in 
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educational performance.115 Leaders of the Barrio Youth Project argued that the PUHSD 
Board believed in the notion that Mexican Americans clacked the inherent determination 
required for academic success. Beliefs in racial tropes and racial inferiority, Project leaders 
argued, clouded public policy and dissuaded PUSHD board members from making serious 
interventions to improve the level of educational performance amongst Mexican American 
students.116 It was for these educational reasons that many Mexican Americans argued that 
bilingual education should be introduced. By the end of the 1960s, it was a pedagogical 
method that its advocates believed could alleviate decades of underperformance in 
education. Its absence from mainstream schooling had caused some leaders of the PUHS 
protests to establish external bilingual programs through community projects. Yet, others 
argued that the generation of Mexican Americans who rose to prominence at this time should 




Another strand of opinion, brought to the surface by the 1969 protests at PUHS, challenged 
Chicano radicalism and argued instead that Mexican Americans should pursue an 
accommodationist approach to racial progress that accepted English language hegemony. 
These debates demonstrate that Mexican Americans in Phoenix were not a monolithic group 
and that arguments made by Chicanos that Mexican Americans should adopt a strident 
identity-based politics were not without challenge. This view was represented by a group 
called the Vesta Club. Established in 1953, Vesta membership was restricted to Spanish-
speaking people who had completed a four-year College degree and had not been involved 
in radical political activities. The organisation emphasised its public displays of patriotism by 
initiating new members with a ceremony which included taking the pledge of allegiance to 
the U.S. flag. Although these actions differentiated Vesta’s politics and strategy from other 
Mexican American groups, its aims were often similar. Their motto ‘Progress through 
education’ typified the Club’s objectives, which it supported through a scholarship 
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program.117 At an annual ceremony, the Vesta Club made awards for a $8000 scholarship fund 
to local high school students. Recipients could use the award to fund college level study at an 
institution within Arizona. The annual award ceremonies included prominent local dignitaries 
such as the Mayor of Phoenix and the Governor of the State. The ceremonies also included a 
guest speaker; indeed, on one occasion, the Mayor of a neighbouring Mexican City was invited 
to address the Club.118  
 
Similar to other Mexican American groups, Vesta believed that education was an important 
tool for influencing lives beyond the confines of the classroom. For example, they also sought 
‘to raise the standards of home life, and to bring into closer relationship the home and schools 
to the end that parents and teachers may cooperate more intelligently in the training of the 
student, and to develop by education of the general public, such united efforts as will secure 
all of these objectives.’119 Vesta’s exclusive membership criteria and operational methods 
restricted its activities to social and cultural elites within Phoenix. For example, the Club 
organized a series of English language talks by local university lecturers addressing themes in 
Mexican American culture and history. The talks took place on university campuses or local 
libraries and complemented a series of books that the Club published on similar topics.120 
Members of the club included locally significant individuals such as Grace Gil Olivierez, a 
Mexican American radio producer. Another prominent member was Eugene Marin.  
 
 In 1954, Marin was one of 35 Mexican Americans who founded the Vesta Club and served as 
the organization’s first president.121 Upon becoming president he explained that Vesta had 
been founded 'to attempt an individual effort of self-improvement.'122 This individualist 
philosophy placed the Vesta Club in ideological conflict with other Mexican American 
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community and civil rights groups. The Club argued that progress for Mexican Americans was 
best achieved through the promotion of individual role models. Their strategy to overcome 
the unequal standing of Mexican Americans was to 'change the image, in the public eye, of 
the Spanish-speaking citizen.'123 Vesta publications promoted success stories concerning 
Mexican Americans in reputable professions or private enterprise in response to news reports 
of Mexican American involvement in criminality or bad behaviour. Alongside this, Marin 
noted that 13 $800 scholarships had been awarded to Mexican American students who 
demonstrated academic excellence. The Vesta Club focused its initiatives and scholarships on 
improving the social mobility of a small number of individual Mexican American students, 
who they hoped would establish successful careers in white collar industries. While 
contributors to COSAW argued that Mexican Americans needed to develop a distinctive 
Mexican American identity, Eugene Marin avoided references to race and instead argued that 
'[e]ducation, therefore, of one kind or another, is the most urgent need. But it must be 
universal - that is, among all segments of society.'124 Vesta Club members also argued that 
Mexican Americans were being held back by their public image which portrayed them as less 
than respectable. Vesta believed that if enough Mexican Americans with the requisite talent 
could enter professions such as law or medicine, then the negative public image associated 
with crime and poverty could be balanced, if not revised. Vesta’s activities suggest that class 
was influential in the divergence of intra-group opinion on political priorities. The middle-class 
college graduates involved in Vesta prioritized supporting a handful of children with the 
potential to attend college and to create a new generation of Mexican American elites rather 
than tackling the wider inequalities that other groups sought to address.125 
 
The political flashpoint of the PUHS protests brought differences between Vesta and 
emerging Chicano politics to the surface. After the first walkout in 1969, Eugene Marin, at 
that point an important figure in the Governor’s administration, wrote a series of articles in 
the Arizona Republic about the protests. Marin, one of the most influential Mexican 
Americans in Arizona, was the State Director of the Arizona Economic Opportunity Office 
(AEOO); a position created after complaints that Mexican Americans were marginalized in 
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public policy decisions. Its purpose was to establish communication between government 
institutions and Mexican American communities in the state and as Director, Marin was a 
member of the Governor's office with responsibility for Mexican American affairs. One of 
Marin’s key responsibilities was ‘to assist that [sic] the Governor is sensitive to the problems 
and issues confronting and involving the bi-cultural, bi-lingual members of our state.’126 Marin 
believed his job was primarily ‘an advocacy role in [sic] behalf of the needy, the 
disadvantaged, and the minorities’. He reported directly to the Governor, which meant that 
he was ‘the direct link between the people and the Governor.’127  
 
In his articles Marin reflected on the progress Mexican Americans had made since the early 
twentieth century and criticised emerging Chicano groups that he considered to be too 
radical. His articles stimulated debate in the local press that demonstrated how Mexican 
Americans were negotiating racial politics and identity during a period of flux. In total, he 
published five articles, on successive days, which addressed the current state of Mexican 
American opportunities in education, housing, and employment. The articles, entitled 'A 
Challenge for Phoenix', represented a dissenting opinion in response to the emergence of 
Chicano political radicalism. Marin argued that Chicano activism at PUHS and broader south 
Phoenix disorder had created a combustible racial climate through ‘law of the jungle’ 
tactics.128 Collectively, 'A Challenge for Phoenix' demonstrated the nuances of opinion about 
politics and assimilation within Mexican American communities in Phoenix. Marin's articles 
distinguished him from many other Mexican Americans, and the civic organisations which 
represented them, on the central question of what it meant to be a minority resident of the 
city. The articles, alongside his earlier public statements and activities with the Vesta Club, 
highlight that in a moment of Chicano ascendancy, when their activities at PUHS were covered 
extensively in the local press, the notion of a homogenous Mexican American racial politics 
or singular collective experience was misleading. 
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Marin was especially critical of the emergent Chicano activism in Phoenix. He dismissed their 
politics as impulsive and ill-thought through, especially what he considered to be their 
‘“sudden discovery” of problems in education.’129 He disagreed with Chicano demands for 
institutional change, instead urging patience for the U.S. education system that ‘is the time 
honored “mother of all professions”. He also considered CPLC to be a collection of agitators 
who knew only 'how to raise cain – from the streets.’130 Yet, Marin also issued grudging praise 
for the walkout and Chicano activism. In particular, he noted that the ability of PUHS 
protesters to highlight the substandard educational experience of minorities was 
‘commendable’ but, again, he argued that the methods of local Chicanos ‘made a “jungle” out 
of Phoenix Union High School.’131  
 
Marin argued that there was a generational divide between older, more traditional 
conceptions of Mexican American politics and identity, and newer interpretations embodied 
by mostly younger, Chicano activists. Marin believed it was incumbent on older Mexican 
Americans to challenge the Chicanos who organised at PUHS. The objectives of Chicanos, he 
argued, would create ‘a self-imposed apartheid … not in keeping with the ideals of our 
Republic.’ To countenance this, Mexican Americans must ‘accept being fully participating 
Americans in the country they have chosen to live in’.132 Marin maintained that younger 
Mexican Americans were undermining the good work of the previous generation which had 
secured economic and social progress in Phoenix by striving ‘toward the Americanization 
processes which led eventually to full acceptance or assimilation.’133 Marin's objections to the 
political ideology and actions of CPLC represented a fundamentally different opinion about 
the merits of assimilation and what it meant to be a Mexican American.  
 
Marin rejected the new language of self-conscious political denotations and the strategy of 
trying to achieve social progress by situating Mexican Americans as a distinctive racial group 
with claims for redress in the Civil Rights revolution. ‘They have made us into a new “race” of 
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people – the “brown race”’ Marin argued. ‘They also branded us a “culturally disadvantaged” 
minority and, categorically, a “poor” people.’ Even to call oneself a Chicano was ‘a new self-
denigrating appellation . . . which is found neither in the Mexican nor the Spanish language.’134 
Instead, he invoked the American story of self-reliance. Earlier generations of Mexican 
Americans had, in his telling, achieved social advancement through hard work and toil. 
Admittance to schools had been an important political priority for this generation, who he 
believed, would consider the act of boycotting school incomprehensible. This, he stated, was 
‘why that generation, feeling that the Spanish speaking community is at the threshold of 
advancement, finds it difficult to go along with all the new terminology: “Brown face,” “Brown 
race,” “Chicanos,” “poor minority,” “culturally disadvantaged groups,” etc.’135  
 
For Marin, it was wrong ‘to blame the laws and the “system” for . . . the “horrible” situation 
they claim we are in’; instead, the causes of continued deprivation and the attainment gap in 
education were that Mexican American children did not appreciate education and lacked 
exposure to the ‘necessary parental or home environment which almost dictates a necessary 
and a thirst for schooling and learning. This is still the most significant deficiency of Mexican 
Americans.’136 Yet his argument was not without nuance as, on other occasions, he indicated 
external factors, over which Mexican Americans had little control, also influenced their 
educational opportunities. For example, the flight of white residents since the increase of 
suburban development during the 1950s, and the dismantling of segregated schooling, meant 
that Mexican Americans had ‘lost the social intercourse with Anglo students.’137 These trends 
created a ‘web of the ghetto, the school authorities who either don’t want to or don’t know 
how to implement solutions, and the conflict between an up-to-now passive home 
environment and the militant groups that are demanding action.’138 Despite acknowledging 
that some influences over lives of Mexican Americans were beyond their control, Marin still 
believed that social progress was best achieved without the intervention of the state or 
through explicit appeals as a distinctive minority group. 
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The PUHS protests raised questions about the relationship between patriotism and citizenship 
to Mexican American protests. Addressing this, Marin questioned the depth of support for 
Chicano politics, suggesting that Americanization programs were more popular than public 
representations. Mexican Americans, he argued, ‘are not chucking out their Americanization 
or assimilation plans, as the militants blatantly profess to be doing.’ Mexican Americans ‘look 
with favour for the opportunity to associate with their Anglo peers.’ This was in contrast to 
students under the direction of ‘the “Chicano” leaders’. For Marin, the rejection of 
Americanization and the questioning of assimilation strategies was contradictory, since 
Chicano political demands for entry into mainstream society and improved opportunities for 
their children could not be reconciled ‘with being full patriotic Americans.’139 Marin also 
encouraged families living ‘in the Phoenix Union High School ghetto area should “sell the 
barrio” and move out. All the tears and emotions and all the “foreign flagwaving” will not 
return that land to the residential status which it once enjoyed.’140 Chicano demands for 
Spanish language instruction and the continued use of Spanish in private settings and 
recognition of Mexican American culture were dismissed as not only counterproductive but 
corrosive. Marin suggested ‘a wholesale exodus’ to other areas of Phoenix.141  
 
Marin’s argument connected English language use to a racially exclusive notion of citizenship. 
It categorized opposition to English-only as an act of disloyalty to the nation state, 
simultaneously depicting Spanish use as incompatible with membership of an American 
national community. The suggestion that Chicano political activism was incompatible with 
American values was the subject of multiple letters written in response to 'A Challenge for 
Phoenix'. Nash Armijo and Romolo Griego, Jr., writing in their capacity as League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) representatives challenged these themes, ‘Mexican-
Americans are hurt deeply by Marin’s statements that they, by speaking out for their rights, 
are being un-American and unpatriotic.’142  A further objection to Marin’s suggestion that 
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activism at PUHS was unpatriotic came from Ricardo Lucero, a self-described Chicano. He 
asked ‘Is there no alternative to America? You cannot stay and help improve the many faults, 
you must leave it, if you don’t love it.’143 In a longer edition of his letter published in another 
newspaper he argued that ‘to classify yourself as Mexican-American was to Mr. Marin – 
unpatriotic.’144 Another angry response to Marin’s articles argued that: 
 
‘Marin is in no way considered a spokesman or leader of the Mexican American community 
and his articles condemning the new Chicano leadership are simply a jealous and vindictive 
attempt to disparage the efforts of those young and dedicated Chicanos who have 
demonstrated an ability and aggressiveness in leading that was sadly lacking in the so-called 
“leaders” of Marin’s generation.’145 
 
For the writer, a Chicano was someone ‘who has great pride in being what he is’, in contrast 
to, ‘phony “Spanish” Americans’ who, he suggested, were less committed to the maintenance 
of cultural heritage. 
 
As an influential Mexican American in the State administration and the State Director of the 
AEOO, Marin demonstrated that officials in the political institutions of the State had little 
interest in pursuing reforms that would address the factors which confined Mexican 
Americans to the most deprived neighbourhoods and their children to the worst schools in 
the city. He believed that this argument was being made by Mexican Americans who 
‘remained out of the mainstream, of their own choosing, but many are now beginning to think 
it has been a clever scheme by the dominant society to keep them down and out.’146 Marin’s 
interventions consistently identified Mexican American cultural values as the primary cause 
of educational underperformance. They had avoided ‘a realistic self-confrontation’ of their 
situation and not made ‘the necessary moves to accomplish their goals.’147  Yet, for all his 
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harsh rhetoric, Marin’s policy solutions were largely similar to those proposed by other 
Mexican Americans, if narrower in scope. For example, to improve Mexican American 
attainment at PUHS, Marin proposed more minority representation on school boards, the 
implementation of bilingual education but only in elementary schools, and most 
controversially, the conversion of PUHS to a school offering only vocational subjects. ‘There 
is little doubt’ he argued ‘that Phoenix Union has become a “ghetto school.”’148 As it stood, 
he considered the institution beyond saving; in need of dramatic measures to improve 
educational standards in the way he suggested.  
 
It is difficult to discern how many Mexican Americans shared Marin’s interpretations. Some 
responses to the Editor of the Arizona Republic questioned his credentials as a community 
spokesperson. Members of local chapters of LULAC wrote a letter challenging the arguments 
made by Marin, describing 'A Challenge for Phoenix' as ‘myopic’ and questioned whether 
Marin was qualified to speak for Mexican American communities in Phoenix. Marin ‘has no 
following in the Mexican-American community’ their letter stated, and as the State Director 
of AEOO ‘he has delivered nothing toward helping solve the problems of Mexican-
Americans.’149 Other responses highlighted the complicated racial history of Mexican-
heritage Arizonans as a means of rejecting Americanization programs. In his articles, Marin 
stressed the importance of these programs as a facilitator of social mobility for an earlier 
generation and noted his concern about the future direction of Mexican American 
communities in Phoenix based on his belief that Chicanos were rejecting this approach. Yet 
Santo Bernasconi, a member of Tempe Elementary District No. 3 School Board, challenged 
this idea. Those who identified themselves as Chicanos, he explained, contained Yaqui Indians 
who do not consider themselves to be Mexican Americans. Bernasconi argued that 
Americanization was in fact a process of ‘Anglization [sic] of all minority groups’ and ‘there is 
no need to “Americanize” those who were here long before the Anglo.’150  
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Another response to Marin’s argument highlighted the conflict which many Mexican 
Americans felt about the connections between racial politics and national identity. Joe 
Rodriguez, a convener of a local community arts project, wrote of the complexities these 
issues raised for many Mexican Americans. His ancestors had been pioneers in the southwest 
and northern Mexico during the territorial era. Rodriguez had fought in the Pacific conflict of 
the Second World War as member of the U.S. Army. Yet, he argued that if Marin thought his 
military service ‘is what will make me as American as anybody then you and I are certainly 
badly mistaken’; rather ‘Heritage is what tells me what I am and who I am.’ 151 Rodriguez 
explained that he shared Marin’s distaste for the emergent radical politics of the Chicano 
movement, but he rejected suggestions that Mexican Americans should assimilate to the 
American mainstream to achieve social and economic progress: 
 
‘I went through the “Mexican or American” conflict of youth myself . . . I have come to the 
conclusion that being anything is not a matter of speaking English, saluting the flag, 
denouncing your people or bending over backwards to prove to my gringo friends that I am 
American. It is a matter of fact that many very American Americans are truly un-American as 
hell.’152  
 
Marin’s politics, and the responses to his interventions, highlight the complexity of Mexican 
American political opinions. Whilst the late 1960s saw Chicano activists achieve visibility as a 
minority rights advocacy group, that should not obscure the differing opinions about civil 
rights and the best strategy for achieving progress. Marin offered an alternative, conservative 
strand of opinion. In the Chicano era, a conservative Mexican American was arguably the most 
influential racial minority member in the state, serving in a Republican governor’s 
administration. But for other Mexican Americans, the protests at PUHS provided a platform 
from which to organise electoral campaigns aimed at obtaining elected office and advancing 
minority rights. It was these debates that formed the basis of the fourth main argument 
around the politics of bilingual education and Spanish use.  
 
                                                        






The fourth element in these debates amongst Mexican Americans was over the notion that 
they should pursue a distinctive minority rights politics in which leading figures sought public 
office as a means of enhancing the voice and visibility of minority issues. This took two forms: 
one in which Mexican Americans attempted to win elected office via the ballot box; a second 
example was the efforts of Phoenix based Mexican Americans to obtain influence in regional 
advocacy organizations. An early iteration of the idea that Mexican Americans needed to 
ensure that their minority concerns obtained greater significance amongst policymakers was 
articulated as part of COSAW’s public meetings. The keynote speaker at a COSAW event to 
launch the report on Mexican Americans and racial discrimination re-iterated this point. Polo 
M. Rivera argued that Mexican Americans were losing out because a racial hierarchy shaped 
the design and allocation of federal funds. The War on Poverty ‘are biased towards Negroes.’ 
He also argued that ‘the apparent emphasis of the war on poverty to cater to and pacify the 
Negro’ was hindering the participation of Mexican Americans in programs intended to 
alleviate poverty.153 Rivera cited the example of federal funding for kindergarten programs, 
which did not include provisions for the use of bilingual methods or the hiring of bilingual 
staff. Rivera re-iterated that overcoming the ‘English language bias’ of federal War on Poverty 
programs was important for Mexican Americans in Arizona.154 Whilst Mexican Americans 
involved in COSAW could agree on the problems that Mexican Americans faced, they had 
difficulty agreeing on the methods to achieve social progress. Mexican Americans had been 
subject to over a century of uncertain racial classification; sometimes considered white, on 
other occasions as a non-white racial Other. Rivera urged those assembled to adopt a more 
distinct identity. He believed that if Mexican Americans were to obtain a fair appropriation of 
public funds to support beneficial policy programs, they must become a more visible minority 
group based upon their linguistic difference to other demographic groups.155 
 
Conflict between Mexican Americans and African Americans, within a context of competing 
against one another for resources, was not simply a rhetorical construction by Rivera or 
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others. The initial PUHS walkouts in 1969 were triggered  by disorder between Mexican 
Americans and African Americans but similar examples of violence and discord in south 
Phoenix imitated what occurred at PUHS. In January 1970, ten African American minors 
between the ages of 13 and 17 were detained on charges of burglary and ‘malicious mischief’ 
after an attempt to ‘run the Chicanos out of the (Matthew Henson housing) project.’ The 
incident was, according to Roy Yanez, director of the Phoenix Housing Authority, the body 
responsible for public housing, proof that public housing tenants ‘don’t want to integrate’. 156 
However, in the immediate aftermath of the incident a Chicano activist group, Valle del Sol, 
and the Phoenix Black Coalition sought reconciliation by announcing that they would work 
jointly to improve the living conditions of the housing project.157 Although grassroots 
organizations were able to co-operate, in electoral politics Mexican Americans and African 
Americans in Phoenix were placed in direct competition for representation. This was the 
result of decades of unequal development policies which caused the concentration of non-
whites in a small number of central and south Phoenix neighbourhoods covered by a single 
Arizona legislature district. In the 1972 Democratic Party primary to select candidates for the 
Arizona Legislature elections, a Mexican American candidate, Alfredo Gutierrez, challenged 
the long serving incumbent in the 23rd district, State Senator Cloves Campbell, who was the 
first African American to be elected to the Arizona Senate. He was seeking a fourth term in 
the State Senate and he had previously served two terms in the Arizona House of 
Representatives. The Legislative District also contained two House seats, both of which were 
held by African American incumbents, that were being contested by Mexican American 
candidates. Despite Campbell’s support of bilingual education, he was defeated by Gutierrez, 
demonstrating both the increased electoral potency of Mexican Americans as a constituency 
and the importance of obtaining elected roles to their political priorities. 158  
 
The decision of prominent Chicanos to seek public office made CPLC distinctive in the South 
west. Following the PUHS protests in 1969, this took the form of trying to influence the 
direction of public policy through the PUHSD education system. This marked the Phoenix 
                                                        
156 ‘Negro youths held in raid on housing project family’, Arizona Republic, 22/01/1970,  
157 ‘Mothers vigilante group at housing project’, Arizona Republic, 24/01/1970, 
158 Bernie Wynn, ‘Blacks and Chicanos in vote showdown’, Arizona Republic, 19/06/1972; ‘Voter neglect 
claimed in south Phoenix’, Arizona Republic, 22/06/1972. 
67 
 
incarnation of the Chicano movement from others in the southwest that were influenced by 
radical ideology and direct action protest methods. Ostensibly, the 1969 protests enabled 
Mexican Americans to make progress on their political and educational objectives. After the 
conclusion of the protests, some publicly visible members of the Chicano movement secured 
access to important local politicians and gave them a voice in Phoenix political affairs. One 
example was an invitation to Chicano leaders such as Joe Eddie Lopez, to meet with the Mayor 
of Phoenix, Milton Graham, on 23 October 1969. During the meeting they raised their list of 
nine demands related to necessary changes required at PUHS and felt subsequently that they 
received a ‘positive’ response from Graham, including a commitment to meet the School 
Board members for discussions regarding the demands.159 Six days later, on 29 October 1969, 
Chicano parents also met with Howard Seymour, Superintendent of PUHSD, and agreed the 
implementation of a program for minority teachers to be trained as counsellors. Initially, ‘six 
chicano and black’ teachers from across the PUHS district would receive the in-service training 
currently provided in the district. The purpose of the program was to address the concerns of 
Mexican American parents about the number of staff from minority backgrounds. 
 
At a public meeting on 11 December 1969, school officials, including Mr Seymour, announced 
plans to recruit more teachers from minority backgrounds. Although Seymour argued that 
the percentage of minority staff had already increased to nine percent, he conceded ‘we’ve 
got to do better’.160 District officials declared that they would address the lack of minority 
staff through a targeted recruitment drive aimed at colleges with a high Mexican American 
enrolment in Colorado, New Mexico and Texas. Yet, however much this meeting represented 
progress, many of the structural issues that undermined the city’s education system 
remained.  At the same 11 December meeting, the leadership of PUHS also announced that 
the number of enrolled students had fallen from 2,900 to 2,680. This meant that 55 percent 
of students at the school were Mexican Americans, 30 percent were reported as being African 
American and 7 percent Anglos. The remainder were recorded as Asian, Indian or 
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unclassified.161  Students who remained at PUHS attended a school that was increasingly 
concentrated with racial minorities and able to access few resources to educate them. 
 
The activities of CPLC were enough to eventually force the concerns of Mexican American 
students onto the PUHSD Board’s agenda. Members of the group were invited to deliver two 
sessions on Mexican American history and culture. Both would be delivered to an audience 
of district principals, administrators and members of the PUHSD board. The decision was 
taken over the objections of Trevor Browne, President of the Board, who argued that CPLC 
had an unacceptably political orientation. Other members of the board disagreed and voted 
to invite CPLC to host the sessions.162 Despite these objections, CPLC delivered the program 
in April 1970. It included a theatre performance from the Barrio Youth Project about Mexican 
American identity and the uncertain place that Mexican Americans felt in Anglo-American 
society. This was a theme discussed at length by many of the scheduled speakers. Much of 
the program re-iterated the failure of the school system to provide a curriculum that 
contained adequate amounts of Mexican American history and culture. The current 
configuration of the curriculum left students with an incomplete sense of their identity and 
poor self-regard in a society that was dominated by Anglo-Americans.  Ane Amaya, a lecturer 
at Arizona State University, told the PUHSD officials in attendance that ‘The Chicano is 
different . . . because of a culture in which he belongs to two worlds.’ He spoke also of the 
tensions caused by being a hyphenated American, especially for students attending a school 
system that provides little ‘institutional dignity’ for their heritage.163 Perhaps Mexican 
Americans would have secured the opportunity to make these arguments directly to the 
leadership of PUHSD over time. But their invitations to address PUHSD officials in the autumn 
of 1969 was hastened as a direct consequence of the protests in the weeks before. Yet, the 
effects of these meetings were somewhat mixed. 
 
The sessions appeared to restore some of the good will between Mexican Americans and the 
PUHSD board that had been depleted by the walkout. Superintendent Howard Seymour 
spoke of how both sides had been misunderstanding one another but the awareness sessions 
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enabled them to find common ground and establish a relationship for making progress on 
Mexican American affairs in future. The Mexican American and Chicano representatives who 
delivered the sessions were able to secure the agreement of the PUHSD board on a number 
of their objectives, most notably, an increase in the number of Mexican American teachers 
employed by the district. This objective was advanced by creating a pathway for Mexican 
Americans without the necessary qualifications to be employed as teachers to work first as 
‘teacher aide[s]’ whilst they complete a teaching degree. Yet Mexican Americans were also 
frustrated by the PUHSD board’s lack of enthusiasm for more Mexican and Mexican American 
studies to be included in the school curriculum. The district director of general education 
argued that any demands by Mexican Americans had to be balanced against those of other 
groups within a multi-racial district. He believed that to acquiesce to these demands would 
cause African Americans, Caucasians, and other groups to demand a course of their own.164  
 
Any hopes that the newly obtained access for Chicano leaders could be utilized to advance 
Mexican American civil rights objectives and defuse tension in Phoenix dissipated within 
months. When further flashpoints occurred on the campus of PUHS, Chicanos organized 
another boycott of the school, beginning in September 1970. As before, the trigger for the 
walkout was conflict between Mexican American and African American students. Several 
instances of violence both on and off the school grounds led parents to conclude that 
promises made about security during the previous winter had not and would not be 
honoured. The principal, Robert Dye, indicated that as many as 50 per cent of the school’s 
2,700 students were absent on the first day of the protest.165 Large-scale non-attendance 
persisted throughout the week, with as many as 1,100 students recorded absent on 
Thursday.166 The protests were costly for PUHS. The state government provided $4.81 in 
funding per pupil, per day of attendance in the first six months of the school year. This meant 
that the boycott cost PUHS up to $6,000 per day, which equated to approximately 42 per cent 
of their daily budget.167 
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Unhappy with their progress, Chicano parents and students organising protests at PUHS 
requested a meeting with the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Recent changes in 
personnel meant that CPLC and Mexican American parents faced a less receptive leader of 
the state’s education system than the year before. After the death of the previous incumbent, 
Sarah Folsom, Weldon P. Sofstall had been appointed by the Governor to complete the 
remainder of her term, which was due to end in 1970. Before Sofstall’s appointment, a 
recruitment committee of state board of education officials evaluated the candidates based 
on their merits as an educational administrator and their experience as a practitioner. Once 
their recommendations had been submitted, the chairman of the committee wrote a private 
letter to the Governor to ‘record a few “off the record” comments.’168 He believed it 
important for the Governor to consider the political implications of the appointment. The new 
Superintendent would be in post for 18 months before the next election and teachers were 
an important electoral constituency in state politics. The Republican Party in Arizona, he 
argued, had failed ‘to enlist the active support of enrolled Republicans who are in the teaching 
profession and to take a policy position which would influence the “swing” votes among 
teachers who are enrolled as Democrats.’169 This situation was rooted in multiple factors. One 
was the ambivalence of state Republicans towards public education, evident in the absence 
of any education policy proposals from the Republican leadership that controlled the 
Legislature. The situation was compounded by the hostile public statements of Republican 
politicians about education reform. This made the appointment of the foremost educational 
official in the state an important political issue for the Governor. 
 
The letter then evaluated the merits of the candidates under consideration for the post. His 
view of Sofstall’s candidacy was unequivocal: ‘Any attempt to put Wendell [sic] Sofstall in this 
position would be a disaster!’170 Sofstall, he argued, was a polarizing figure who evoked either 
vociferous criticism or support. He also advised that this appointment could create internal 
divisions and party management problems. But these concerns were trivial compared to the 
response he would elicit from elementary and secondary teachers and education groups who 
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would interpret this appointment as ‘a direct rebuff’ to their agenda. He concluded by noting 
that ‘it is fairly evident that voters among minorities are definitely opposed to his 
appointment.’171 On 24 June, Williams wrote to his chief political aide Charles Krimminger 
about the vacancy, in which he indicated that influential GOP figures were lobbying the 
Governor. ‘Softsall is having quite a campaign waged in his behalf’, he noted.172 This followed 
an 18 June letter from Howard Seymour in his capacity as President of the State Board of 
Education. He expressed his preference for a consensus candidate who ‘will command the 
respect of educators, legislators, and citizens throughout the state.’173 This was ‘the first time 
in the history of the state [that] the Governor has the opportunity to express his concern and 
support for quality education in our elementary and secondary schools’. He implored the 
Governor to fully utilize the historical opportunity to ‘enhance both the reputation and the 
future of education in Arizona.’174 Despite receiving cautionary advice from the recruitment 
panel and other education officials, Governor Jack Williams continued to support Sofstall, 
even though his appointment would likely be interpreted as a sign of the administration’s 
disregard for the concerns of non-whites. 
 
Sofstall's appointment caused particular consternation amongst Mexican Americans and soon 
after the relationship between him and local Mexican Americans deteriorated further. In 
November 1969, Sofstall gave an alarmist speech that warned of the dangers of failing to 
confront anti-Vietnam War protests. ‘Rioting and Guerrilla warfare in the United States are 
symptoms of a serious illness in our country which will be fatal unless Americans take drastic 
action to reverse the current trends in education.’175 Later sections of the speech made his 
unwillingness to engage with Chicanos explicit. Sofstall expressed hostility to government 
intervention, which he argued ‘has almost destroyed the free market.’ He then singled out 
‘the La Raza advocates amongst Spanish-Americans [who] are developing into militant racists 
and purveyors of hate who are destroying the United States as the great “Melting Pot” of the 
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world and “One Nation Under God.”176 Chicanos’ fears were confirmed when Rocky Manes, 
an appointee of Softsall’s, re-iterated these sentiments. Members of CPLC concluded that 
they were now unlikely to obtain a fair hearing from the Superintendent's office. Manes was 
responsible for appointing people to a state committee that was responsible for investigating 
the education issues concerning Mexican American students. Manes’s presence deepened 
the distrust between CPLC members and educational officials, creating the perception that 
he would ensure that Chicanos were not represented on the committee.177 
 
Sofstall continued to be an antagonistic presence as the Superintendent of Instruction. A few 
months later he denounced CPLC as a ‘communistic’ organization and had refused to meet 
Mexican American parents with children at the school. Sofstall believed that ‘he could not do 
anything for this group and therefore did not see any need for a meeting.’178 He did, however, 
agree to meet with Father Frank Yodi of the Immaculate Heart Church in south Phoenix. Yodi 
was an important community organiser and the church was the centre of gravity for much of 
the Chicano organizing in south Phoenix. At the meeting, Sofstall once more refused to discuss 
the political demands of local Mexican Americans; instead, he told Yodi he believed he had 
been duped ‘by a group which was very subversive and communistic in its actions and 
thinking.’179 The hostility of state officials, even to engaging in dialogue with Chicanos, 
highlights the difficulties of the political climate in Arizona and the limits of their strategy. On 
occasions when Chicanos secured meetings, little definitive progress was agreed.   
 
Although Chicanos in Phoenix were distinctive to other movements, leading members sought 
to connect local activism in Phoenix to a wider network of Chicano activism in the Southwest. 
One speaker told the 2 March 1969 meeting about the formation of a Unity Council in San 
Antonio and discussed its activities. This established a trend in which members used meetings 
to share knowledge about other Chicano activist groups and considered their methods. 
Others saw CPLC as an outlier in the regional Chicano movement. Phil Montez, a member of 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights regional office in Los Angeles, remarked upon the lack of 
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racial consciousness in the state. He told a CPLC meeting on 23 March 1969 that ‘there was a 
lack of awareness throughout the southwest among Chicanos and this was especially so in 
Arizona.’ He suggested that he could identify sources of financial support for a conference on 
CPLC’s activism regarding ‘the grape boycott, Phoenix Union High School and other pressing 
issues to the Chicano community.’180 
 
At a meeting on 12 October 1969, members discussed how to ensure that CPLC received 
adequate representation amongst regional Chicano and Mexican American advocacy groups. 
They discussed submitting a request to the Southwest Council of La Raza for a seat on the 
Board of Directors. Being represented on the board would enable CPLC to remain informed 
about the activities of similar Mexican American organizations in the region. CPLC leaders also 
wanted a voice at the Southwest Council that was proportionate to other groups in the region. 
Prior to this point, all states on the Council were represented equally. CPLC members agreed 
that they would lobby for 3 members on the board to ensure that their organization was given 
a voice proportionate to other Chicanos in the southwest.181 It is difficult to know how 
cognizant CPLC members were of Chicano activism, or its strategy and tactics in other 
locations. A selection of Mexican Americans in Phoenix made the conscious decision to begin 
to identify as Chicanos during the late 1960s. In this way, the actions of Chicanos in Phoenix 
correlated with other Mexican Americans in other U.S. cities.182 This decision to identify 
collectively as a more forthright minority group was driven in part by the Great Society 
legislation of the 1960s. Legislation, particularly the Bilingual Education Act, brought visibility 
to problems that had existed for generations but had not been a priority for public policy 
makers. It also gave them standing to pursue enforcement of non-discrimination statutes and 
remedial action via the courts. Joe Eddie Lopez articulated this argument in a letter he drafted 
to a newspaper editor. In response to an editorial that had expressed outrage at demands 
                                                        
180 Chicanos Por La Causa, Minutes, 02/03/1969, Rose Marie and Joe Eddie Lopez Papers, Box 9, Folder 11; 
Chicanos Por La Causa, Minutes, 23/03/1969, Rose Marie and Joe Eddie Lopez Papers, Box 9, Folder 11. 
181 Chicanos Por La Causa, Board Meeting, 12/10/1969, Rose Marie and Joe Eddie Lopez Papers, Box 9, Folder 
11. 
182 Lilia Feranadez demonstrated that an awakening of racial and political identities occurred in Chicago, and was 
not confined solely to the southwest. Lilia, Fernandez, Brown in the Windy City: Mexican Americans and Puerto 
Ricans in Postwar Chicago (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2012); Guadalupe San Miguel Jr., Chicana/o 
Struggles for Education: Activism in the Community. (College Station, TX. Texas A&M University Press, 2013); 
Guadalupe San Miguel Jr., Brown, Not White: School Integration and the Chicano Movement in Houston. 
(Houston. Texas A&M University Press, 2005). 
74 
 
that PUHS publish information to parents in both English and Spanish, he cited the school’s 
obligation to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under this legislation, he 
argued, ‘school districts have the responsibility to adequately notify national origin minority 
group parents of school activities’. For such notices to be adequate they ‘may have to be 
provided in a language other than English.’183 Yet, the Arizona incarnation of Chicano activism 
was devoid of the more militant, nationalist ideological strand that had flourished in other 
southwestern locations.184 On occasion, invited speakers at CPLC encouraged Chicanos in 
Arizona to consider more radical perspectives. In July 1970, Froben Lozada and Antonio 
Camejo spoke at a CPLC meeting to promote a national Chicano moratorium against the 
Vietnam War that was scheduled to take place in Los Angeles on 29 August 1970. Both 
speakers told local members of their moral opposition to the war and how American 
casualties included a disproportionate number of Chicanos. Camejo and Lozada questioned 
the continued support of the Democratic Party from Mexican Americans if it did not do more 
to address their political interests. Both speakers were running for elected office in California 
as candidates for the Socialist Workers Party. They argued that electing Democrats had done 
little to advance Mexican American priorities and if it continued then Mexican Americans 
should either withhold their support or vote for a third party candidate.185  
 
From the beginning, a question of how representative CPLC was of the local Mexican 
American population remained unanswered. At a 7 December 1969 meeting the first item on 
the agenda was the recent poor attendance at CPLC meetings. Those present argued that 
rules be introduced to mandate attendance and that leaders of CPLC should make telephone 
calls prior to scheduled meetings to encourage rank and file members to attend. Other 
concerns focussed on the conduct of those associated with CPLC. Internal discussion about 
the Barrio Youth Project indicated that some individuals were concerned also about the 
motives of some of the CPLC members involved in the project’s activities. Gustavo Gutierrez, 
the Vice President of CPLC, warned that no one involved in the organization should be using 
the Barrio Youth Project ‘as a springboard to benefit individual members.’ Internal 
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disagreements amongst members were also present. He questioned the appointments that 
had been made to the Barrio Youth Project board, in particular that of Alfredo Gutierrez to a 




This chapter began by showing the deep roots of language based discrimination by 
institutions of state power in Arizona. Restricting the use of Spanish in public institutions such 
as the school house had been a crucial tool of Anglo domination since the late 19th century 
and interpreting the introduction of bilingual education, which supplanted English Only 
instruction, was an important modification to the polity. Aside from a handful of notable 
exceptions, histories of bilingual education have not captured this historical lineage. Instead, 
they have considered the issue as part of burgeoning culture wars including political conflicts 
over the content of curriculums or the teaching of contentious subject material. Earlier 
sections of this chapter argued that bilingual education should instead be considered 
alongside other restrictive policy measures, often related to immigration enforcement, which 
sought to exert control over the lives of people constructed as non-white racial Others. As a 
result of these processes, bilingual education, both as an educational remedy and as part of 
broader language use agenda, formed a central part of internal discourse amongst Mexican 
Americans about their collective political priorities. This chapter focused only upon prominent 
figures who engaged in public debates about the topic. Although some spoke with the 
authority of being representatives of community groups or committees such as COSAW, it is 
not clear how widely their views were shared amongst ordinary Mexican Americans. 
Although, responses to the local press on occasions such as the PUHS protests or after Eugene 
Marin’s provocative interventions suggest that these moments stirred previously non-
political Mexican Americans, it is for future studies to ascertain general public opinion on 
these topics. Yet, the importance of language to Mexican American rights discourse in Arizona 
appears distinctive from similar groups in other south western locations chronicled by 
scholars to date. These debates show that the late 1960s were a highly uncertain moment of 
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transition for Mexican Americans in which they sought to make sense of the new rights 
conferred onto them by bureaucrats and policymakers in the federal government. Part of the 
public discourse highlighted in this chapter shows that leading representatives attempted to 
craft a new civil rights agenda to fully utilise newly acquired language rights but as part of a 
broad debate about the condition of Mexican Americans and the causes of the disadvantages 
they faced. This debate was more than a narrow, technocratic discussion of policy. Yet, even 
so it contained differing opinions and lacked homogeneity. The contributions of Eugene Marin 
show that events in Arizona represent a significant rupture with present historical 
interpretations of the period. He was influential in the state and espoused a political 
perspective of accommodationism that was often overshadowed during the emergence of 
Chicano politics. The continued influence of this strand of opinion into the late 1960s, 
contradicts previous understandings that neatly categorised these ideas as having passed 
with a previous generation.  
 
As much as Mexican Americans in Phoenix debated the merits of bilingual education and 
future progress on civil rights issues, they had to contend with forces beyond their control. 
One was the structural change in development, patterns of residency and, as a result, school 
enrolment levels and racial composition. Another was a state bureaucracy staffed with 
personnel who were hostile to minority rights issues. The appointment of Weldon Sofstall was 
the most evident example, something that curtailed the access of prominent Mexican 
American figures to the locus of power, which up to that point had been the major 
achievement of the PUHS protests. It is this jagged trajectory of progress and subsequent 
retrenchment, as well as policy remedies contending with deep rooted structural 











Chapter Two  
Bilingual Education in Arizona 
 
The previous chapter has demonstrated how the late 1960s was a period of flux for Mexican 
Americans in which internal debates containing diverse opinions about racial formation and 
new civil rights opportunities flourished. Whilst these debates occurred, members of the 
Arizona Legislature took up the issue of bilingual education. They did so after the passage of 
the federal Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which established the right of national language 
minority origin students to access remedial programs as a means of reducing the attainment 
gap between Latinos and Anglos, and address the disproportionately high rates of poverty 
amongst Latinos. Of the limited number of studies that have analysed the politics and policy 
of bilingual education, most have focused upon the introduction of the federal Bilingual 
Education Act.187 Gareth Davies’ See Government Grow, the most comprehensive account of 
bilingual education, demonstrated how the policy became entrenched in the federal 
government despite its highly uncertain prognosis beyond the initial years of funding 
appropriated by Congress in 1968. He attributed the policy survival to the actions of 
enterprising federal bureaucrats who worked to ensure that school districts enforced the 
provisions of the act.188 Scholarship on the implementation of bilingual education at the state 
and local level, as well as the policy consequences of the act upon school districts, is far more 
limited. However, a collection of recent works have considered the effects of the Bilingual 
Education Act beyond its role in the high politics of the U.S. Congress.189 These studies have 
been largely focused upon California and Texas but they highlight some themes that were 
consistent with Arizona’s experience. For example, Natalia Mehlman Petrzela argued that ‘the 
BEA [Bilingual Education Act] was pivotal not only in conceiving a federal commitment to the 
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educational achievement of limited-English-speaking (LES) children but also in spurring action 
at the state and local level.’190 This chapter mostly agrees. The introduction of federal bilingual 
education broke an impasse in Arizonan politics over its introduction in the state’s schools. It 
was only after the passage of the BEA that members of the Governor’s administration and the 
Arizona State Legislature made serious efforts at introducing a state level version of the act. 
Yet, this expansion of the availability of bilingual education was secured with little bipartisan 
enthusiasm. Unlike in California, where Natalia Mehlman Petrzela has demonstrated that 
conservative figures such as Ronald Reagan and Max Rafferty were important to the 
proliferation of bilingual education programs, in Arizona, conservative politicians took only a 
cursory interest in the program. Although it was passed whilst Republican Jack Williams was 
Governor, and though he expressed rhetorical interest in the policy, he indicated little 
willingness to expend political capital to ensure its introduction, expansion, or funding to 
levels that would make the program meaningful. The Arizona Legislature was also under 
Republican control when state bilingual education legislation was passed but, as later sections 
will show, there was significant dissent amongst GOP politicians. As a result, the early history 
of bilingual education in Arizona is a more contested one than that experienced in other 
southwestern states, signifying that the state’s politics were an important forerunner for the 
divisive English Only political initiatives of the late 1980s and 1990s. This chapter adds to a 
growing historiography that studies the policy implications of bilingual education, particularly 
its implementation at the state and local level. It does so by situating Arizona’s experience as 
an important counterweight to interpretations developed in locations such as California and 
Texas that were more hospitable to Latinos.  
 
Bilingual education features only fleetingly, even in histories of Mexican Americans in Arizona, 
despite being the most significant civil rights accomplishments for Latinos in the 1960s. Yet, 
as the previous chapter has shown, language use formed an important part of internal 
Mexican American debates. Therefore, this chapter expands upon the previous one by 
demonstrating how many Mexican Americans sought to influence bilingual education policy 
from within the education system, as opposed to an earlier focus upon protest. This chapter 
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also highlights the position of bilingual education in state and local politics. Although bilingual 
education was administered by the state government and local school districts, not Phoenix 
City Council, the partisan conflict it attracted was a sharp contrast to other political issues. 
Later chapters will demonstrate that, in Phoenix, important matters of political economy had 
been neutered as matters of partisan dispute, a result of the dominance wielded by an 
ostensibly non-partisan political machine that controlled the municipal government. As such, 
the political climate in Arizona accentuated political differences were instead directed 
towards policies such as bilingual education. 
 
This chapter begins by examining the legislative process in 1969, through which the first 
bilingual education programs funded by the Arizona state government were passed. It argues 
that legislators sought to implement a narrow interpretation of the state’s responsibilities to 
Mexican Americans. Bilingual education policy initially existed in a precarious state and an 
uncertain future beyond an initial three years of appropriations. Later sections demonstrate 
how Mexican Americans, in combination with sympathetic state politicians, worked to ensure 
its survival and later expansion. Yet, in the later years of the 1970s, critics of the program 
coalesced. They questioned the efficacy of bilingualism, challenged its continued use in 
Arizonan schools and threatened its future. Finally, this chapter concludes that whilst 
ostensibly a new federal commitment to civil rights under the BEA was powerful and self-
affirming for many, in reality it had a limited effect upon the lives of Mexican Americans living 




Several years before any federal legislation was passed, politicians in Arizona had explored 
the possibility of introducing a state-funded bilingual education program.191 In December 
1966, Sarah Folsom, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, lobbied the Governor and 
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members of the Arizona Legislator on the issue of bilingual education. Yet Folsom’s efforts 
were met with resistance; after Folsom held a briefing session for legislators to persuade 
them to take up the issue, Republican members of the House and Senate counselled the 
Governor, Jack Williams, not to proceed with the issue.192  Bilingual education was simply not 
a political priority at this time. But even if it had been, the Arizona Constitution contained an 
English-Only stipulation, which stated:  
 
‘Provisions shall be made by law for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public 
schools which shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from sectarian control, 
and said schools shall always be conducted in English.’193 
 
The constitutional clause stymied efforts by Folsom, between 1966 and 1968, to introduce 
state funded bilingual education, even after the introduction of federal legislation. Yet, she 
continued undeterred and two years later, raised the question of expanding bilingual 
education with the Governor directly. Following this exchange, Williams wrote to Folsom to 
clarify his thoughts on the issue. His letter contained an annotated version of the English-only 
passage from the Arizona Constitution and made clear his belief that statutory changes would 
be necessary ‘before we can undertake a real bilingual instruction program.’194 This was a 
view which Williams explained on more than one occasion: in response to a letter from an 
Arizona resident expressing her support for bilingual education and enquiring about his views, 
Williams again highlighted the prohibitive sections of the Arizona Constitution. He expressed 
his support for ‘the concept of bilingual education’ and his willingness to ‘endorse appropriate 
legislation to change the present laws when that legislation is drawn.’ But, he argued, 
responsibility for mandating bilingual education was ‘the prerogative of the legislature.’195 
The Arizona Constitution impeded politicians from implementing bilingual education 
programs, but also provided them with a convenient statutory excuse. By supporting a change 
in bilingual education in theory, politicians could appear responsive to minority concerns 
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without having to contend with the political problems that would emanate from an actual 
attempt to pass legislation and implement the policy.  
 
The stalemate regarding the introduction of bilingual education was broken by the Federal 
Bilingual Education Act of 1968. Following the introduction of the Act, students at PUHS 
become some of the first in the country to attend bilingual classes funded by federal 
appropriations. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
provided an initial $76,427 to support the instruction of up to 100 students. These funds 
facilitated a change in approach for the chosen students, as from then on, half of their class 
time was conducted in Spanish and the other half in English. The teaching staff at PUHS 
interpreted the objectives of bilingual instruction not only as a means of improving Mexican 
American educational performance but also as vehicle for improving cultural pride in the use 
of Spanish.196 However, education boards and school districts in Arizona were restricted from 
developing large-scale programs for children with limited English proficiency until the State 
Legislature passed legislation authorizing its introduction and allocating funds. There was 
confusion in the state administration about whether a bilingual program, state funded or 
otherwise, was legally permissible because of the Constitution’s stipulation of English 
language use. However, the possibility of establishing bilingual education programs changed 
in February 1968, when the Arizona Attorney General ruled that such programs could be 
established in schools, but only under the English as Second Language method. The incident 
was the first occasion where the most significant effect of the Bilingual Education Act was 
evident – acting as a catalyst for change at the state level. In this instance, the Attorney 
General was forced to look into the matter after federal legislation placed bilingual education 
onto the political agenda. 197  
 
Together, the new federal legislation and the Attorney General’s guidance forced the Arizona 
State Legislature to act. Bilingual education legislation was thus introduced as House Bill 
Number 1 in July 1968.  Such action has led one scholar to argue that ‘[a]fter the enactment 
of the BEA, local educators moved quickly to implement bilingual education in schools and 
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state legislation.’198 Yet, this should not obscure the vociferous opposition and obstructionism 
of some legislators who sought to revise the Bill in accordance with a particularly narrow 
interpretation of the state’s educational and fiscal commitment to language minorities. The 
reasons for opposition varied. Whilst representatives such as Jane Hull (R-Phoenix) resisted 
House Bill Number 1’s introduction based upon the cost of its implementation, others 
questioned its effectiveness as a pedagogical tool. Another strand of opposition questioned 
the compatibility of teaching children in Spanish with full participation in American society. 
The chair of the Arizona House Education Committee, Jim Cooper (R-Mesa), dismissed the 
idea that Arizona was a historically multilingual borderland, arguing instead that ‘if a group of 
people are going to live here, they will just get along better with English. The best way to learn 
it is to speak it.’199  
 
Democratic members of the Arizona Legislature had hoped to pass an expansive bilingual 
education program that would enable all Mexican American students in the state to access 
language instruction. However, opponents of the Bill were able to impose significant 
limitations on the program: bilingual education was to be limited to students in the first three 
grades of schooling; there was no provision for kindergarten classes; students could enrol in 
one course of instruction only, with courses lasting for just one year and  bilingual classes had 
to be conducted alongside the regular curriculum within the limit of two hundred and forty 
minutes of instruction per school day. Alongside this, there were financial restrictions. To fund 
the proposals, the Bill appropriated $100,000 for the first year of the program. This was 
intended to serve 4,000 students at an allocation of $25 per unit of instruction, which meant 
that schools faced restrictions on the number of pupils they could serve. Moreover, the Bill 
specified that no further funds could be allocated once the $100,000 appropriation had been 
exhausted and it limited the capacity of school districts to raise revenues to supplement an 
expanded bilingual program. This restriction resulted from a 1967 measure which capped 
increases in school spending at six per cent year on year. Although state-allocated bilingual 
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education resources fell outside this cap, schools could not raise additional revenue to make 
up any funding shortfalls or to schedule additional classes.200 
 
These revisions led some vocal advocates of bilingual education to renounce the final version 
of the Bill. During a debate on the proposed legislation, several Democratic State 
Representatives announced that the newly-introduced limitations on the scope and eligibility 
of the program meant that they would vote against the Bill when it came to the floor.201 The 
resulting statute retained the supremacy of English through a stipulation that ‘[a]ll schools 
shall be conducted in English’, with the exception of classes for those ‘who have difficulty in 
writing, speaking or understanding the English language or who come from environments 
where the dominant language is other than English.’202 Monies appropriated under the 
legislation were to be used for a bilingual education method of instruction named English as 
Second Language Instruction (ESL). This method involved using Spanish to teach students with 
limited English skills until they achieved an appropriate level of proficiency to continue 
schooling with their Anglo classmates. Yet, the political conflict witnessed in the Arizona 
Legislature on the issue of the new bilingual education Bill highlights the difficulties which 
Mexican Americans faced in fully accessing the new rights granted under the BEA. Federal 
money funded small, ad hoc programs but the possibility that substantial numbers of Mexican 
American students could obtain bilingual education was contingent upon more extensive 
state-level measures. Aside from a minority of Arizona Legislators who were vocal advocates 
of bilingual education, in general, members of the Legislature, either because of inertia or 
disdain, demonstrated little interest in crafting legislation which would provide bilingual 
classes for language minority students.  
 
After the passage of bilingual education legislation in the Arizona Legislature, there existed 
two types of bilingual instruction, ESL and two way bilingual classes, funded through different 
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methods, federal grants and state appropriations. One provision of the Bill passed by the 
Arizona Legislature was that it required re-authorization after three years. Although the 
expansion of bilingual education through state legislation in itself represented progress for 
Mexican Americans, in the intervening period federal officials indicated a greater willingness 
to enforce the provisions of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. This concentrated the minds 
of education officials throughout the state and even prompted discussion in the Governor’s 
Office. The change in emphasis from federal officials began approximately two years after the 
passage of the Bilingual Education Act, when the Director of the Office for Civil Rights within 
H.E.W., Stanley Pottinger, wrote to school districts with more than five per cent national 
origin minority group children ‘to clarify D/HEW policy on issues concerning the responsibility 
of school districts to provide equal educational opportunity to national origin minority 
children deficient in English language skills.’203 Pottinger informed the school districts that 
they must take affirmative steps to rectify language deficiencies that prevent students from 
fully participating in instructional programs. Any programs introduced to achieve this must 
not ‘operate as an educational dead-end’.204 Williams and Sofstall seemed unwilling to do 
more than fulfil their statutory obligations to language minority origin students. They believed 
that the rudimentary programs, established in the state with federal money, would inoculate 
them from federal investigation. Upon receiving the memo, the Governor wrote to Sofstall 
for clarification of its implications for Arizonan schools, suggesting that ‘perhaps our bi-lingual 
[sic] programs give us a little lead time’.205 Williams enclosed Sofstall’s evaluation of Arizona’s 
bilingual programs in his response to Pottinger. Sofstall explained that ‘the local educational 
administration’ for bilingual education programs in Arizona were required to sign a 
declaration stating that they would comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and not 
discriminate against students on the grounds of ‘race, color, or national origin’. Sofstall 
explained that Arizona had ‘qualified consultants’ who ensure that schools receiving federal 
money comply with their legal obligations.206 
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For bilingual education advocates in Arizona, the next opportunity to make progress was the 
re-authorization process in the Legislature during 1972. Having established bilingual programs 
in public schools in 1969, bilingual advocates set about amending the relevant legislation to 
expand its scope. Democratic Senators such as Manuel ‘Lito’ Pena wrote a Bill that would have 
made bilingual education a universal right for Arizonan students. Although the need for a 
larger program was obvious, efforts to expand the program were once again stymied by 
Republican opposition.207 Yet, Pena and other bilingual advocates were able to secure 
students in the first eight grades of schooling were now eligible to enrol and the stipulation 
that pupils were limited to one course of instruction was removed. The funding appropriation 
was also increased to $50 per unit of instruction.208 In July 1973, Weldon Sofstall, issued a 
guide to administrators to bring clarity to the responsibilities placed on school districts 
following the re-authorization of state bilingual education legislation. The guidance focused 
on enforcement of the eligibility criteria, which became necessary after a stipulation was 
introduced that made school districts responsible for enforcing regulations related to the 
program. The biggest change was a requirement that a student might enrol in a bilingual 
education program only 'after satisfactory proof has been presented to the superintendent 
that the student is legally present in this state.'209 Although theoretically this regulation gave 
new responsibilities to school districts, in reality, it had little discernible impact immediately 
after it was introduced. There is neither any trace of an enforcement apparatus in the records 
belonging to the school districts or Arizona Department of Education, nor any local press 
stories of school children being turned away from school because they could not verify their 
status as legal residents. Seemingly no students were reported to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) because of their attempts to attend bilingual education classes.210  
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Lax enforcement, or intentional disregard of the regulations, meant that schools were 
providing language instruction to more pupils than they received funds for under the state 
funding formula. This meant that by the end of the decade, ADE reports recorded a fall in per 
capita spending for bilingual education, at a time when the numbers of students enrolled was 
rising. The annual report on Bilingual Instruction and Special English Training published in 
1978 for the subsequent school year celebrated ‘the successful growth of the program’, proof 
of which was signified by the 21,981 students receiving language instruction as a results of 
state funding.’211 This figure was recorded as the level of ‘Actual Student Participation’, as 
opposed to the concept of ‘Actual Daily Membership’, which ADE had previously relied upon 
as a means of determining funding appropriation. ‘Actual Student Participation’ was a new 
measurement for which the ADE only began collecting data during the 1977-1978 school year. 
It documented the existence of a shadow enrolment figure; a higher number of students were 
participating than the recorded daily membership number. In this school year the difference 
between the two was 4,414. By the 1979-80 school year, this shadow figure began to have 
significant implications for the financing of bilingual education. ADE reported that Arizonan 
public schools had ‘experienced an increase in the number of students of limited English 
proficiency in the 1979-80 school year’.212 This had caused a disparity between the levels of 
‘actual average daily membership’, recorded at 19,999, compared with the ‘actual student 
participation’ rate of 23,748. The cumulative impact of the increase of limited English 
proficiency children was to reduce the real terms level of funding from $50 per unit of 
instruction to $30.96.213 
 
The introduction of bilingual education in the late 1960s raised important questions 
concerning how best to configure such programs; the appropriate level of funding to allocate 
to them and how best to measure their efficacy. Whilst bilingual education was not a priority 
for many state politicians during the 1970s, it was not entirely peripheral. In 1972, Governor 
Jack Williams opened the 30th Session of the State Legislature by announcing that the 
education budget had expanded to consume 74 per cent of revenue collected by state 
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authorities. 214 Yet, as the economy slowed in the early part of the decade, policies were 
placed under increasing fiscal scrutiny, viewed through the prism of affordability and 
desirability, with the result that many previously successful initiatives were then considered 
frivolous in the harsher light of fiscal retrenchment.  
 
The first political conflict over bilingual education began less than a year after the Bill was 
signed into law. In early January 1970, the Republican-dominated Arizona Senate 
Appropriations Committee began deliberating on the state budget. Prior to this, the ADE had 
submitted a budget proposal which included a $200,000 appropriation for bilingual education 
in public schools, double that originally allocated by the Legislature. In response, the 
Appropriations Committee suggested half that amount.  Weldon Sofstall agreed to the 
proposal because he claimed he could not provide sufficient evidence the program was 
successful enough to justify the requested appropriation.215  Following this, on 13 January 
1970, a group of Mexican Americans from the Valle del Sol Coalition, an umbrella organization 
which encompassed 24 Phoenix-based Mexican American advocacy groups, confronted the 
State Superintendent at his office in the state capitol. Similar to recent Mexican American 
activism at PUHS and in south Phoenix, the group demanded properly funded bilingual 
education programs alongside efforts to make public institutions representative of local 
demographics. 216 The pressure from Valle del Sol appeared sufficient to influence Sofstall, as 
two months later, he reversed his position on bilingual education funding and wrote to the 
chairman of Appropriations Committee requesting the original sum be allocated. The 
Superintendent claimed that the proposed $100,000 would serve only 4,000 students across 
the state in accordance with the statutory rate of $25 per unit of instruction. However, 
evidence from the Arizona Department of Education indicated that, in reality, double that 
number of students were in need of bilingual education. Sofstall was clear: the Committee’s 
proposal was inadequate, and he supported the ADE’s request for a larger appropriation.217 
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By the spring of 1970, the federally funded program at PUHS had run into trouble. Guidelines 
for establishing programs under the BEA were ambiguous thus there was uncertainty 
amongst district officials regarding their legal obligations. In response to queries, federal 
authorities insisted that any program created under the federal mandate must be fully 
integrated and contain a balance of Mexican American and Anglo students. Federal officials 
from HEW instructed PUHS to create racial balance in their bilingual classes. This meant that 
PUHS had to include 25 freshmen and 30 sophomore students, who were not language 
minorities, in the program. According to the program’s director, Maria Vega, the compliance 
notice meant ‘a truly bilingual program . . . [would not] be possible.’218  This stipulation 
created a perverse situation whereby Anglo children, without any Spanish language skills, 
were attending bilingual classes specifically targeted at Mexican Americans, in order to 
comply with racial balance requirements. As a result, Mexican American students were 
missing out on the opportunity to participate in bilingual programs which they badly needed 
to improve their educational attainment. This incident was the first to be cited by opponents 
of the program as part of an emerging critique that bilingual education was inefficient and an 
example of liberal profligacy.219 
 
While bilingual education programs were threatened by regulations and limited funding 
appropriations, they were also threatened by public opinion. A report by the Phoenix Gazette 
into the use of bilingual education in the state’s schools captured contemporary discontent, 
describing the program’s uncertain place within the educational and political landscape. ‘In 
Arizona’, they argued, ‘the foundation for bilingual education seems to rest not on any 
popular will of the people, but on a grudging compliance with federal mandates.’220 The fact 
that the programs were federally mandated created a climate of opposition. This, according 
to the State Director of Bilingual Education, Nancy Mendoza, meant that bilingual education 
‘[was] seen in the same light as civil rights activism, ethnic studies and affirmative action. 
People react to those issues emotionally.’221 Even within Mexican American communities, 
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there was opposition to the initiatives. One local teacher stated he did not support bilingual 
education because ‘English is the official language of the country and those kids have got to 
learn it.’ He also questioned the value of such within the school environment, stating ‘I don’t 
need the teacher to teach me my language or culture . . . I can learn my culture at home.’ The 
President of the board of trustees for Phoenix Elementary School District offered only 
qualified support of the program, arguing that bilingual education was necessary in the first 
three grades but only as a narrow remedial measure.222  
 
Appraisals of the bilingual education programs introduced in the initial years after the federal 
government and state Legislature intervened were undermined by a lack of clarity about the 
objectives of the program. Although local press reports were not uniformly negative, one 
report In March 1972 described the bilingual program as a ‘success’. It did so for reasons that 
differed from Mexican Americans’ criteria for judging the program.223 In particular, the first 
two years of the program had been successful in helping Mexican American children learn 
English. The report understood bilingual education, especially the ESL method, as a means of 
improving assimilation. This was in line with the views of conservative supporters of bilingual 
education, who argued that once Limited English Proficiency children had been given a course 
of remedial instruction, they would integrate into mainstream Arizonan society and culture 
with greater ease. This was an altogether different measure of success to bilingual advocates 
in PUHSD and Chicano activists, who believed that the aim of bilingual education was to 
encourage cultural pride.  In this regard, even a small bilingual program created greater 
acceptance of Spanish language use. One teacher noted at the school ten years earlier ‘kids 
got slapped if they spoke Spanish’.224 It was this change in approach, not assimilation, that 
was the aim.  
 
In the 1972-1973 school year, bilingual education classes at PUHS contained 250 students 
across three stages organized according to age. Most were long term residents in the U.S., 
but 22 students in the program had travelled to the country from Mexico less than 18 months 
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earlier.225 Incorporating recent arrivals into the schooling system was not easy. An annual 
report prepared for the Governor in the same period noted that 6,900 migrant children had 
been educated at '27 common schools, secondary schools, junior colleges, and 
universities.’226 ADE officials were concerned about the condition of migrant children being 
subsumed into the education system. Many such children, the report noted, 'were identified 
as lacking in health and nutritional needs', whilst others were seen as ‘educationally deprived' 
and thus required additional schooling 'to assist in bringing them up to grade level.'227 The 
annual report also documented the legislative appropriations for the State Department of 
Education. Aid to bilingual students for the fiscal year of 1972 - 73 was recorded at $200,000, 
showing how the appropriation had recovered to the level it was at two years earlier after 
being halved in 1970. At first sight, this marked progress, yet in comparison to other 
educational spending commitments, funding remained low. For example, support for 'Gifted 
Pupils' in the same year stood at $208,000. The entire budget administered by the ADE was 
$201,977,250. This figure had increased by a third in just four years. A significant increase in 
the Basic Grant for educational costs accounted for most of the rise in education spending.228 
 
Despite additional money being made available after the state program’s legislative re-
authorization, the funding appropriation set by the Arizona Legislature placed significant 
strain on local school districts. Arizona Revised Statute  – 1099 had allocated $50 per unit of 
instruction but the report explained this was inadequate to meet the challenges faced by 
schools with high language minority enrolments. In 1976, there was a ratio of 146 students 
to every one member of instructional staff. The $50 appropriation would enable a district with 
100 language minority students to hire just one member of staff. This placed a significant 
burden on local school districts to provide the supplementary funds necessary to make 
bilingual programs viable. In the 1972 and 1973 school years, local districts had spent more 
on language education than the state administration. But even after the increased 
appropriation in 1974, local and state support had only reached a point of near parity. In the 
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1976 school year, the state spent $832,827 in comparison with $819,260 spent by local 
districts. The ADE’s report recognised the increase in support from both local and state 
sources but argued ‘the commitment is still far from sufficient to meet the need.’229 It 
estimated that 33,968 (75 per cent) ‘Spanish Surname’ students in grades Kindergarten to 
four were eligible to receive bilingual instruction but were not currently being served by a 
state funded program. An additional 16,907 (50 per cent) students in grades 5 to 8 were also 
not receiving bilingual education despite being eligible.230  
 
The new rights granted to Mexican Americans as language minority citizens represented 
significant progress. The passage of the federal Bilingual Education Act forced state politicians 
in Arizona to consider an issue that was previously peripheral to the Legislative agenda. Unlike 
California and Texas, states with histories of greater accommodation of language minorities 
and willingness amongst local political actors to introduce bilingual programs, Arizona had a 
history of hostility towards the use of Spanish. These trends were evident in political conflicts 
over bilingual education. State politicians took up the issue reluctantly and many conservative 
members of the Legislature tried to restrict the eligibility of state funded programs to a small 
group of students. This made the survival of bilingual education in a meaningful form beyond 
the initial year after the Arizona Legislature introduced an appropriation to support it, was far 
from certain. It also created a complex web of programs and methods. For example, the 
majority of students receiving bilingual instruction relied upon the state funded programs 
that were restricted to limited English proficiency students in the first eight grades of 
schooling. But bilingual classes funded by the state government were restricted to using the 
ESL method that would later be struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. Ostensibly, students 
in PUHSD were able to attend a full bilingual program but in practice the numbers able to 
access the classes were low due to the limited fiscal appropriation made by Congress. 
Although those rights were fragile and contested, their survival indicated that the racial 
politics of the state, which sought conformity through the use of English Only, had been 
unsettled. 
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Classroom Materials Committee 
 
As has been seen, various challenges were mounted throughout the 1960s and 1970s to 
aspects of education policy in Arizona, not least by Mexican Americans, using direct action, 
political campaigns or bureaucratic channels. A typical response to such action was the 
creation of committees to investigate the contested issue further. Often these committees 
produced reports which validated the complaints raised, but substantive action rarely 
followed. However, such committees were not unimportant because they created forums for 
debate between key political actors. The Classroom Materials Committee (CMC) created in 
1968 was an example of such a forum. 
 
If language education was a contentious topic, so too were issues relating to curriculum and 
classroom materials, with many Mexican Americans believing such did not adequately 
represent their history. In September 1968, the State Board of Education agreed to establish 
a committee to identify classroom materials which were more representative of minority 
histories and cultures. In doing so, the Board believed it would appear responsive to minority 
concerns. Yet, beyond this, their decision represented, at the very least, a partial recognition 
of the increased visibility and strengthened political voice which Mexican Americans had 
secured in recent years. Once established, the Committee comprised some of the most 
important education officials in the state, including Eugene Marin, State Director of the 
Arizona Office of Economic Opportunity, through whom the Governor’s office become 
involved. Collectively, these individuals were given the task of compiling a bibliography of 
alternative materials which schools could use to make their syllabuses more representative. 
The bibliography was intended to ‘depict the contributions minority groups, have made, and 
are making, in our society.’231 The final decision, however, remained with individual school 
districts; the Committee had the power only to recommend, not compel the use of new 
materials. 
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The Committee met regularly, but made little tangible progress, largely due to certain 
unenthusiastic and apathetic members. A memo circulated in November 1968 suggested that 
the Committee was bloated and lacked direction: 
 
‘Members of the Committee – Nameless because it has so many names, but it is the one 
appointed by the State Board of Education to do something (we’re not sure what) toward 
improving educational opportunity about and for minority groups.’232  
 
The textbook Committee presented their findings and conclusions to the state board of 
education on 24 February 1969. Yet, before the presentation, members of the Committee 
clashed over the unwillingness of some members to give its work serious consideration. The 
chairman of the Committee, Eddie Myles, wrote to his colleagues to stress the importance of 
full participation in the preparation of their final recommendations and subsequent 
presentation to the board. Those events, he wrote, would determine ‘whether we succeed or 
fail.’ He also reminded Committee members that the work itself was something they believed 
was long overdue’.233 But Marin did not heed the warning, attending neither the Committee’s 
final meetings nor the presentation. In response, Myles wrote to Marin to express his 
disappointment and stated clearly that the meetings were of such importance that was 
necessary to ask him ‘quite frankly, are you really interested in the problem to the extent you 
wish to continue to serve on the committee.’234 In the end, the textbook Committee failed to 
reach a consensus or agree a list of recommended books of classroom materials.  
 
In moments of acute political crisis, such as the PUHS protests, politicians and education 
officials were prepared to make rhetorical commitments to addressing the concerns raised 
by Mexican Americans. However, amongst education officials in the governing institutions of 
Phoenix and the state administration, the period of 1968-1980 was one of a perennial political 
indifference towards Mexican Americans. The expansion of Latino civil rights during the 1960s 
enabled local Mexican Americans to obtain a hearing within the political institutions of the 
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state, yet meaningful change in policy was often not forthcoming despite this newfound 
voice. A similar pattern of inaction is evident one year later, in 1969, when the political 
pressure on state officials appeared to be reaching a critical mass. Just a few weeks after the 
violence at PUHS, Dr. Welton P. Sofstall, established the Minority Group Educational Advisory 
Commission, which had the singular purpose of investigating the educational needs of 
minority groups. For someone occupying the highest position in the state’s education system, 
Softsall was remarkably aloof and detached from contemporaneous education debates. 
When he spoke at the first meeting of the Committee on 13 December 1969, he admitted ‘I 
don’t know the answers’. He also appeared unaware of the longstanding appeal from Mexican 
Americans for educational programs to target their unique situation. For example, he stated, 
‘I don’t know if the injustices suffered by the three minorities [African American, Mexican 
American and Native American] here are different or not.’ 235  
 
Although Sofstall established the investigatory committee, his personal hostility to 
interventions by the state undermined any perception that Mexican Americans would receive 
a receptive response to their concerns. During his tenure, Mexican Americans faced a hostile 
education bureaucracy, in which Sofstall was the most senior figure and demonstrated a lack 
of interest in addressing the attainment gap between Mexican Americans and Anglos. He 
believed that ‘the sole function of government should be to provide the person with the 
individual liberty to achieve his God-given destiny on this earth.’236 Sofstall opposed any 
interventions of the state to provide social welfare or education programs and although he 
did not sabotage or hinder the state bilingual education program, it was not a priority and he 
expressed little interest in doing more than fulfilling its statutory obligations.237 The limited 
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bilingual education programs in the state were not sufficient to meet the level of demand or 
the scale of the attainment gap between Mexican Americans and Anglo students. Four 
Mexican American educators wrote to the Governor in May 1970 to urge him to take further 
action to reduce the ‘injustices in the education of Mexican-American children in Arizona’. 
They argued that the magnitude of the problem required an immediate intervention to 
overcome the ‘failure to understand the unique language learning problems of the Mexican-
American’, amongst other suggestions about the recruitment of more Mexican American 
teachers.238 Yet, when members of Arizona’s Legislature asked for direction about the Arizona 
Department of Education’s priorities for the 1971 Legislative Session, Softsall responded by 
listing his view of the current ‘educational deficiencies’: ‘Drug abuse prevention’, ‘Moral 
values – juvenile conduct’, and ‘Love of country’, amongst others, but his list made no 
mention of any education programs to address the attainment gap or language deficiencies 
in Arizonan schools.239 
 
Sofstall was not the only prominent figure to display such a lack of understanding. On 18 May 
1970, Governor Jack Williams attended a public meeting at PUHS to address the concerns of 
Mexican American parents regarding the quality of education provided in the state. Parents 
complained that schools had ‘failed to meet some of the most important educational needs’ 
of Mexican American children and highlighted particular areas of concern, most notably the 
ongoing problem of bilingual education; the acute lack of cultural understanding and the 
failure to provide Citizenship classes.240 In response, the Governor admitted that he was 
unaware of the difficulties Mexican Americans faced in education. Given that the protests at 
PUHS earlier in the school year had been a prominent news event, this admission was 
surprising for many. Eugene Marin, a member of Williams’ office with a designated portfolio 
for Mexican American affairs had written five articles which ruminated on earlier protests, 
their causes and their implications for the city's racial politics. For Williams to tell parents that 
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he was unaware of the problems they faced indicated either that he had entirely delegated 
that area of policy to Marin, or that his response was disingenuous.   
 
In its brief, Sofstall asked the Advisory Commission to identify the causes of Mexican American 
underachievement in education and recommend possible solutions. In its final report to the 
State Superintendent in 1970, the Committee was highly critical of Arizona’s education 
system. Put simply, 
 
‘[t]he present program of instruction in most Arizona schools, particularly those in the larger 
urban centres, has failed to meet some of the most important educational needs of a 
significant majority of Mexican-American children’.241  
 
To read the report’s conclusion is to see that Mexican Americans faced entrenched, structural 
barriers that bilingual education alone could not solve. The report depicted the institutions of 
Arizonan schooling as unresponsive and alienating, points which indicated the Committee 
was sympathetic to the arguments made by minority parents. According to the report, 
Mexican American children entered the classroom with pre-existing educational deficiencies, 
but these were exacerbated by staff who were unable or unwilling to offer remedial 
instruction. In the case of Phoenix, the Committee believed the difficult school experiences 
and unequal education outcomes for Mexican Americans were derived, in part, from the 
divided metropolitan landscape. Mexican Americans residing in the densely populated South 
Phoenix barrios faced significant disadvantages in comparison with their Anglo peers in 
PUHSD. The most important force shaping the attainment of Mexican American students was 
the ‘different cultural and linguistic forces not shared by his Anglo peers nor, in most cases by 
his teachers and the educational system.’242 These linguistic and cultural difficulties were, 
according to the report, in a large part due to a persistent lack of funds or training for 
teachers. School districts had done ‘[l]ititle or nothing’ to ‘update the competency of 
classroom teachers’ as the result of a fundamental unwillingness to address the problems of 
Spanish-speaking children. Based on these findings, the Committee recommended the 





Superintendent instruct school districts to audit the students under their jurisdiction to 
establish the extent of language deficiencies in the state. They believed that the existing 
provisions were not adequate to meet the needs of language minority students and once a 
full appraisal of the demand had been ascertained, districts should develop language 
instruction classes to be conducted by qualified staff, to be achieved through a combination 
of training for existing staff and targeted recruitment of bilingual specialists. They also 
highlight longstanding recommendations, made by other investigatory committees, such as 
the preparation of a curriculum which reflected minority history and culture more 
appropriately than materials currently used in classrooms.243  
 
In the report, the Committee also cited the lack of Mexican Americans employed as teachers 
or administrators as a cause of the attainment gap between Mexican American students and 
their Anglo peers. During the 1968-69 school year, 12,467 elementary school teachers were 
employed in the state but only 448 were recorded as being Spanish-surnamed. The 
proportion of Spanish-surnamed high school teachers was only marginally better. Of a total 
of 5,119 teachers, only 253 were Spanish-surnamed. In the 1969-70 school year, 1044 
administrators were employed in the state’s public schools yet only 32 elementary school 
administrators were recorded as ‘Spanish-surnamed’. In the state’s high schools, just seven 
‘Spanish-surnamed’ individuals were employed as administrators.244 These disparities, the 
report stated, had arisen because ‘[i]n the past, school districts have made it a practice, 
consciously or unconsciously, not to recruit Mexican-American teachers.’ More than this, 
‘very little effort has been made to utilize positively the personal and professional resources 
of the Mexican-American teachers who are currently employed.’245 Statistics for the entire 
state obscured worse levels of minority employment in Maricopa County, which included the 
state’s largest city, Phoenix, and largest population of Mexican Americans. Despite the 
significant minority population, only 2.8 percent of teachers in the county were Spanish-
surnamed and only 2 Spanish-surnamed administrators were employed in Maricopa County 
school districts.  
                                                        
243 Idem. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Mexican American Educational Needs: A Report for the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 1970. 




To combat this problem, the Committee made comprehensive recommendations regarding 
the reform of hiring practices and school governance. First among them was the 
recommendation that school districts should make the hiring of Mexican American educators 
an immediate priority. The purpose of this recruitment drive was to establish a policy of 
maintaining staff levels ‘proportionate to the number of Mexican-American students enrolled 
in the district.’246 Another recommendation stated that schools with a high enrolment of 
Mexican American students should test candidates for administrative roles in relation to their 
‘competence in meeting the needs of Mexican-American children’. Similarly, the Committee 
suggested that school districts should establish guidelines to ensure teachers in areas with 
large minority enrolments ‘have strong empathy for and a deep understanding of the 
Mexican-American.’ The governance structures of school districts should also include a 
‘standing committee of Mexican-American educators to inform it on matters concerning 
Mexican-Americans.’247  
 
If Williams was previously unaware of the disadvantages Mexican Americans, and other racial 
minorities, suffered in the state’s public schools, he was left in no doubt following the 
Committee’s report. This newfound awareness coupled with the stark nature of the report’s 
findings led many to expect an urgent policy response, but this did not occur. Sofstall himself 
had little power to compel school districts to change their schools, nor could he exert any 
influence over a racially segregated metropolitan landscape. His power was largely confined 
to setting priorities and shaping the contours of discussion about education policy. Yet, his 
response, or any sustained effort to make progress in spite of his limited powers, 
demonstrated that he was not interested in implementing reform to reduce the racial 
attainment gap. Thus, as with other committees formed to investigate minority affairs, many 
of the Commission’s recommendations were not implemented, particularly those related to 
course content. Together, the examples of the Classroom Materials Committee and the 
Minority Group Educational Advisory Commission clearly show that the usual pattern 
following publication of their findings was inertia. Yet, the Commission’s report was not 





completely ignored, as PUHSD implemented some limited reform. Within two years of the 
findings, officials had amended the district’s staff recruitment policies to broadly mirror those 
contained in the Commission’s suggestions. This change was announced on 18 January 1972, 
when Gerald DeCrow, Superintendent of PUHSD, wrote to secondary school principals under 
his direction to inform them of a new recruitment policy. Closing the Parity Gap, as DeCrow 
called it, codified a policy of improving the proportion of minority teachers ‘as rapidly as 
possible.’248 DeCrow explained that his aim was to ensure that the number of minority staff 
employed on each high school campus in the city corresponded with the level of minority 
enrolment in that particular school. DeCrow argued that the school system not only had a 
responsibility to comply with the anti-discrimination law but also a ‘moral commitment as a 
public body to move expeditiously to close the parity gap.’249 
 
In the 1969-70 school year, just 78 of 2,643 teachers in high schools within Maricopa County 
were ‘Spanish Surnamed’ and just two high school administrators were ‘Spanish 
Surnamed’.250 
Therefore, DeCrow’s commitment to improving the demographics of the PUHSD teaching 
staff was an important moment of recognition, validating concerns that Mexican Americans 
in Phoenix had raised for many years. But it was only one demand met amongst many 
advanced. The majority of issues, which Mexican Americans, and now ADE-appointed 
Committee members, had highlighted as contributory factors in a schooling system which 
produced different education outcomes depending largely on a student’s race, remained 
unresolved. In truth, therefore, the importance of the Advisory Commission’s report lay not 
in the action which resulted directly from it, but rather it removed the possibility that Sofstall 
did not know the disadvantages which Mexican American students faced in the classroom. 
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Bilingual Education politics 
 
The 1974 election cycle returned the issues of minority representation and the education of 
Mexican Americans to the forefront of state politics. Sofstall had declined to seek a full term 
as Superintendent, leaving an open contest that year. Despite suggestions that bilingual 
education did not command wide public support, Carolyn Warner made the policy a 
prominent feature of her campaign for State Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1974. 
Warner had grown up in Oklahoma, briefly attending the University of Oklahoma before 
moving to Arizona in 1953. She became involved in the Phoenix education system as her 
children attended local schools. She was elected to the board of Phoenix Union High School 
District before deciding to seek the Superintendent’s Office in 1974.251 Three weeks before 
polling day, Warner stated that the bilingual program in Arizona was ‘one of the finest  . . . in 
the country, but it needs to be expanded even further.’252 Warner calculated that there were 
125,000 bilingual students in the state who would benefit from an enlarged instruction 
program, yet state and federally funded programs combined only reached 20,000 students, a 
mere 16% of those who required support. Warner argued that, if elected, she would attempt 
to expand bilingual programs into all high schools. She argued this could be done without 
raising additional revenues, simply by taking ‘another look at our priorities, understand[ing] 
the problem, and start doing something about it.’253Beyond bilingual education, Warner 
attempted to address the wider issue of inequality, arguing that substantial remedial 
measures were required to continue the progress of racial integration in public schools. She 
argued that politicians and education officials ‘have to strive to do everything possible to 
equalize educational opportunities through legal means’. This included, ‘student exchanges, 
integrated employees of school districts, and better educational opportunities for all.’ 
Warner’s support for these measures represented a break with educational orthodoxy under 
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Sofstall, who, as Superintendent, firmly supported a policy of localism and non-intervention 
in schooling matters.254  
 
Even in a year when the Democratic Party was particularly successful, Warner’s victory in 1974 
was impressive. In the November elections Democrats won the Governorship, as well as state-
wide elections for Secretary of State and Attorney General. Democrats also gained seats in 
the Legislature. They reduced the Republican majority in the House and gained control of the 
Senate after eight years in the minority. However, Warner’s result was the most decisive 
victory; she received 296,844 votes while her opponent, Bill Roark, received 200,859. This 
meant that she obtained the highest number of votes of any Democratic candidate 
participating in a state-wide election that year. Irrespective of party, only Barry Goldwater, in 
his successful re-election campaign for the U.S. Senate, obtained more votes than Warner.255  
 
Warner’s election to the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction changed the priorities 
of state education institutions. A few months into her term, Warner highlighted 
‘bilingual/bicultural education’ as the primary problem facing Arizona public schools.’256  A 
quarter of students in Arizona public schools lived in a non-English speaking home. This, in 
addition to the high dropout rate of Mexican American students, convinced Warner that 
bilingual education should be a policy priority. This was scarcely a majority view. In the 
summer of 1975, Warner wrote to the Chairman of the Arizona House of Representatives 
Judiciary Committee, Peter Kay, a Republican representing the 26th Arizona Legislature 
district, which included the eastern fringe of Phoenix, to build consensus around her 
agenda.257 To her letter, Warner attached a newspaper article which highlighted bilingual 
education as a priority for her administration and asked for Kay’s comments. In his response, 
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Kay stated that he did ‘not feel that bilingualism is the Number One issue in education in the 
State of Arizona’.258  
 
Within a year of taking office, Carolyn Warner ordered a fundamental review of education in 
Arizona. For her, and the newly-appointed Committee, the importance of the classroom and 
the education provided within it transcended mere pedagogic instruction. Instead, she 
believed '[t]he patterns shaped by schools become part of what we as individuals accept as 
normal in society.'259 Education was, therefore, simultaneously a reflection of contemporary 
society and a vehicle to impart values onto future citizens. Now that the ADE was under new 
leadership, in particular with a Superintendent who was sympathetic to minority affairs, there 
was a possibility of meaningful change in Arizona’s education system. Similar to earlier 
reviews, the Superintendent’s Committee findings were critical of Arizonan education. The 
report noted that ‘Schools have generally reflected society's values and modelled them.'260 
For example, they found schooling in Arizona had been largely constructed along patriarchal 
lines, as men occupied most senior teaching and governance roles. Alongside this, within the 
classroom itself, there were clearly defined gender roles for boys and girls centred upon 
traditional ideas about masculinity and femininity. Males were encouraged towards athletic 
pursuits, females towards passivity and domestic skills. The Committee’s report also 
addressed the racial orientation of education. Schools had traditionally 'modeled [sic] a 
monochromatic society'. As late as 1970, school textbooks had reflected these 
'racist/monochromatic views', highlighting the difficulties that Mexican Americans faced in 
public schools.261  
 
In the initial years of her tenure, Carolyn Warner had been focused upon expanding the 
availability of state-funded bilingual education programs. Her administration had hoped to 
secure a new state law that would mandate school districts to provide ‘programs of oral-
English development of the limited English-speaking’. Other recommendations for members 
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of the Arizona Legislature to consider included an increase of the per child allocation to 
$100,000 and a fairer funding formula based upon the needs of a school district.262 However, 
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the Lau v. Nichols case of 1974, school districts in 
Arizona were increasingly concerned about complying with federal mandates for language 
minority students. The driver in this development was a case originating in California. A group 
of Chinese American parents brought the suit against the San Francisco public schools on the 
basis that the district’s failure to provide bilingual instruction deprived their children of a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in the classroom. The lower courts had dismissed the 
arguments made by Lau’s lawyers that this violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The 
Courts ruled that Chinese American students received the same education as other students, 
meaning that there was no discrimination. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case 
and handed down its ruling in January 1974, in which they reversed the Court of Appeal’s 
earlier ruling. Consequently, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the Equal Protection 
argument but they upheld OCR’s regulations, described in the 1970 memo from Stanley J. 
Pottinger.263 The Supreme Court's ruling in Lau and the re-categorization of ESL as insufficient 
under the subsequent HEW directive meant that, from then on, several school districts in 
Arizona were no longer in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bilingual 
education had been established in the state primarily under the ESL method. But the use of 
ESL also represented the fundamental ideological understanding that many politicians and 
educational officials in Arizona held. Yet, the ruling did not appear to immediately alter the 
education of Mexican Americans in Arizona. 
 
The first signs of action occurred in 1976 when, as a result of the Lau ruling, Warner appointed 
a task force to identify the remedies available to school districts with a high proportion of 
language minority students. The task force comprised education professionals from across 
the state and in October of that year, they submitted their findings to the Superintendent. 
The ADE had no power to enforce new regulations; rather the findings served only as 
suggestions for districts on how to ensure compliance with federal mandates. Even the task 
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force's more limited objectives, identifying and sharing effective methods, had to contend 
with the strong impulse to resist a centralising educational bureaucracy and maintain local 
control of schooling in Arizona. Such was the case that an official from the ADE wrote to the 
Chairman of the task force to specify it was not the Department's policy  
 
'to mandate specific compliance plans to local school districts and a district which chooses to 
follow alternative compliance plans may do so as long as it can show that the alternatives are 
as effective as the suggestions of the Task Force document.'264  
 
The task force suggested that high school districts should consider four approaches for 
students whose home language, or first language, was not English. These included combining 
teaching subject matters in the student's native language with English as second language 
program; teaching subject matters in the student's native language with a bridge into English 
program; teaching solely under an English as second language program (ESL); or a full bilingual 
instruction method.265 Elementary schools were advised to establish programs which were 
entirely bilingual. For the task force, although the ESL method was considered a component 
part of a bilingual instruction program, it was not acceptable in and of itself. This view derived 
from the Lau ruling and the subsequent directive released by the federal Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which became known as the Lau Remedies. The 
Remedies stipulated how school districts should interpret the recent Supreme Court ruling. 
In particular, the directive confirmed that the ruling had outlawed the use of ESL as a method 
for teaching non-English speakers. The Remedies stated that whilst 'ESL is a necessary 
component' of teaching programs, it 'may not be sufficient as the only program operated by 
a district to respond to the educational needs of all the types of students'.266 
 
As demonstrated earlier, different opinions regarding the most suitable method of instruction 
was a proxy for differing views concerning the program itself. In the years immediately after 
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the introduction of state-funded bilingual education, Mexican American parents at PUHS 
argued for a full bilingual program throughout the school. Grace Blossom, President of the 
Arizona Bilingual Council, wrote to the editor of the Arizona Republic to make the case for a 
two-way bilingual program. She estimated that ’90 per cent of bilingual students’ in Arizonan 
schools ‘have great difficulty reading at grade level’. Blossom argued that the current 
instruction programs, which focussed solely on spoken English skills, was a major reason for 
the Mexican American student dropout problem.267For some Mexican Americans, the 
introduction of bilingual instruction in schools was just one part of a wider agenda to reclaim 
the bilingual-bicultural history which they believed had been lost as a result of Anglo-
American conquest. For others, a true bilingual program would create space for greater 
recognition and celebration of Mexican American heritage whilst also being the only method 
to close the attainment gap.  
 
Continuing a pattern established following the PUHS protests, parents and bilingual education 
advocates sought to influence policy through local school districts. These included PUHS’s 
advisory council of parents, established to discuss the needs of Mexican Americans at the 
school, and the PUHSD bilingual program, a forum for teachers and public officials to organise 
bilingual education provision. The responsibilities of the bilingual advisory council was to 
‘outline the Phoenix Union High School District Bilingual Program . . . and to seek the advice 
of the Task Force on the direction for expansion of Bilingual Education through District and 
Federal funds.’ Similar to the advisory council, the task force was made up of educators from 
schools in Phoenix with a significant bilingual enrolment, along with representatives from the 
Arizona state administration and members of the State Legislature with a policy interest in 
bilingual education. State Senators Felix and Guteirrez were also invited to attend. 268 
 
At a meeting of the task force on 21 January 1974, a representative from the Arizona State 
Department, Hank Arredondo, argued for the need to establish a ‘true Bilingual Program’. He 
defined such a program as including an all-encompassing approach to cultural pluralism. For 
Arrendondo, a ‘true’ bilingual program ‘involves all students in a multi-lingual – multi-cultural 
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program’, including study of all languages and cultures present in a school, hence it would 
‘not just involve Mexican-American students.’ The State legislation which was being debated 
at the time aimed to ‘help all students become Bilingual-Bicultural’ in this manner. During the 
meeting, Arrendondo’s interpretation of the aims of bilingual instruction was accepted as the 
consensus view of the task force. Collectively, they agreed on ‘the need for Bilingual Programs 
that are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural.’ The bilingual task force also endorsed the need to 
make progress towards ‘a comprehensive approach to Bilingual Education.’269 
 
Mexican Americans working on the task force attempted to use its work to expand bilingual 
education, but there was a lack of consensus in relation to how this should be achieved. A 
representative from other secondary schools in the city spoke of the need to expand the 
fledgling bilingual program at South Mountain, and support schools other than PUHS. Another 
suggestion was that the number of schools providing bilingual classes should be expanded. 
Maria Vega, the bilingual education co-ordinator at PUHS, told the meeting that bilingual 
classes should be adapted to include ‘Mexican-American culture and Mexican History.’ She 
explained that, of the schools in PUHSD which offered bilingual education, PUHS had the 
largest enrolment in bilingual classes, with roughly 400 students by 1974. The program at 
PUHS was being supplemented with funds from federal Title VII appropriations. Students in 
the ninth grade were taught courses on ‘Spanish, Reading, English, Math and Mexican 
History.’ But as students progressed through the school, the range of courses available to 
them was reduced. Just a year later, tenth grade students could attend only ‘Spanish, English 
and American History.’ Junior level students were taught only ‘English and Spanish’ and Senior 
year students just Spanish. Maria Vega was keen to stress the impact that the program had 
on the educational attainment of students who enrolled in the program. ‘[M]any students 
who graduated from the bilingual program’, she argued, ‘hold responsible jobs in the 
community where they use their bilingual talents.’270  
 
South Mountain High School reported that, in 1974, their bilingual program served 100 
students. The school also had a class of students from Mexico and Costa Rica who possessed 





no English skills. Bilingual instruction classes at East High School served only 50 students. Roy 
Flores, speaking for East High, noted that ‘most of the students in the program did not live in 
the East High attendance zone but came from Phoenix Union and South Mountain attendance 
areas.’ Flores was also concerned that bilingual programs in the upcoming school year would 
be required to include ‘students who were not just remedial.’271The requirement to include 
native English speakers would reduce the number of LEP students which could be served by 
the program.  
 
Later in the meeting, Vega argued that additional funds should be sought for ‘counselor 
involvement in home visitation and fulltime bilingual counselling.’272 Her remarks re-iterate 
how bilingual education transcended the classroom, incorporating both the public and private 
sphere. Whether intentional or not, the program had the additional effect of reforming 
parents: bilingual instruction programs aimed not just to help Mexican American children, but 
also to reshape the language practices of Spanish-speaking parents. Robert Dye, the Principal 
of PUHS, endorsed the recommendations which resulted from the advisory committee. 
Mexican American parents had previously criticised Dye during the 1969 walkout, as they 
believed he did not take their concerns seriously. His support for the conclusions of the 
Committee indicated some education officials were becoming more responsive to the 
concerns of Mexican Americans. This history of bilingual education and the committees that 
were established to examine the provision in Arizona demonstrates the contests that were 
ever present throughout the decade after its introduction. To ensure the survival of bilingual 
education, its advocates were required to negotiate and work within the education system, 
eventually securing a gradual expansion of available programs. But as the decade progressed, 













Despite pressure from Mexican American parents to expand the program, the continued 
existence of bilingual education even in its most basic form became increasingly doubtful, as 
the difficulties faced by the program became more severe by the end of the 1970s. PUHS’s 
reliance on federal monies left it at the mercy of bureaucratic officials in HEW and the U.S. 
Congress. Eventually, after five years of funding, the federal government reduced the amount 
of financial support available to PUHS. On 31 January 1977, PUHS was notified funding for its 
bilingual program would be removed at the end of the school year.273 The loss of federal funds 
would undermine the bilingual provision available to students at the school.  
 
The PUHS Advisory Committee wrote to the PUHS Board to express its view that ESL ‘will not 
be an effective replacement to the Bilingual Program’. They clearly stated that ‘it will not be 
fair to either the students or the community as a whole to try to make them think that the 
new program is a “Bilingual Program” just because one of its sections has been called 
“bilingual.”’274 Some members of the Committee argued that providing only ESL would 
produce inferior results and waste tax revenues, whilst others made provocative suggestions 
regarding the motives of the state administration and the Board of Education, suggesting they 
were influenced by ‘a strong desire to suffocate the longings of the Mexican-American 
student and of the Chicano community for a substantial improvement in education.’ For those 
in power, the success of the bilingual education threatened the existing racial and economic 
order which underpinned Arizonan society and was thus viewed with suspicion. Committee 
members argued that politicians and public officials saw Mexican Americans as a racially 
inferior people who ‘should be for ever destined to perform the menial chores in our society.’ 
A thriving bilingual program provided Mexican American students with an opportunity to 
break the cycle of educational underachievement which had persisted for many decades. The 
reluctance of the Arizona Legislature to fund a replacement program, they argued, was 
intended ‘to keep the Mexican-Americans “where they belong”’ and ‘to destroy THEIR 
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PROGRAM.’275 The Advisory Committee also warned that Chicanos in the city were watching 
carefully to see how the Board would act, implying that the unrest of 1969/70 could occur 
again.  
 
Supporters of bilingual education had achieved incremental expansion of the state-funded 
program throughout the decade since its inception.  More money than ever before had been 
appropriated to fund the program and educate students. Although the sums remained 
relatively small compared with the state’s overall budget, this progress nevertheless 
represented an important victory for local Mexican Americans. Yet, the program remained 
contested and many questions about its effectiveness were left unanswered. In the second 
half of the 1970s, these challenges became more vocal, threatening the continuation of 
bilingual education in Arizona. 
 
Arizona statute stipulated that the ADE was obligated to prepare an annual report concerning 
bilingual instruction programs within the state. In spite of mounting political pressure and 
increased questioning, the 1977 report was unequivocal in terms of the program’s success. 
Increased funding under the 1973 legislation had had a significant impact on the number of 
students receiving instruction. Before it was expanded in 1973, the number of students 
enrolled had dwindled to 2,000 but by 1977 the number had increased to 21,981. ‘Bilingual 
Instruction and Special English Training in Arizona’ the report argued, ‘has the potential of 
being one of the most productive programs we have ever had in our schools.’ 276 
 
In a late 1970s context when PUHSD was administering budget cuts to schools within the city 
the program was surprisingly durable. Dr. John Walters, Assistant Superintendent of PUHSD, 
confirmed in 1972 that bilingual education funding would not be cut. Instead, the district 
would absorb the cost of the program without requesting further federal funds. A condition 
of the funding stated that PUHS must submit an annual evaluation report detailing the 
progress of students within the bilingual program.277 In reality, this meant that students 
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receiving bilingual education were assessed using the Stanford Reading Test before they 
enrolled in the program and again at the end of the program. The evaluation report showed 
that the bilingual program contributed to modest improvements in the educational 
attainment of those enrolled. Students 
 
 ‘whether they are Spanish or English dominant, will increase their reading proficiency by a 
mean minimum of 1.5 grade levels between pre and post administration of the Stanford 
Reading Test.’278 
 
When a critical national report, produced by the American Institute of Research (AIR) for the 
U.S. Office of Education, was released in July 1978, it had local implications in Arizona. At its 
core, the report argued that students in bilingual education classes were not learning English 
any faster than their counterparts in non-bilingual classes. Yet, both the method and findings 
of the report were controversial. One critical response was circulated within the Arizona 
Superintendent of Public Instruction's office and submitted to AIR for inclusion in the final 
version of the report. Written by former members of AIR, it expressed concern at the findings 
published and intended to 'correct interpretations of the findings, suggest alternative 
interpretations, and identify the limitations of the study.'279 The document dissected AIR’s 
method of the study, with particular focus on the evidence behind the claim that students in 
bilingual classes did not make more progress learning English than those outside the program.  
 
Regardless of its flaws, the report provided sceptics with the intellectual authority to 
challenge bilingual education in public schools. One Arizona State Senator wrote to Carolyn 
Warner, enclosing an editorial on the matter from the Arizona Republic. State Senator Boyd 
Tenney reminded Warner 'that I had reservations about the bilingual program which this 
editorial brings out.' With this in mind, Tenney suggested that the ADE 'eliminate the request 
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for bilingual funds from the up-coming budget.'280 The attached editorial referred to the 
'Bilingual Failure' proved by the report and argued that it highlighted policy consequences 
which were 'not what the educators had in mind when they came out so strongly for bilingual 
education.' This method of instruction acted as a 'crutch' which prohibited the progress of 
Mexican American students. The Republic concluded that 'the findings of the U.S. Office of 
Education should result in dropping the use of Spanish to teach English in Arizona schools.'281 
 
Yet this is not to say the local press was uniformly critical of bilingual education following the 
AIR report. For example, the Phoenix Gazette offered a more nuanced response. Its editorial 
implored Arizonan education officials to take the report seriously despite 'criticisms of it', as 
the educational and social cost of possible shortcomings were too serious to ignore. Yet 
'[r]ather than making arguments against the study’, the paper argued that ‘Arizona educators 
should devote their talents and energies to improving a program that doubtless has flaws but 
is far too important to abandon.'282 A number of supporters of bilingual education registered 
their disapproval by writing to the editor. For example, Miguel Roman Garcia challenged the 
editorial's interpretation of the study. He argued that the Republic's call for the end of 
bilingual instruction was based upon an inaccurate representation of the program; 'Spanish 
is not being used to teach English in Arizona, or in any other bilingual program to my 
knowledge.' In contrast, Spanish was being used to teach basic subjects to Spanish speakers 
who would find conventional schooling in English incomprehensible.283  
 
By the end of the 1970s, the debate about the meaning and merits of bilingual education, 
which had been contested 10 years earlier, had become muted and the policy was well 
established in the state. Even those who had been advocates of the policy during the mid-
1970s had become less vocal by the end of the decade. For example, although Carolyn Warner 
had made bold promises during her first campaign for State Superintendent of Public 
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Instruction, four years later the issue was absent from her re-election campaign. In 1978, her 
campaign was based upon a record of fiscal restraint, which she portrayed as being in 
alignment with an anti-government spending public mood.284 Although Warner had been 
criticised for seeking the 1976 Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate election, seemingly 
at the expense of her current role, there was little expectation that she would face a close 
race, or for a while even an opponent.285 The eventual GOP candidate was a former education 
official named Steve Jenkins. During the campaign he criticised Warner for falling education 
standards and proposed a change in focus for school curriculums to include a greater 
emphasis on traditional education and free enterprise.286 Yet, Jenkins struggled to make an 
impact in the race, eventually losing by 45 per cent to Warner’s 51 per cent of the vote.287 
Warner was re-elected once more in 1982 before becoming the Democratic Party’s 
unsuccessful nominee for the 1986 Arizona Gubernatorial election. 
 
Despite the fizzling of debate surrounding bilingual education, it was firmly incorporated into 
the educational infrastructure of the state. In 1982-83, school districts in Arizona recorded a 
total of 25,175 students as having received bilingual instruction classes during the previous 
year.288 By the 1985-86 school year, 71,045 students received bilingual education classes in 
Arizonan schools.289 Considering the uncertainty that surrounded the program in its early 
years both federally and locally, such a level of enrolments by the mid-1980s represented a 
significant achievement. These new rights and opportunities for language minorities were 
granted by the federal Bilingual Education Act, but the number of students who attended 
bilingual instruction as a direct effect of this legislation was limited. Even in the 1982-83 
school year, it accounted for just 49 percent of funds used in the state for language 
instruction.290 
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This chapter has expanded upon current historical understandings of bilingual education 
policies by chronicling the political conflict and policy implementation at a state and local 
level. In Arizona, bilingual education was initially a small program encompassing just a few 
classes in PUHSD. The trajectory of state and federally funded bilingual education programs 
mirrored one another in that both faced highly uncertain futures beyond the years of initial 
funding appropriated by the U.S. Congress and Arizona Legislature. Yet, both were able to 
survive, expand and flourish by the end of the 1970s. In doing so, the complicated relationship 
between the federal Bilingual Education Act and state level programs became apparent. This 
chapter complements earlier work by Natalia Mehlman Petzela by showing that although the 
practical effect of the Bilingual Education Act was limited, it had a more significant effect of 
spurring action amongst local politicians. In Arizona, this was particularly apt as any action to 
introduce bilingual education programs were stymied by the English Only clause in the 
Arizona Constitution. Without the passage of a federal Act, bilingual education would have 
remained prohibited in Arizonan classrooms. Yet, for the overwhelming majority of Mexican 
American students in the state, they were not able to utilise the new rights granted by the 
Act without subsequent legislation from the Arizona Legislature.  
 
Bilingual education was contested throughout, particularly by members of the state 
education bureaucracy such as Weldon Sofstall. During the re-authorization process in 1973, 
bilingual education detractors placed additional demands upon schools and school districts 
that threatened the viability of the program. Most notably, the requirement that school 
districts check the eligibility status of its pupils. Although this measure does not appear to 
have been fully implemented it suggests that bilingual education and the school house were 
by the 1970s, becoming sites of immigration enforcement. Historian Mae Ngai argued that 
during the late 19th and early 20th century, U.S. immigration laws became ever more 
draconian, with the effect of expanding the enforcement apparatus further inland, away from 
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simply regulating points of entry.291 These regulations were also consistent with an era in 
which regulations governing access to social welfare were being tightened.292 In doing so, the 
decision to attach stringent eligibility criteria to bilingual education programs compliments 
one of the arguments made in the previous chapter that regulating language use should be 
considered alongside other methods, typically imposed as part of immigration policies.  
 
Another theme that persisted throughout the 1970s was the attempts of Mexican Americans 
and Chicanos to influence the development of bilingual education through the institutions of 
power. The effects were mixed, as particularly under Sofstall, the conclusions and 
recommendations of committees were not acted upon. But the election of Carolyn Warner in 
1974 enabled Mexican Americans to shift from trying to simply ensure the survival of bilingual 
education to advocating for a full bilingual program including two-way instruction alongside 
the teaching of Mexican history and culture. These efforts continued a line of internal debate 
that proliferated during the PUHS protests: establishing full bilingual education programs 
represented more than simply a debate about the best pedagogical method but also an 
attempt to obtain recognition of Arizona as a shared territory of English and Spanish speakers. 
Yet, to fully understand education in Phoenix and evaluate remedies to reduce racial 
discrimination it is necessary to account for the structural forces that inhibited Mexican 
Americans. One mentioned in the first two chapters has been policymakers who were 
reluctant to address non-white concerns in a meaningful sense. In the next chapter, this is 
expanded by exploring the metropolitan landscape in which students were schooled and the 
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Urban Development  
 
The leaders of Phoenix City Council had, since the 1940s, marketed the City as a place with a 
distinctive way of life that included low density living and an environment free from polluting 
industries. This distinctive lifestyle was accompanied by a distinctive political economy. 
Between 1940 and 1960, PCC and private sector boosters created a business-friendly 
environment, underpinned by low rates of taxation, limited employment rights and a 
reduction in the power of unions. Although this political-economic model was distinctive from 
areas in the Rustbelt, many practices that created segregated neighbourhoods and schools in  
both the old Jim Crow south and urban north were replicated in Phoenix. Historians have 
identified a web of federal and local government action that created residential segregation. 
Access to mortgages and home improvement loans for non-whites was curtailed by policies 
such as the Federal Housing Association lending guidelines. The waves of suburbanization 
during the 1940s and 1950s were shaped by these policies, which firmly entrenched racial 
inequality in metropolitan landscapes by the early 1960s.293  
 
To fully understand the implementation of bilingual education and its limitations as a policy 
response to the problem of high rates of poverty amongst Latinos, it is necessary to take 
account of the environment in which schools were situated and from where they drew their 
enrolments. Any analysis of classroom pedagogy and the educational performance of 
students would be inadequate if it was confined to actions within the classroom. The previous 
chapters have stressed that one of the main arguments for the introduction of bilingual 
education was to reduce the attainment gap between Mexican American students and 
Anglos. Yet bilingual education had limited success at achieving this objective. This chapter 
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will argue that one important reason was prejudicial development policies orchestrated by 
PCC. Schools in Phoenix were both products of their surrounding environment and important 
tools in shaping the development of the city. They derived most of their income from levies 
on local properties, a calculation that was based upon the property’s value, meaning that 
resources available to any school were contingent upon the desirability of a neighbourhood, 
the quality of local utilities, and the economic opportunities of surrounding areas. 
Development policies that prioritized outlying areas, which contained overwhelmingly white 
inhabitants, at the expense of those in the inner city, which had the largest concentrations of 
non-whites, inhibited the reduction of the educational attainment gap between Anglos and 
Latinos.  
 
The introduction of bilingual education in PUHSD schools occurred concurrently with an 
important juncture in the City’s history. The costs of Phoenix’s low density model of 
development were increasingly unaffordable and the Council’s ability to impose political 
control on the city was weakening. Yet, the City Council intervened to ensure the survival of 
the city’s way of life that prioritized outlying, mostly white neighbourhoods at the expense of 
the urban core. PCC published plans for the redevelopment of Phoenix that would run for the 
next two decades, a process that began in 1968 with publication of its development plan for 
Central Phoenix. Although this document referred to a small part of the city, the plan captured 
the anxieties of Council officials and their commitment to renewing a political economic 
model that continued the distinctive, Phoenix way of life. What followed was a voluminous 
planning literature, produced by Phoenix City Council between 1968 and 1978, which, 
cumulatively, reimagined the entire metropolitan landscape. The development plans 
established the development priorities for the city and indicated where future growth should 
occur. The culmination of the Council’s planning aspirations was the publication of the 
Comprehensive Plan for Phoenix, which set out a model for the future development of the 
city during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The Plan was published in 1971 as the 
definitive planning guide for the Phoenix Metropolitan Area. Yet, these volumes were 
revealing not just because of their planning contents, but also because they demonstrated 
the moods and motives of city politicians during a turbulent political period. Leaders on the 
Council were fearful that the political and social environment of low density living which 




Whilst historians have chronicled the causes of metropolitan segregation during the first two 
decades of the postwar era, less attention has been paid to the 1970s onwards.294 Throughout 
the U.S., concentrations of African Americans and Mexican Americans in urban 
neighbourhoods and schools after the Brown v. Board of Education decision were assumed to 
be a product of de facto segregation. Yet this chapter shows that in Phoenix the influence of 
state actors in the remaking of metropolitan segregation continued into the Great Society era 
and beyond. Housing and urban development policies initiated by PCC at the start of the 
1970s consolidated an already racially imbalanced landscape. They re-affirmed the Council’s 
preference of developing outlying, suburban neighbourhoods at the expense of the inner city. 
The result was to further undermine inner city neighbourhoods, reducing the ability of school 
districts to raise revenues. 
 
This chapter begins by showing how opposition to development policy, often on the basis of 
its effects upon local schooling, became an important part of Mexican American politics. 
Subsequent sections demonstrate the causes of that opposition. The second section explains 
the context of inner city Phoenix at the start of the 1970s before explaining how the city’s 
Central Plan demonstrated a commitment from Council officials to the survival of the low-
density development that had proliferated since the 1940s. It then demonstrates how 
subsequent planning initiatives remade metropolitan inequality by directing resources away 
from inner city areas whilst ensuring that prisons and other undesirable developments were 
located in mostly non-white neighbourhoods. Actions by elite policymakers were 
compounded by ordinary residents who sought to prevent the spread of public housing or 
other developments that could encourage non-white residents to re-locate to their 
neighbourhood. This chapter concludes by showing how by the end of the 1970s, PCC 
struggled to retain control of the local planning model in the face of a homeowner populism 
that demanded the municipal government shield them from the costs of low density living.  
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Opposition to the city’s planning model 
 
The CGC’s dominance of Phoenix had been unbroken in the 20 years since 1948, in part 
because of the at-large voting system for Council elections, which made it difficult for 
opposition groups to consolidate their support. This had enabled business and political elites 
to offset the costs of growth, particularly its most undesirable features, on to the politically 
powerless areas of the inner city. However, in the ten years between 1968 and its demise in 
1978, it suffered a number of ruptures.295 One of the first challenges to the CGC’s political 
power was increasingly vocal opposition from minority rights groups. An early instance of 
Mexican Americans challenging the development policies of PCC occurred on 22 June 1970, 
when more than 300 local residents attended a public meeting of Phoenix City Council, held 
in the Nuestro Barrio area of South Phoenix. At the meeting, local residents expressed their 
frustration at the planning policies that meant the area had insufficient recreation facilities, 
unpaved streets, limited public transportation and overflowing irrigation ditches.296  
 
Protests by Mexican Americans at PUHS were followed by protests against the 
Comprehensive Plan. Many understood the interconnectedness of education to the 
metropolitan landscape and sought to change the nature of urban development policies. For 
example, CPLC and its most prominent members considered land use policy and urban 
development an important arena of social justice in which they organised to obtain more 
equal access to resources. Following the publication of the City of Phoenix Council’s 
Comprehensive 1990 Plan, CPLC co-ordinated opposition to the plan amongst residents of the 
inner city. In anticipation of a public meeting on 17 June 1971, they collaborated with an 
independent local news outlet called Voice of the City to publish 14 objections to the plan.297 
City officials were scheduled to publish further details of the plan at a public meeting on 17 
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June 1971. In Voice of the City they urged anyone who was interested in opposing the plan, 
especially at the public meeting, to contact CPLC representatives.298 
 
CPLC aimed to publicise the importance of the plan to local residents, especially because it 
contained no provisions to improve the economic and civic life of south Phoenix. Planners had 
also decided not to include any new areas of residential development in this area of the city. 
These decisions, opponents believed, were indicative of the priorities of the City’s leadership 
who resided in north Phoenix and continued to use the area of south Phoenix as a dumping 
ground. For decades, land in south Phoenix had been used as the Council’s long-standing 
preferred site for the construction of prisons and waste facilities.299 The 1990 Plan continued 
this history of disregard toward the city’s poor and minority inhabitants. Proposals had been 
drafted without any representation from the neighbourhoods of the central city and south 
Phoenix. For CPLC and others who opposed the plan, it demonstrated another example of 
business and political elites imposing their model of economic development upon a 
disenfranchised minority. The dividends of the city’s economic growth were not shared 
equally, nor were its costs. Planners had chosen to expand the availability of industrial land 
use in south Phoenix but not extend the potential lucrative ‘Central Corridor’ further south. 
Doing so would have expanded the business districts in the area, improving the employment 
opportunities for local residents.  
 
The Plan indicated that future construction of waste management facilities would occur 
disproportionately in south Phoenix, even for plants servicing North Phoenix. Inner city 
residents had been displaced and inconvenienced by the construction of the Maricopa 
Freeway, yet no money had been appropriated for beautification of the freeway, despite the 
disruption it caused affected residential communities. Neighbourhoods that had been 
desecrated and depopulated by policies that neglected the urban core would be further 
undermined. Mexican Americans and African Americans feared that the plan would 
precipitate the encroachment of industrial units into the neighbourhoods of south Phoenix. 
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The organizers of opposition to the Plan suspected foul play, which, they argued, was 
configured to encourage the displacement of minority inhabitants of south Phoenix and to 
precipitate their eventual relocation. The implementation of the 1990 plan ‘will benefit only 
the developer and not the people of South Phoenix’. In particular, they suspected that 
developers would use the opportunity to purchase properties in south Phoenix at a low cost 
and ‘then he will change the zoning make a large profit by reselling the land for industrial 
use.’300 
 
After the Comprehensive Plan was introduced in 1971, Alfredo Gutierrez, a prominent 
Chicano in south Phoenix, made opposition to unequal development policy a prominent part 
of his successful election campaign for a seat in the Arizona State Senate. Once elected he 
challenged plans to use the inner city and south Phoenix as a site for undesirable land uses, 
such as prisons and waste facilities, often citing the implications these actions had on local 
schools. In the summer of 1972, Chicano organiser Alfredo Gutierrez entered what would 
become one of the more contentious election campaigns for the Arizona House of 
Representatives, due to be elected in November of that year. Gutierrez was a 29-year-old 
community worker heavily involved with the Barrio Youth Project. He was recruited to stand 
in the election by Arizona Rep. Manuel Pena, a Democrat representing the neighbouring 
district who was influential in enlisting Mexican American candidates for office.301 
Generations of discriminatory land use policy and housing segregation had influenced the 
electoral map of Phoenix. As a result, most of the city’s Mexican American and African 
population lived within the 23rd Legislative District and were thus in direct competition for 
democratic representation.  
 
One of the issues that Gutierrez believed needed greater attention was the unequal allocation 
of land use within south and central Phoenix compared to other areas of the city. The Arizona 
Republic described the district as ‘a mixture of industrial plants, slum quarters, middle-class 
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residential housing, low-rent quarters’ and sporadic business premises.302 Many of the 
neighbourhoods within the area were the most deprived in the city, surrounded by heavy and 
polluting industries. In his campaign, Gutierrez argued that 1990 land use plan would cause 
significant upheaval for local residents by earmarking more land for industrial expansion. The 
designation of land for these purposes highlighted a disparity between the areas of the 23rd 
district and other parts of Maricopa County. City authorities, he argued, used the south side 
“for a dumping ground”.303 One example of the second-class status with which city officials 
treated Mexican Americans concerned the Maricopa freeway crossing that CPLC had 
previously challenged Phoenix authorities about. The freeway bisected the area and forced 
some children to walk via a tunnel originally constructed for flood control. Students in the 
suburban area of Tempe crossed the freeway using a purpose-built bridge.304 
 
Gutierrez won the Democratic Party primary for the 23rd district, defeating Cloves Campbell 
by 2602 votes to 2472. His primary campaign benefitted from the support of United Farm 
Workers (UFW), who had been active in the state as part of an effort to recall the Governor. 
They provided campaign infrastructure to defeat Cloves Campbell because of his decision to 
remain neutral in the ongoing dispute between the UFW and Governor Jack Williams. 305 
Several months later Gutierrez was comfortably elected to the Legislature as the 
representative for the 23rd district, despite a write-in campaign conducted on behalf of Cloves 
Campbell.306 Once in the Arizona Legislature he continued to speak about the unequal 
treatment of south Phoenix, often highlighting the effects of development policy upon local 
schools. Both state and city officials continued to use sites in south Phoenix for the 
construction of undesirable projects. One example was the decision by members of the 
Arizona House of Representatives to instruct the State Corrections Department to begin 
planning the construction of a new medium security prison on a 150 acre site in south 
Phoenix. Gutierrez argued that the Durango site in south Phoenix was 22nd on a list of 29 
potential locations and was selected in spite of requests from officials in Tucson and Gila Bend 
to host the facility. Building the prison in south Phoenix would be expensive, particularly as it 
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would require land valued at $97,000 to be purchased prior to construction. Three years 
earlier, the area of Deer Valley, an alternative site in north Phoenix,  had been judged the 
most suitable location for a new prison but dismissed by state legislators. Rep. Peter 
Corpstein, the member of the Arizona House who represented that area, later voted for the 
south Phoenix site. Another proposal to situate the prison in the north Phoenix district of 
Paradise Valley had also been dismissed immediately, in this case despite being on state-
owned land.307  
 
Gutierrez argued that the close proximity of elementary schools and residential areas made 
the site in south Phoenix particularly unsuitable. The Joint Legislative Budget Committee 
responsible for the decision claimed that the location had been selected because of its 
proximity to an existing facility of juveniles and a jail annex. Sen. Gutierrez argued that the 
decision was based upon a disregard for south Phoenix and the racial minorities who 
populated these neighbourhoods. The House leadership, he argued, ‘selected the site 
because it’s next to poor people, to brown people and to black people’. In a subsequent 
debate in the Arizona Senate, he argued that the decision was ‘a symbol of racism . . . an act 
of irresponsibility . . . a tragic mistake.’308 The opposition which Gutierrez organized against 
the selection of the south Phoenix site received a surprising amount of support from 
Republicans. Sandra Day O’Connor expressed her agreement with some of Gutierrez’s 
speech. She also stated her belief that prisons should be located in areas ‘where at least a 
majority of residents are willing to have it put there.’309 An editorial in the Arizona Republic 
expressed the paper’s view that ‘[i]t is an outrageous decision which cannot be left 
standing.’310 The prison site selection was just one land use decision that treated the residents 
of south Phoenix unfairly. Gutierrez noted that 10 schools in the inner city and south side 
areas of the city were beneath the flight path of Sky Harbor airport. South Phoenix was also 
the site of much of the city’s landfill. On another occasion City of Phoenix Council selected a 
site in south Phoenix for the development of an NFL stadium without consulting local 
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residents. This, Gutierrez argued, despite the proposed venture offering little benefit to the 
surrounding neighbourhoods.311 These decisions highlight the unequal distribution and use 
of state power in Phoenix. The policies that underpinned these actions, and the spark for the 
opposition of Mexican Americans detailed above, are the focus of the subsequent sections of 
this chapter. Before analysing PCC planning policy, it is important to understand the condition 
of inner city Phoenix at the beginning of the 1970s and the context in which metropolitan 
inequality was remade. 
 
The condition of inner city Phoenix 
 
The confinement of poor and minority citizens to inner-city neighbourhoods came as the 
result of a political ideology which fused racial exclusion, class privilege, economic marginality 
and political disenfranchisement. The costs of growth and suburban living were offset against 
inner-city neighbourhoods, heavy and polluting industries were located in areas south of 
McDowell Road, the line that demarcated the north Phoenix suburbs from the inner-city.  One 
set of scholars has traced these processes as far back as the late nineteenth century, as part 
of their studies concerning environmental racism.312 Whilst these actions were discriminatory 
and had a pernicious effect on many of the city’s inhabitants, this chapter argues that they 
were the results of a different type of racism to the visceral segregationism embodied by 
figures such as George Wallace. Instead, it was a less obvious prioritization of white interests 
and a commitment to a way of life that directed resources into areas that maintained the 
advantages that white residents had accrued over generations. It is not possible to know what 
was in the minds of policymakers working in PCC, the Phoenix Housing Commission (PHC) or 
any other planning body which re-designed the city’s landscape during the early 1970s, 
particularly as the publications they produced contained no overtly prejudicial statements 
about Mexican Americans, African Americans, Native Americans, or any other minority group. 
They contained none of the overt cultural panic that was articulated by Samuel Huntingdon’s 
Who Are We?313 Instead, the subjugation of Mexican Americans living in South and inner-city 
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Phoenix was replicated and intensified over multiple generations. It is for these reasons that 
Charles Tilley’s work is particularly instructive. He introduced the concept of ‘Durable 
Inequality’, whereby systematic replication of social inequality is achieved through 
exploitation and opportunity hoarding.314 In Phoenix, elites typically utilized the former to 
profit from the labour of the economically marginalized without allowing them to share in the 
profits. Non-elites erected boundaries to hoard opportunities and prevent others from 
accessing their resources. Tilley argued that opportunity hoarding 'operates when members 
of a categorically bounded network acquire access to a resource that is valuable, renewable, 
subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhanced by the network's modus 
operandi.'315  
 
Tilley argued that opportunity hoarding was a relatively benign force when judged against 
other forms of categorical inequality. Other scholars have been far less sanguine about the 
consequences of opportunity hoarding, especially as they relate to education and Civil 
Rights.316 In Phoenix, the distinction between exploitation and opportunity hoarding was 
often unclear. Yet, by examining the city's housing and development plans, a consistent 
pattern of policies, which sought to maintain a way of life derived from economic exploitation 
and the hoarding of opportunity in outlying areas, can be identified.  
 
By the time public officials considered the future of Phoenix and the distribution of city 
resources, the association of race, the inner-city, deprivation, and inferior behaviour was 
firmly entrenched, so much so that overt acts of racial discrimination were unnecessary. 
Phoenix City Council politicians rarely engaged in overtly discriminatory discourse or 
committed racist acts. Yet in spite of this, Phoenix was a racial polity of the kind described by 
Charles Mills as being structured 'to maintain and reproduce this racial order, securing the 
privileges and advantages of the full white citizens and maintaining the subordination of 
nonwhites.'317  As a result, there was a Phoenix which was white and a Phoenix which was 
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not. Until the late 1960s, this divide was clearly demarcated by Van Buren Street, but as later 
sections will show, the actions of the Council shifted it north to McDowell Road. South of this 
line, the population was typically poorer, attended inferior schools, and crucially, came 
overwhelmingly from minority backgrounds. This chapter is an examination of the institutions 
that influenced the development and availability of housing in Phoenix. But to fully 
understand the forces and institutions that shaped the lives of non-white citizens living in the 
inner-city, it is essential to look beyond acts of commission. Public officials at the City Council 
did not express overtly prejudicial ideas or intent. But the smaller, covert actions as well as 
the decisions not to act, to direct resources elsewhere, or to remain ignorant of the issues 
faced by inner-city residents were also an important part of the repertoire of exclusion.  
 
The 1970 census revealed a starkly unequal metropolitan landscape. Patterns of race and 
residency had a clearly demarcated spatial form with overwhelmingly white neighbourhoods 
north of McDowell Road and the city’s minority citizens living south of that point. In ways 
similar to other Sunbelt locations such as Charlotte and Atlanta, the population of Phoenix’s 
inner-city had declined during the postwar period. Despite Phoenix’s general population rising 
rapidly, the population of the inner-city fell by 32 per cent between 1950 and 1975, by which 
point it stood at 53,727 inhabitants. Of those who departed, 14,000 left in the five years 
between 1970 and 1975. The City Council anticipated that the decline of the inner-city would 
continue throughout the 1980s, with one contemporary estimate indicating that, by 1985, 
the population could be as low as 45,000. By 1970, 57.8 per cent of inner-city residents were 
non-white.318 One of the main consequences of this migration trend was a change to the 
demographic composition of the inner-city, meaning that neighbourhoods became 
disproportionately populated with racial minorities.  
 
Those that remained in the inner city faced other sources of inequality, particularly in relation 
to housing. Residents in these areas were more likely to live in dwellings which were old, over-
crowded and had a lower market value. Phoenix’s prolonged housing boom, beginning in 
1950, had enabled most housing stock to be rebuilt or existing units replaced. Yet this trend 
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bypassed much of the inner-city. In these tracts, only 32 per cent of housing had been built 
after 1950; 42 per cent of the housing stock pre-dated 1939.319 Moreover, at a time when the 
city as a whole was experiencing exponential economic and population growth, the number 
of housing units in the urban core fell. In 1950, there were more than 27,798 housing units 
within the inner-city, yet the special Census of 1975 recorded just 23,896.320 The quality of 
the houses that remained had deteriorated. As a result, the number of inner-city residents 
who lived in overcrowded conditions was considerably higher than in outlying areas. The 
value of such properties was also significantly lower. More dwellings in the inner-city than 
elsewhere in Phoenix lacked plumbing and kitchen facilities. Residents living in between Van 
Buren street and McDowell road, at the northern edge of the city, typically lived in high-
quality housing. The number of housing units without plumbing or kitchen facilities in these 
areas was far lower than the outlying area average of 1.97 per cent. Yet, in the areas South of 
Van Buren, as many as a quarter of homes required the use of external bathroom facilities.321  
 
These trends contributed to the creation of neighbourhoods that, judged by metrics such as 
unemployment, labour force participation, education, housing and income, were the most 
deprived in Phoenix. They were most in need of government intervention and yet some of 
the least likely to receive it. In 1969, the median family income for Phoenix was $9,956. 
According to the 1970 Census, every inner-city tract had an income that was below average, 
with a quarter of households classified as beneath the poverty line.322 In the neighbourhoods 
south of Van Buren, which contained most of Phoenix’s non-white residents, deprivation was 
compounded by low levels of education. The city-wide average for years of education 
obtained was 12.3 years. Yet in only two of the seventeen 1970 Census tracts within the inner-
city was the average years of education obtained even close to the citywide average. 
Furthermore, within those seventeen tracts, a significantly lower number of residents 
graduated from high school than residents in other areas of the city.323 The future 
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development of the city was of paramount importance to the education system. Public 
officials consistently dismissed the possibility of using busing as a remedial tool to overcome 
the disadvantages of racial imbalances in Phoenix Union High School District Schools. Their 
refusal enhanced the importance of physical proximity to a good school. Without the use of 
busing or forced integration, residency patterns and equitable access to property and lending 
markets became essential means by which minority families could utilize the new rights 
granted to them under Civil Rights legislation.   
 
The Central Phoenix Plan  
 
The process of re-making the city in the post-Civil Rights era began with the publication of the 
Central Plan. Decisions about where to locate the main centre of business and regulations 
upon the density of future developments had implications for PUHSD schools. The Central 
Plan’s emphasis upon the retention economic power within an influential coterie of 
businessmen worsened a hollowing of the urban core, which was already underway by the 
end of the 1960s. This created imbalances in both the enrolments of PUHSD schools and the 
quality of provisions that inner city schools offered. Yet, policymakers did not seek to redress 
the unequal metropolitan landscape. Although PCC considered itself to have a modern 
approach to political-economy, it did not intend to integrate an accompanying, modern 
commitment to racial liberalism. Instead, the Central Plan was a manifestation of the Council’s 
understanding of the city and a clear expression of their fears as the end of the 1960s 
approached. Throughout its pages, the Council expressed its belief that growth would 
continue at a significant pace. The consequences would be increased pressure on local 
services, the need for additional space and demand for more construction work. Far from 
being a narrow policy document considering the development options for the area, the Plan 
contained much material detailing how City officials understood Phoenix’s history. The City 
Council believed that the very existence of Phoenix was rooted in the ‘desires of thousands 
of people looking for a better way of urban life.’ That way of life was distinct in Phoenix. 
‘Thoroughly western’, as the Council described it, and ‘like other cities’ suburbs – spacious, 
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convenient, relaxed.’ The spatial form of Phoenix after 20 years of near unimpeded growth 
reflected the ‘preferred way of life’ of its residents’; in particular, they valued ‘low density 
decentralization of residences, employment and commercial activity.’324 Yet, as the Council 
warned, this way of life was threatened by unmanaged growth. Without immediate action, 
they felt the city would succumb to the problems which had blighted other large urban 
centres.  
 
The City Council’s desire to shape development in accordance with this particular way of life 
meant that decisions about bricks and mortar were also decisions about facilitating social 
interactions, in particular the interactions of influential figures. Social capital was essential to 
the formation of the Central Plan. The political economy of Phoenix had been dominated by 
a small coterie of businessmen for decades. Their values, identities and personal 
characteristics mirrored those of officials in the City, which was an essential element in the 
hoarding of opportunities. Many moved freely between public office and private enterprise, 
establishing a consensus between Phoenix City Council and Phoenix businessmen concerning 
the priorities for the central corridor.325 Through this interaction, the preferences of business 
became development policy; one of the primary justifications for the planning policies 
recommended in the Central Plan was the response of business leaders to the Council’s 
consultation on the issue. The central area, according to the Council, was the administrative 
and governmental hub of not only the city, but also the state. The success of businesses and 
municipal functions rested upon the ability of ‘many people [to] come together, face-to-face, 
frequently and efficiently.’326 The future of the central business corridor was thus contingent 
upon the continued system of knowledge transfer amongst its inhabitants. During the 
consultation, businessmen expressed their strong desire to maintain proximity to one 
another, allowing them to socialise without the inconvenience of significant travel 
obligations, dissuaded City leaders from pursuing alternative paths for the central city. The 
decision of the City Council, and the process by which it was made, is an example of bonding 
social capital.327 The ties between policymakers and members of the private sector were 
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based upon shared characteristics and understandings, which cultivated agreement on the 
direction of public policy. Consensus between them was essential to the practice of forming 
boundaries which demarked exclusion for inner-city residents. These connections enabled 
City Council policymakers, in agreement with the private sector, to maintain the status quo 
and continue to withhold opportunities for economic development beyond a small elite. 
Crucially, missing from the alternatives considered by the Council was the idea that 
prioritizing a more diverse range of locations across the city for major government institutions 
or private enterprise would benefit a greater number of Phoenix residents.  
 
Within the central corridor, there was little residential development and thus few residents 
to consult. But the Council accepted that discussions regarding the structure of the city’s main 
business district affected all residents, particularly when those discussions focused on the 
socioeconomic distribution of city resources. A decision to prioritize investment in other parts 
of the city could have altered the nature of inner-ring neighbourhoods, in which minority 
residents sought to relocate from the inner-city. City Council officials had the opportunity to 
change  Phoenix’s economic model and the patterns of residency but the authors of the plan 
consulted only private businessmen and public officials already working within the Council. 
The results reflected their preferences and interests, as well as being a restatement of the 
principles which had guided development of the city since the 1940s. Above all else, the 
Council sought to manage growth without fundamental change by relegating questions 
concerning equitable distribution of resources to an afterthought.  
 
The Council’s preferred option for future development was the continuation of 
‘neighborhood associations’ of businesses within the central corridor. They hoped to cultivate 
a prestigious business district capable of attracting corporations of regional and national 
standing. It was assumed that Companies of this magnitude would expect a distinctive central 
business district. Yet, an exception was made for manufacturers, such as Motorola, who had 
opened a plant on the city’s fringes. The announcement of planning priorities was just one 
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method by which the Council could influence the distribution of resources, especially ‘by 
limiting other locations where development could take place.’328 These decisions 
demonstrated the PCC’s willingness to continue to use government to facilitate a business 
friendly environment. Another method used was that of zoning, a method The Council was 
particularly interested in the use to protect residential neighbourhoods and prevent the 
proliferation of commercial activity away from the centre. ‘Zoning has traditionally been the 
protector of residential values’, the report argued. But these values were being eroded by 
‘increasing traffic and encroaching commercial activities. Many neighbourhoods have already 
been blighted.’ The Council argued it was essential to persuade the inhabitants of ‘fine 
residential areas’ that the value of their property remained secure and the quality of local 
amenities would remain high.329  
 
The Council distilled the debate about both the central area, and the entire metropolis, as 
‘Centralization vs. decentralization . . . should more development be guided into the central 
area, or should outlying business districts be encouraged?’. It was acknowledged that a policy 
of ‘radical dispersion’, whereby places of employment and residency would be scattered 
throughout the city, could achieve some of the Council’s stated aims, especially the reduction 
of traffic congestion.  The influence of a small business elite upon PCC policy was highlighted 
when this proposal was ultimately dismissed as a serious policy option on the basis that ‘there 
is still a strong preference on the part of certain key business men for physical proximity to 
the major components of the business district.’330 Another option was to focus on the 
development of outlying areas alone. This was considered a promising option in future, but it 
was dismissed as an immediate solution, as it required significant investment in the city 
outskirts, which could discourage investment in the central business district. The Council also 
believed it would cause land speculation.331  
 
City Council officials believed that modernity was central to the identity of Phoenix. They 
argued that it was a ‘thoroughly 20th century city’, in contrast to other cities that were 
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‘burdened with the forms of the 19th century, and they are struggling to make their dense, 
congested central districts operate.’ Officials sought to cultivate the image of Phoenix as a 
new kind of city, set apart from traditional metropolitan centres in the U.S. An essential 
element of this model was the centrality of the automobile to life in Phoenix. To live in the 
open, spacious, low-density environment of Phoenix required the use of an automobile. At its 
core, the Plan was designed to facilitate the transportation of residents via car. Major zoning 
and planning decisions were decided on the basis that this was the preferred method of travel 
in the city. Yet, the Council accepted that less than 50 per cent of the city’s population had 
access to an automobile. The Plan, and subsequent planning documents, expressed vague 
wishes for improved public transport, but these mainly focused on improving bus services. 
The Council’s fear of Phoenix’s ossification into a state similar to those cities of the urban 
north meant that a subway or tram system was dismissed, as were other considerations of 
serious investment in a public transport network which could support the 50 per cent of 
residents who did not have the resources to purchase an automobile.332 
 
The urgency of the moment, especially the need for definitive action to make the growth of 
the city sustainable, caused City officials to include only measures that could be enacted 
immediately. The Plan was not ‘a collection of ideas on which to draw’ but instead ‘a plan of 
action’.333  For this reason, the Plan contained a detailed appraisal of Central Phoenix as it 
existed at the end of the 1960s, with particular emphasis on the economic and social life of 
the central city. The Council made recommendations to ensure that future development 
occurred in accordance with ‘the tastes and technology of our time.’334 It portrayed the city’s 
recent history and identity as being based upon modernity, but their conception of being a 
modern city was connected only to technology, civic governance and an alternative business 
model. When the Council argued that Phoenix represented a modern place to live, there was 
no attempt to portray the city as a bastion of racial liberalism. In policy matters with 
implications for civil rights or racial integration, PCC seemed content to simply fulfil its legal 
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obligations, without pursuing a more expansive effort to reduce racial inequality.335 Even in 
areas of public policy where the Council had scope to implement strategies which may have 
distinguished Phoenix as a modern city by virtue of its tolerant approach to race, the Council 
demonstrated little interest.  
 
PCC argued that the ‘challenge now facing Phoenix is managing the growth that economic 
expansion will inevitably bring.’336 To this end, the Plan suggested alternative options for the 
future development of the central city area. The starting point for their investigation was the 
question of ‘what forms could the City take and which are the most desirable?’ Yet, the 
subsequent pages of the Central Plan contained little fresh thinking. Perhaps the most 
illuminating element is the Council’s unwillingness to depart from orthodoxy. Possible 
alternatives, which included distributing wealth and employment more equally across the 
city, were dismissed, mainly because the automobile remained integral to the way of life city 
officials wanted to promote. The possibility of using public resources to support a 
comprehensive transportation system was considered not in keeping with the modern nature 
of Phoenix. ‘The introduction of such a system . . . would require dense concentrations of 
population – the very concentrations that many people came here to avoid.’337 Future 
development was to be ordered around the automobile and its supremacy as the preferred 
method of travel.  
 
The Council’s desire to maintain this way of life caused it to clash with the Phoenix Housing 
Commission, who reviewed the plans before they were published. Prior to the publication of 
the final report, external consultants commissioned by PCC to advise on the drafting of the 
plan, submitted their recommended plan for Central Phoenix to the task force. These included 
restrictions on higher density building and maintaining the limits on high rise construction. 
The Phoenix Housing Commission reviewed the differences between the proposal provided 
by the external consultants and that of PCC appointees. The Housing Commission was critical 
of the task force’s decisions, particularly in relation to the matter of high-rise development. 
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The initial proposals drafted by the consultants recommended that high-intensity 
development be encouraged in the area south of Thomas Road. But the task force amended 
the plan to ensure that high-intensity development was limited to areas not farther north 
than the Papago Freeway. 338 The decision meant that high-intensity development would be 
concentrated in the streets south of McDowell Road, the purpose of which was to ensure 
neighbourhoods further north would remain dispersed and able to sustain the low intensity 
living central to the city’s identity. The Housing Commission argued that it was ‘not 
reasonable’ to limit high-intensity development to McDowell and the areas further south. 
Although the Commission did not believe there should be a moratorium on high-rise 
development north of Thomas Road, it accepted the consultants’ recommendations and 
suggested that construction of high-intensity building be encouraged south of this street.339 
Following detailed consideration of the plans and a single public consultation meeting, the 
Commission confidently assumed that ‘virtually everyone, to our knowledge . . . support the 
plan in concept, if not in detail as presented’, though they acknowledged some dissenting 
opinions likely existed. In its report, the Commission urged the City Council to ignore ‘selfish-
interest groups’ and pursue a development plan for the central business corridor that was ‘in 
the best interest of the total community’.340  Both the contents of the Central Plan and the 
process by which it was developed, demonstrate the commitment of Council officials to 
maintaining the economic and development model that had defined the city since the 1940s. 
Although the Plan covered only a small area of the city it highlighted two important elements 
that shaped discussions about future developments. Firstly, were the anxieties that officials 
displayed about maintaining a way of life that could only be implemented through minimizing 
political dissent. Secondly, the details of the Plan highlight that other options were possible, 
perhaps even preferable to those they approved. Yet, the influence of a small business elite 
remained critical to decisions about the city’s future. The Central Plan was the just the start 
of discussions about the city’s future in a post civil rights context, they were elevated further 
by the compilation of The Comprehensive Plan. 
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The Comprehensive Plan 
 
The Central Plan exposed the political, economic and racial assumptions that influenced PCC 
decisions, but a subsequent document was more consequential for the future of the city’s 
development. In November 1969, City of Phoenix Council first published The Comprehensive 
Plan – 1990; the purpose of the document was to bring order to a metropolitan landscape 
that had for years sprawled with little direction from the city government. The Plan ran to 
1990, by which time the Planning Commission estimated that Phoenix’s population would 
increase by 560,000, reaching 1,080,000. It contained detailed plans about the Planning 
Commission’s preferences for the future growth of the city. These decisions about where to 
direct new housing developments and private sector investment had significant implications 
for the city’s education system.  
 
There could not be racially balanced schools without an urban development policy that 
distributed resources equitably, unless education officials or the courts were prepared to 
impose remedial policies such as busing. PUHSD officials had no interest in implementing such 
a policy, which meant that housing policy was intimately linked to racially segregated school 
enrolments. The Plan also highlighted the complicity of PCC planners in the re-enforcement 
of an unequal metropolitan landscape, undermining arguments that residential segregation 
was the result of private decisions by homeowners to relocate. These actions were a catalyst 
for the hollowing out of the urban core, which left non-whites in inner city neighbourhoods 
that were deprived of resources. From 1971 onwards, the year that the final version of the 
plan was published, the schools that served the inner city, PUHS, East High and North High, 
contained an increasing number of non-white students whilst the number of Anglo students 
enrolled decreased. The actions of the state were critical causal factors in these trends. No 
integrated schools would emerge if fundamental racial prejudices shaped planning and 
housing policies. Understanding the municipal government’s actions is critical to a full 
appraisal of bilingual education policy in Phoenix as well as accounting for the failure to enact 
a meaningful reduction in Latino educational underachievement and rates of poverty. 
 
Appointed by the City Council, the Commission contained a mix of public officials and notable 
local figures deemed suitable to make recommendations on the future of development policy. 
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In the earlier Central Plan, city officials had expressed concern regarding the impact of 
continued uncontrolled growth. They intended the Comprehensive Plan to serve as a long-
term guide to public policy which would limit the consequences of growth and maintain the 
Phoenix way of life. The plan forecasted the amount of land required for residential 
development, business, and public facilities, alongside explaining how these developments 
would be integrated into a cohesive planning model for Phoenix. The City Council portrayed 
the plan as a manifestation of the city’s values, as well as a practical guide to achieving ‘where 
we want to go, and how we are going to get there.’341 
 
The expanse of space in and around Phoenix enabled Phoenix residents to live a dispersed 
lifestyle, free from the crowdedness of other large metropolitan centres. As a result, the city 
had a high proportion of single family units compared to most other major U.S. cities with a 
population over 250,000. By 1965, single family units covered 28,927 acres and 33.1 per cent 
of total developed land. The contemporary U.S. average stood at 28.3 per cent in cities of a 
comparable size.342 Phoenix had significant opportunities to expand even further but the 
Planning Commission faced challenges to ensure that it complied with its aim of facilitating 
orderly growth. They worried that a continuation of previous growth trends would make the 
cost of maintaining public services and its way of life unsustainable. In particular, the 
Commission wanted to avoid leapfrog development, a type of sprawl whereby existing 
urbanised land on the periphery is bypassed for undeveloped land that required the extension 
of public facilities. They estimated that, within the planning area of the city, there were 73,500 
acres of vacant land suitable for development. The land was spread-out, but the highest 
proportion was found in the north Phoenix areas of Paradise Valley and Deer Valley. The 
Commission argued that much of this land had been bypassed because of poor transport 
routes and lack of utilities. A more significant problem was the conversion of a large amount 
of 60,200 acres of land, used at that time for agriculture, into urban uses. Most of the land 
was situated in South Phoenix and the Laveen area, southwest of the city. Although the 
Commission acknowledged the process of converting agricultural land was arduous, it was in 
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these areas that they hoped future growth would occur. Their preference was for ‘compact 
and orderly development outward from the core’. Converting agricultural land presented the 
best opportunity for ‘providing economical municipal services.’343 
 
The Plan set forth principles and priorities for future development in the Phoenix planning 
area. One method through which the Planning Commission sought to influence future growth 
was the control of the housing supply and location. They aimed to end the unplanned growth 
witnessed in the previous three decades and ensure ‘proper safeguards’ were applied for the 
future. In the context of Phoenix public policy, where an association of inner-city 
neighbourhoods with deprivation and slums had been present for generations, the notion of 
development safeguards indicated a preference for preventing the outward growth of the 
urban core. In the Comprehensive Plan, earlier assumptions about the inner city persisted. 
For areas in transition due to outgrowth from the inner-city, close regulation of development 
was considered especially important. In particular, the planners wanted to deter land uses 
which were considered to be ‘incompatible’ with residential neighbourhoods. They expressed 
their priorities for residential areas through a series of ‘special development considerations’. 
Identifying priorities for the nature of future construction often acted as a barrier to be 
utilized by the City Council, and local residents, to maintain the homogeneity of low density 
living in Phoenix. One proposal advocated the creation of a law eliminating ‘blighting 
influences’, which they hoped would enable property values to be maintained. Social capital 
had been an important influence upon the formation of the Central Plan, and with it the 
future of the Phoenix political economy. A similar force influenced the Planning Commission’s 
guidelines for residential development. Beside the picture of an idyllic neighbourhood, lined 
with palm trees and detached, low-density housing, the Commission encouraged ‘special 
attention’ to be paid to the ‘organization of a pleasing living environment’. The tools they 
suggested to achieve this were the use of zoning ordinances and subdivision review. At its 
core, these planning goals aimed to preserve the supposed Phoenix way of life that boosters 
marketed to prospective new residents. The Planning Commission prized the development of 
‘well balanced’ residential units that were ‘convenient for informal social needs’. These goals 
ensured that a heavy emphasis was placed upon the ability of Phoenix residents, particularly 
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those living in suburban areas, to maintain the social environment of their local community. 
Planners believed that maintaining social relations of this nature, along with good residential 
services, contributed to the all-important ‘feeling of place’ in Phoenix. Inherent in this 
proposal was a line of thinking that suggested further construction would undermine the local 
community. They indicated that conformity was a high priority, more so than equitably 
distributing resources across the metropolis or enabling the city’s residents to access them 
fully. Outsiders were seen as a threat to property values; good-quality residential services 
could only be maintained in this environment.344 
 
Other long-standing influences upon public policy in Phoenix were also present in the 
Comprehensive Plan. For example, the plans demonstrated that questions of federalism and 
the proper role of government, which had pervaded local politics since the 1940s, continued 
to shape decisions about the city’s development. In the Plan, these questions resurfaced as 
the Planning Commission considered the extent to which the government could intervene to 
influence the nature of development. They accepted that government ‘could give support and 
encouragement to the rehabilitation and rebuilding of dilapidated housing’ and that ‘Various 
assistance programs of the Federal government might be used to help us achieve this.’ 
Government intervention had been largely absent for almost a decade because Phoenix was 
ineligible for federal funding after voters repealed the building code. However, the absence 
of significant action to improve housing conditions indicated it remained a low priority for the 
City Council. The authors of the Comprehensive Plan recognised that successive governments 
since the Second World War had been too preoccupied with ‘the political and economic 
problems of expansion’, meaning that city officials had neglected their ‘social and aesthetic 
responsibilities.’ The burdens of the city’s expansion, such as ‘widespread pollution’ of the 
air, water and food with toxic chemicals, even ‘technological unemployment’, had fallen 
disproportionately on poor residents of the inner-city and South Phoenix, with little 
compensation in return.345 Members of the Planning Commission acknowledged that there 
were options available to alleviate the unequal burdens of development on the inner city and 
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south Phoenix areas but politicians at PCC had decided for ideological reasons not to pursue 
them. 
 
There was remarkable continuity in the ideological assumptions within the polity despite 
changes in who held leadership positions within the City Council. An incident from 1969 
highlighted the Council’s disregard for the aesthetics of the inner-city, especially when 
intervention could threaten the white advantages and suburban privileges of outlying areas. 
In the autumn of 1969, an application from the City of Phoenix for funds under the federal 
urban beautification scheme was refused. Phoenix had been ineligible for many federal 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs since voters in the city repealed the 
building code in 1962. The Council had since tried to access other funding schemes to support 
improvements in the standard of urban living and its infrastructure. After receiving the news 
that the city’s application for urban beautification funds had been refused, the Mayor of 
Phoenix wrote a detailed letter to the HUD Secretary, George Romney, ‘to express [his] grave 
concern, and that of our City Council, about a new and questionable policy in HUD concerning 
its various grant programs for cities.’ Phoenix had been awarded funds in previous years, most 
recently HUD had approved $342,000 in 1968-69 for similar schemes. The HUD regional office 
informed the City Council that Phoenix’s plan to spend just 30 per cent of the funds on 
poverty-area beautification did ‘not compare favourably with the higher percentages planned 
by other cities in our region.’346 The plans Phoenix submitted in support of their application 
indicated that only a small proportion of the grant would be directed towards areas of the 
city with significant amounts of poverty.  
 
The Mayor argued that HUD funding had become disproportionately weighted towards 
poverty reduction programs, which he believed was ‘somewhat pessimistic.’347 ‘At risk of 
seeming to be against fighting poverty’, he continued, ‘we protest what we feel is an 
unhealthy and dangerous trend in the Federal Government’s philosophy in helping cities.’ He 
believed this change in HUD policy was against the spirit of the original legislation which 
established the funds, and in any case, Phoenix was an exception. The city needed 
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improvements to the water and sewage, especially in areas where leapfrog development had 
occurred; as well as beautification projects, throughout the whole city. If HUD directs federal 
funds only to areas with ‘high levels of poverty’, he asked, ‘where will the needed help come 
from for meeting responsibilities in non-poverty areas?’.348 The Mayor’s letter demonstrated 
one of many complicated interpretations of the role of government within the city’s political 
elite. The incident highlighted that members of PCC were not uniformly against the use of the 
state, and accepting federal money, if it suited their priorities for the development of the city. 
Graham, on this occasion, lobbied HUD Secretary George Romney for federal investment to 
be directed into Phoenix suburbs. Graham’s actions demonstrate that the continuity in the 
governing ethos of the city that had shaped its development since the 1940s was still 
influential in public policy decisions at the end of the 1960s. There was no ideological 
opposition to federal government involvement in local matters. 
 
Population mobility and entrenched inequality 
 
A consequence of the Council’s preference for suburban development was the creation of a 
static inner city population, comprised mainly of non-white inhabitants. This was a key 
element in making PUHSD schools increasingly racially imbalanced and entrenching 
educational disadvantages for Mexican Americans. This occurred as a result of the close 
partnership between Planning Department officials and private sector actors. Although the 
Plan was meant as an indicative expression of the Council’s preferences for future 
development, there was substantial synchronicity between their intentions and the 
construction projects implemented by private sector companies.349 For example, the plan 
continued the longstanding prioritization of suburban areas for new development whilst 
almost all new private sector construction projects were located on the fringes of the city. 
Within the Phoenix metropolitan area, there was no construction work funded by private 
developers anywhere south of Thomas Road at the time of The Comprehensive Plan's 
publication.350 Builders and developers supplied a fluid housing market in North Phoenix and 
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outlying neighbourhoods. Within Phoenix, 246,000 residents were estimated to have lived in 
the city less than five years and 348,000 people to have lived within Maricopa County for the 
same period. Of those who had moved from other U.S. states, California, Illinois and Indiana 
were the most common previous locations.351 Newcomers to the city mostly chose to live in 
North Phoenix locations. In neighbourhoods south of Van Buren Street, just three per cent of 
households comprised new arrivals.352 Even those who were not new to Phoenix relocated 
frequently. In nine of Phoenix’s 20 metropolitan districts, one third or more of the population 
had lived within that area for more than five years. The inner-city and south Phoenix were 
exceptions to this trend, as these neighbourhoods had more static populations than other 
areas. 79 per cent of residents in South Phoenix had lived there for more than five years. In 
other inner-city areas, the number was between 79 and 89 per cent; in comparison to a city-
wide average of 66 per cent.353  
 
The effects of these actions had significant implication for PUHSD. PCC’s actions made it 
harder for inner city neighbourhoods to attract new investment and retain existing residents. 
As white inhabitants left the inner city in increasing numbers, non-white and low income 
residents assumed a larger proportion of the population. As a result, it was both harder for 
PUHSD schools to raise revenues via property taxes to fund educational programs and 
creating racially imbalanced enrolments. This was highlighted by the Phoenix Housing 
Commission (PHC), a body comprised of lay persons and public officials appointed by the City 
Council to review the state of Phoenix’s housing and the quality of its planning policies, when 
it explained how the city might improve racial integration. They envisioned interactions 
between residents and public housing occupants occurring in schools, neighbourhood parks, 
in their yards or whilst their children played in the street.354 Integration of the type they 
described was hard to achieve when the Council discouraged investment into inner city 
neighbourhoods and created barriers for non-whites to relocate to outlying areas.  
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The web of actors that confined non-white residents to the inner city had many facets. 
Undoubtedly, some residents in areas south of Van Buren St. lived there for a combination of 
reasons but other forces, including structural and systemic discrimination, curtailed the 
freedom of inner city residents to relocate and created the immobility amongst the 
population highlighted above. The legacy of restrictive eligibility criteria for federal mortgage 
guarantees, residential redlining and prejudicial lending practices influenced the spatial 
configuration of the city. As one of many minority groups affected by discriminatory lending 
practices, Mexican Americans often found that real estate brokers and banks refused to 
sanction their mortgage applications for properties in racially mixed neighbourhoods. 
Alongside this, PHC highlighted less formal and easily quantifiable barriers that prevented 
minorities from accessing suburban homes. The Commission argued that the small number 
of minorities working in the city’s real estate industry had compounded generations of 
institutional discrimination. Yet, the few that did work in the industry tended not to work in 
areas covering all-white neighbourhoods, making it harder for fellow Mexican Americans and 
others to gain access. Race permeated the judgements of brokers on the market value of 
properties and investments. White brokers were more likely to provide a lower valuation of 
properties in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of minority residents. Appraisals of 
potential value in these areas were also typically lower, discouraging investment of private 
funds. These practices highlight a common-held view within the contemporary property 
market, namely that deals involving minority residents were disproportionately risky in 
comparison with similar deals involving  white buyers.355  
 
The Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color, 
religion or national origin in the sale or rental of property.356 In the autumn of 1968, the City 
of Phoenix implemented an ordinance that made discrimination on the same grounds illegal. 
Whilst in parts the ordinance echoed the Fair Housing Law, it went further than these laws by 
establishing an enforcement committee and including provisions making it illegal to advertise 
or utilize application forms in a manner likely to induce discrimination.357 By this point, real 
estate agents had developed subtle methods for advertising properties in a manner that was 
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compliant with legislation, yet also discouraged minority buyers. One of the new advertising 
provisions stipulated that realtors must submit a HUD Fair Housing Marketing Plan to a local 
HUD-FHA Equal Opportunity Housing Representative. To obtain approval, advertisements for 
areas containing a large number of white residents must include efforts to promote the 
availability of HUD-FHA financial assistance or guarantees to minority buyers. Prior to this 
new regulation, a common method was to include an Equal Opportunity logo within the 
advertisement. Although many realtors advertising in the Arizona Republic or Phoenix Gazette 
included an adequately sized logo, some used a barely visible version. Others obscured the 
availability of FHA financial support entirely.358 In the context of a restricted private housing 
market, the possibility of accessing publicly subsidized accommodation was the only option 
for many seeking to relocate from the inner-city. Yet, Phoenix had an extremely limited 
number of public housing units; as of September 1973, they contained only 1,565 residents, 
42 per cent of whom were African American, 35 per cent Spanish American, 20 per cent white, 
3 per cent Native American and 2 per cent other. The city’s housing projects often comprised 
a large minority population alongside white residents. Yet, even in the inner city, different 
demographic groups lived in concentrated silos, separate from one another. In only one 
location were large cohorts of Mexican Americans and African Americans living together. The 
Sidney Osborn Homes, Matthew Henson Homes, and A.L. Krohn Homes housed large 
numbers of African Americans. Mexican Americans were clustered in Frank Luke Jr. Homes 
and Marcos de Niza Homes.359  
 
The importance of expanding the availability of public housing units was recognised by the 
Housing Commission when they suggested that social connections were essential to reduce 
segregation. They believed that earmarking suburban land for the location of new subsidized 
developments would enhance everyday interaction between occupants of subsidized and 
nonsubsidized properties, as well as ensure a fairer distribution of socioeconomic resources. 
After reviewing the existing provision of public housing, they suggested that new subsidized 
lots could be allocated evenly across the six planning zones within the municipal area.360 Yet 
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even as the Commission suggested methods for making the city less economically divided, 
their recommendations indicated that their proposals remained largely racially exclusive. 
They argued that cohesion would be easier and resistance to the construction of subsidized 
units weaker if the difference between new residents was merely economic, presumably as 
opposed to racial. If nonsubsidized residents had ‘major differences in life style and values, 
mixing can lead to hostility and conflict.’361 They also discouraged the creation of more public 
housing on the grounds that it would contravene the Council’s goal of maintaining city 
residents in locations near ‘friends, relatives, churches and clubs belonged to, and other 
familiar landmarks and valued places.’ To move residents away from areas with a dense 
concentration of other minorities, the Housing Commission argued, ‘can be a traumatic 
experience for a minority household.’ Planners further pathologized the condition of minority 
residents by arguing that they feared being unable to make friends or establish meaningful 
relationships ‘unless common values, interests, and living patterns exist.’362 In their appraisal 
of housing in Phoenix, the Commission noted that minority residents might not want to 
relocate from their existing neighbourhoods, nor would the placement of a new family in a 
neighbourhood ‘immediately change its social relationships.’363 Implicit in their belief was the 
notion that poor white residents of public housing would be more tolerable to private 
homeowners than racial minorities, even if they were of a similar economic position. 
 
Resistance to the building of subsidized housing lots highlighted the complexity of Phoenix’s 
racial hierarchy and the position of the city as a crucible of race and nation. A selection of 
homeowners had expressed opposition to subsidized tenants moving into their 
neighbourhood because they believed such tenants might indulge in unsavoury behaviour or 
adhere to less robust moral standards. Complaints of this nature served as a thin veil for 
racialized concerns about the inferior values of Mexican heritage residents. Some 
homeowners discriminated on the basis of nationality because they associated ‘undesirable 
character traits and behaviour to all persons of a certain nationality.’364 These arguments 
demonstrated the persistence of associating Mexican Americans, and other racial minorities, 
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with the deprivation of inner-city and inferior personal values. It also suggested a fraught lived 
experience for Mexican heritage residents in the city. Homeowners who associated Mexican 
culture, lifestyle, and behaviour with inferiority and sub-personhood was unable to know the 
nationhood status of the Mexican heritage person he encountered in daily life.  
 
The Commission’s findings highlighted the complex factors that shaped not only Mexican 
Americans’ standing in the property market but the construction of their racial identity in 
Phoenix. They surveyed the opinions of residents in outlying neighbourhoods to identify 
reasons for opposition to the construction of subsidized housing. Four of the most frequently 
cited reasons fused racialized concerns with the language of economic class. One reason often 
used was that subsidized lots would be of inferior quality, meaning that ‘[n]o one but poor 
people will ever want to live in them’. A second explanation for white resistance to subsidized 
housing was the feeling that poor people would not bother to maintain the properties.  Other 
complaints linked cultural concerns with schooling and property valuations, for example a 
third reason cited was the belief that ‘[t]hey will have lots of children and create an added 
burden on the school system. They will not pay their way.’ Another reason for opposition was 
the belief that building property of this kind would lower property values and cause a decline 
in the quality of the neighbourhood. Opposition to building subsidized housing outside of the 
inner city blended cultural concerns with economic arguments that they would become a 
drain on local taxpayers. Homeowners in prestigious neighbourhoods raised concerns about 
integrating the children of poorer, non-white residents they believed were culturally unfit to 
attend schools in affluent neighbourhoods. For example, some responses to the Commission 
suggested that children from subsidized housing ‘will use bad language and teach the present 
residents’ children bad habits.’ This accompanied a belief that ‘crime will rise’.365 The 
objections that the Housing Commission identified demonstrated the precarious nature of 
being a low or moderate-income resident in Phoenix. Families within this category were most 
likely to occupy inner-city neighbourhoods with little opportunity to relocate. These areas 
also contained the highest proportion of Mexican Americans and African Americans, meaning 
that, through successive generations, the inner-city space became synonymous with racial 
minorities and was imbued with racialized characteristics. In the minds of suburban residents, 
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the simultaneous concentrations of poor and minority residents fused racial resentment with 
class prejudice. Opposition to the construction of subsidized housing was thus articulated in 
a language which depicted proposed residents as being culturally alien and unfit to relocate 
beyond their existing neighbourhoods. Despite the introduction of federal legislation and 
local ordinances that outlawed the use of discriminatory practices against non-white groups, 
conditions in Phoenix highlighted the deeply entrenched antipathy that was crucial to 
ensuring long standing barriers prevented non-whites from relocating to outlying areas. 
Whilst equal opportunities for non-whites in Phoenix had been granted under the law, 
fundamental change to local property markets was not forthcoming. 
 
The opposition of affluent homeowners represented an important part of the explanation as 
to why minority residents continued to experience unequal treatment in the housing market. 
Such opposition was given greater import because of the willingness of public officials to 
placate these sentiments. City Council officials interpreted these concerns as a reasonable 
middle-class desire ‘to live in economically and socially homogenous areas where it is also 
easier to pass on cherished values to children and where property values are not 
threatened.’366 The Housing Commission indicated the difficulty of implementing meaningful 
action to overcome discriminatory practice, they argued that ‘[t]hese fears cannot be easily 
dismissed’ and questioned whether it was ‘appropriate and feasible to encourage ethnic 
integration’.367 Members of the Commission did, however, suggest some policy interventions 
which they believed would lessen the anxieties of homeowners. In terms of education, non-
subsidized residents believed they would be forced to pay additional taxes to fund the 
increased enrolment of children from low income families, as subsidized residents would not 
be able to make meaningful contributions to fund the additional cost associated with new 
developments.368 The Commission proposed a scheme to centralise school funding, thus 
reducing the importance of property taxes to school budgets. This policy proposal was cited 
as a tool for reducing the tax burden on affluent homeowners, rather than creating a more 
equitable distribution of resources, suggesting that reform was only viable if it was deferential 
to middle class interests.  
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Other proposals focused on reforming potential occupants of subsidized housing. For 
example, the Commission suggested that ‘their so-called inferior values can be lifted to a 
higher majority standard, if such is present.’ But regardless of this, the basis from which City 
Council officials proceeded remained the notion that the arguments raised by affluent 
homeowners were reasonable, grounded in their personal experience of subsidized housing 
residents. The Housing Commission tried to reconcile these concerns with the notion that 
‘maintaining stable neighbourhoods to control racial balance and demand . . . is politically and 
ethically controversial, if not illegal.’369 However, the main motivator for homeowner 
opposition to public housing was the notion that racial diversity represented a threat to 
property values. The Commission stated that a ‘major obstacle’ to developing subsidized 
housing and fostering better social cohesion was ‘the general lack of desire by home 
purchasers of tenants for heterogeneity.’ Homeowners opposed heterogeneity because of 
the difficulties of selling a home that ‘is 20 percent higher in value than those around it.’ 
Potential purchasers were discouraged from entering the market because they feared that 
‘the general surrounding market’ would damage the subsequent resale value of their home.  
 
Purchasing a home had obvious financial benefits for the owner, enabling wealth 
accumulation amongst other things. The home was also viewed as ‘a symbol of identity . . . 
[and] stability; it shows purpose and involvement and implies at least a minimum level of 
responsibility.’ These symbols and meanings have greater power, they argued, ‘if the house 
is owned’.370 Undoubtedly, the Housing Commission spoke for many residents and many 
others when they stressed the importance of the home to Phoenicians, ‘a home is more than 
just shelter to many people. It is a symbol of continuity – a visible guarantee of tradition and 
future.’371 As in much of the country, the detached, single family unit was the most popular 
type of house on the market. Homes of this type were available in Phoenix at a reasonable 
rate. John F. Long developers marketed a two-bedroom, one-bathroom unit in Maryvale, a 
recently developed area in west Phoenix, for $16,990; a similar unit in Paradise Valley was 
available for $17,990. This price was achieved by reducing the overall size of the unit to 850 
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square feet and charging extra for items such as a refrigerator, deemed a luxury. The decision 
to build smaller lots and exclude additional items had, according to the Housing Commission, 
‘brought new detached home purchase back into the price range of a young couple in their 
twenties with one child, and earning $7800 to $9100 per year . . . the typical buyers.’372  
 
The 1980 Census indicates that, as the population grew, so too did the distribution of non-
white residents in neighbourhoods which were previously predominantly white. For some 
non-white families, the development of affordable housing at the western edges of the city’s 
boundaries provided limited opportunities for relocation. In particular, areas in Maryvale 
experienced a growth in the Mexican American population.373 Yet, this change was limited.  
For many poor and minority citizens the possibility of homeownership was remote.  These 
families lacked the mobility and resources to relocate.  Although discrimination on grounds 
of race or class was not easily delineated, and often intertwined, a disproportionate number 
of Mexican Americans and African Americans were represented in the percentage of low and 
moderate income households.374 45 per cent of Mexican American families and 61 per cent 
of African American families earned below the $7,000 annual income threshold deemed 
necessary to afford even the new developments in Maryvale.375 Although the proportion of 
‘All Other’ families below the $7,000 threshold was only 27 per cent, at fully 34,951, they 
were the largest component. Families other than the two largest minority groups in the city 
made up 75 per cent of this economic category.376 PCC’s unwillingness to countenance any 
policy intervention using public money raised either locally or appropriated by the federal 
government meant that families without the means to accumulate sufficient wealth to 
relocate were stranded in inner city neighbourhoods. Redeveloping those neighbourhoods 
was not a priority for the Council, nor was improving the public infrastructure or schools. The 
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result of these decisions, consolidated in The Comprehensive Plan, was to remake the 
inequalities that had accrued over generations and limit the progress that non-white 
residents could obtain in the post-Civil Rights era. Collectively, they undermined the 
possibility of other remedial programs effectively reducing levels of inequality across the city. 
Yet, this model of municipal governance and urban development was contingent upon a like-
minded elite retaining possession of political power and their ability to maintain a consensus 
amongst the majority of the electorate about the benefits of growth. In the years following 
the publication of The Comprehensive Plan, that consensus began to dissolve under the 
pressures of an increasingly vocal minority rights contingent and dissatisfaction with an 
increasingly unsustainable economic model. 
 
Fracturing of the Metropolitan Planning Model 
 
Another force that shaped city politics at this time was a burgeoning homeowner populism, 
rooted in the overwhelmingly white neighbourhoods of the urban fringe, which challenged 
the city’s ability to manage continued residential and population growth. They hoped to 
prevent the fracturing of city planning priorities by implementing a new process for deciding 
the planning needs of local communities. The Planning Commission appointed lay persons to 
advisory panels in the hope they would enable planners to devise ‘a plan that would reflect 
the desires of residents.’377 The introduction of advisory panels came in response to the 
complaints of local residents who believed that the Council ‘did not reflect public opinion’ in 
the planning process.378 They were unhappy with seemingly aloof planning department 
officials who decided what was best for their communities based upon citywide goals and 
regulations.  
 
The Paradise Valley Plan was the second to include an advisory capacity for citizens in the 
development of the plan. The plan for the North Phoenix area of Deer Valley, published in 
1970, marked the first attempt at utilizing this method. Beginning in 1972, members of the 
Planning Committee held bi-monthly public meetings to discuss the future development of 
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Paradise Valley, by then one of the fastest growing areas in the Phoenix metropolitan region. 
In 1965, the area’s population stood at less than 13,000; by 1970, this had expanded to 
23,000. In the subsequent three years, the population more than doubled to 50,000. A further 
10,000 residents took up residence in Paradise Valley across the next two years, meaning that 
by 1975, its population stood at 60,000.379 The introduction of local control into planning 
policy created further opportunities for residents to restrict access to neighbourhoods and 
services. Local residents were anxious to ensure that future growth sustained, rather than 
damaged, their existing way of life. But residents also recognised the need to enhance the 
economic base of the area. Paradise Valley, in its early iterations, was known as a bedroom 
community, an area comprised almost entirely of single occupancy housing. As much as the 
absence of high value utilities, commercial, or industrial units was central to their idea of 
idyllic suburban life, residents realized that such an absence deprived them of important 
property tax dollars. Local residents also sought to create employment opportunities within 
the planning area and thus reduce the need for Paradise Valley residents to commute into 
the downtown area. Yet they insisted upon rigid guidelines concerning the type and location 
of permitted industry. For example, their proposals stated a preference for ‘research 
orientated’ employment activity and prohibited industrial lots for the purposes of: ‘heavy 
manufacturing’, ‘processing and compounding of materials’, ‘fabrication products’, 
‘warehousing as a primary use’, ‘retailing as a primary use’,  ‘gasoline or chemical storage’, 
and ‘open storage’.380 New industrial units were also required to be constructed in a manner 
in keeping with the existing character of the neighbourhood. If the building was single story, 
it should not cover more than twenty per cent of the net site area. For a two-story building, 
this was limited to ten per cent. Adherence to these guidelines tended to limit industrial 
activity to either white-collar professions or high-tech industry. Thinking of this kind was not 
new, but it was hard to reconcile with other proposals that sought to diversify the area. 
 
Planners and local residents acknowledged that existing development in Paradise Valley had 
been imbalanced.  The planning committee expressed its wish that future development 
should incorporate ‘all ages and income levels’.381 To this end, the plan included 






recommendations to avoid the ‘over concentration of any one density or life-style’. Instead, 
the study area should ensure that sufficient capacity remained for ‘medium density, multi-
family, low income and senior citizen residential developments.’ The implementation of these 
guidelines would alter the composition of Paradise Valley, at that point one of the most 
exclusive neighbourhoods in the metropolitan region. Under the proposals, future growth in 
the area would take place on a balanced basis, halting the accumulation of wealth in the 
suburban enclaves of North Phoenix. Yet, taken as a whole, despite ostensibly noble aims, the 
plan did not make the area accessible to most urban poor and minorities. If traditionally low 
skill or industrial employment opportunities were prohibited under the new plan, relocation 
was limited to middle class, white-collar workers. Anyone else who occupied the affordable 
housing built in the northern section of Paradise Valley would face limited employment 
opportunities or a significant commute to other areas of the city.382  
 
An area planning committee for the inner-city made similar reflections upon local housing 
and development which had occurred in recent decades. In doing so, they made a point which 
had become apparent to many by the end of the 1970s: ’Many affluent former inner-city 
[residents] . . . have relocated elsewhere to obtain adequate housing, resulting in a declining 
population and an area dominated by low income and minority families.’ They hoped that 
future planning policy would encourage a more equitable balance of resources throughout 
the city, particularly so that residents could ‘improve their living standards without leaving 
the area.’383 Phoenix had been subject to the same trend towards suburban living that every 
other Sunbelt metropolis had experienced, but it retained a strong economic centre within 
the inner-city. In the years between 1970 and 1978, the number of jobs in the inner-city had 
increased by almost 10,000, which amounted to a 15.5 per cent increase. Yet the idea that 
metropolitan growth was universally beneficial seemed an ever more dubious proposition by 
the end of the 1970s. The 1970 Census recorded a disproportionately high number of males 
residing in the inner-city who were either unemployed or not actively participating in the 
labour force. Of the 17 inner-city tracts, only one had a rate of unemployment or non-
participation below the city average of six and a half per cent. The area planning committee 





blamed a ‘lack of skills, education, or experience, and discrimination and unnecessarily rigid 




Throughout the Sunbelt, postwar residential segregation had been constructed through a 
variety of state actions such as FHA lending guidelines, combined with non-state actions such 
as racial covenants. By the time that Phoenix City Council published The Comprehensive Plan 
this apparatus had been dismantled. Although many of the effects of overtly prejudicial 
development policies were still evident, this chapter has explained why Phoenix remained an 
unequal metropolis into the post-Civil Rights Act era. The Central Plan, published at the start 
of this period, displayed the anxieties of leading members of the Council about their ability to 
sustain the Phoenix way of life in the final quarter of the twentieth century. Yet, in a moment 
of flux, business and political elites decided to reassert the ideology that had dominated local 
municipal politics since the 1940s.  By considering, and rejecting, other development models, 
the Central Plan highlighted that other courses of action were possible. The decision to reject 
them was based in large part on the views of a downtown business elite that, as the Central 
Plan showed, continued to hold significant influence in Phoenix politics.  
 
The Central Plan was one example from this period, when the city’s leadership pursued a set 
of policies that although not explicitly described as intending to disadvantage non-white 
inhabitants, had that effect. Collectively, the development and political economic decisions 
made by the Council narrowed the range of available and acceptable options because of a 
worldview that prioritized capitalist accumulation, limited public investment, and a 
commitment to low density living. As a result, many courses that may have rebalanced the 
distribution of power and wealth were not given due consideration. But political and business 
elites did not entirely impose this model upon the populace. The chapter also demonstrated 
the continuing presence of grassroots opposition to subsidised housing, the proliferation of 
which many homeowners believed would increase the presence of the poor and non-whites 
in their neighbourhoods. The emphasis within the Comprehensive Plan on maintaining a 
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neighbourhood’s current way of life and social connections, therefore enabled homeowners 
to continue to hoard the opportunities accrued through generations of discriminatory public 
policy. Historians have observed similar trends in the Sunbelt but normally in a setting that 
contained a population comprised of a white majority and an African American minority. This 
chapter has demonstrated that in Phoenix, similar techniques were applied to Mexican 
Americans, refining our understanding of both Sunbelt development and the Mexican 
American experience within it. 
 
To embed its model of political economy and urban development PCC had marginalised 
dissent, particularly from inner city residents with little institutional power. For the powerless 
and largely voiceless residents of south Phoenix their neighbourhood existed at the whim of 
planning decisions made by a political elite comprised almost entirely of middle aged white 
males. Politicians and public officials responsible for these decisions appear to have taken 
little consideration of the way planning decisions made in the pursuit of economic growth 
affected the lives of south Phoenix residents or whether they were likely to share in the 
proceeds. Yet, this chapter showed that the Council’s ability to act with impunity was limited 
in the post-1968 context. In particular, this chapter highlighted that the growing assertiveness 
of Mexican Americans and Chicano organizations were not pre-occupied simply with policy 
areas typically associated with these groups, such as education or immigration. Residential 
and economic development were also important issues around which they mobilised 
opposition, and in the case of the 1972 Arizona Senate Election, became a crucial part of local 
electoral politics for Mexican Americans. They were not always, or even often, successful but 
in doing so they initiated a gradual reshaping of a polity from which they had largely been 
excluded until recent years. But they were not the only detractors. Similar to other Sunbelt 
metropolises during this period, PCC was also assailed by a homeowner populism which 
demanded the state act to preserve their way of life and act to prevent its costs from rising. 
The next chapter will demonstrate the implications of this force upon education policy.  
 
All of these trends had profound implications for students in the PUHSD system. The 
unwillingness of the Council to use either federal, or municipal funds to intervene on behalf 
of Phoenix’s poor and non-white inhabitants removed the possibility of redeveloping the 
inner city and limited their options for relocating. These actions remade an unequal 
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metropolitan landscape in the post-Civil Rights era, ensuring that residential patterns 
remained in the most part in accordance with the decades long trend of a non-white urban 
core surrounded by overwhelmingly Anglo suburbs. The result was to undermine inner city 
schools such as PUHS and contribute towards the dramatic reduction of inner city school 
enrolments during this period. Bilingual Education alone could not overcome these deeply 
entrenched forces. The next chapter demonstrates the importance of schooling to policies 
around neighbourhood development, how they shaped each other and its effect of further 




























School Finance and School Construction 
 
Shortly after losing the Gubernatorial election in 1970, Raul H. Castro addressed an audience 
at East High School about the condition of racial minorities within the Phoenix Union High 
School District. Castro expressed his hope that PUHSD could become ‘a model school system 
for the entire Southwest.’ He argued that PUHSD should be a laboratory for integration 
methods and demonstrate to other cities with large multi-racial populations how to 
successfully educate children in these circumstances. Castro simultaneously challenged the 
education system to do more to improve the standard of schooling in the city and Mexican 
Americans to take more responsibility to overcome the longstanding image of them being ‘a 
man under a cactus or a person who is mentally retarded.’ Undoubtedly, the District faced 
difficulties in closing the attainment gap between Mexican Americans and their white 
classmates, but Castro predicted that ‘history will be made in this district.’385 The idea that 
Phoenix faced Civil Rights issues that were distinct from those of other prominent cities and 
regions was accepted by local politicians of various ideological perspectives. In February 1962, 
the United States Commission on Civil rights held public hearings in Phoenix. The Commission 
opened the hearings by congratulating public officials on the progress they had made in 
extending civil rights and asking what lessons other cities could learn from the experience of 
Phoenix. In his testimony, the Mayor of Phoenix, Sam Mardian Jr., boasted of how ‘There is 
no discrimination toward any minority group . . . discrimination that existed here prior to 1954 
is now non-existent.’ In Mardian’s telling, Phoenix had successfully achieved racial integration 
through voluntary methods that had not required the intervention of the courts. He 
suggested that other locations that were reckoning with a history of racial segregation should 
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Within twenty years, the Phoenix Union High School District, the single district responsible for 
all high schools in the city, was placed under a desegregation order by the federal 
government. In 1981, just four of the city’s eleven high schools were in compliance with the 
Civil Rights Act; the other seven had been relapsed into racially isolated institutions that 
resembled a previous era of state sanctioned segregation. This chapter seeks to understand 
how this process occurred. Mardian’s perspective on the state of race relations in the city was 
as flagrantly inaccurate as it was self-serving. Previous chapters have explained how 
discriminatory practices that marginalized racial minorities cascaded through generations of 
Phoenix public policy. These conditions remained in place at the time of Mardian’s testimony 
and subsequent development policy interventions further entrenched the unequal standing 
of minority citizens in Phoenix when compared with their white neighbours. The formal 
mechanisms of segregation may have been removed from 1954 onwards, but the absence of 
significant policy to redress the decades of discrimination meant that material change was 
limited. That little meaningful action countered the legacy of legally enshrined segregation 
contributed to the city’s noncompliance with Civil Rights legislation. This chapter will argue 
that two significant policy interventions at the beginning of the 1970s altered the course of 
racial progress and was a significant factor in remaking racial inequality in the post-Civil Rights 
era. The first related to where schools were built; the second concerned how they were 
funded.  
 
The introduction of school site construction guidelines demonstrated the importance of the 
schoolhouse to the process of urban planning, despite school districts having ultimate 
responsibility for choosing the site of new schools. Therefore, as with decisions about where 
to locate housing, the planning department’s intervention precipitated the hollowing out of 
a network of inner city schools and was not a response to the individual decisions of private 
homeowners. In doing so, members of Phoenix City Council utilized Federal Government 
recommendations that schooling should occur in suburban-like settings to justify their 
decisions. Recent studies have demonstrated that similar actions to prioritizie suburban areas 
for new school construction occurred throughout the Sunbelt, therefore situating Phoenix 
alongside Nashville, Tennessee and other metropolitan settings where space had been 
imbued with racial characteristics. Ansley Erickson’s study of Nashville demonstrated the 
importance to the remaking of racial inequality of decisions about where new schools should 
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be constructed. This chapter expands upon her methods by deploying them alongside the 
debate about school finance structures. Phoenix politicians and boosters had marketed the 
city as a place without racial conflict and free of the legacy of explicit Jim Crow segregation, 
yet they utilized the same methods for ensuring that white advantages were preserved.387 
Ultimately, school finance and school construction decisions highlight the inaccuracy of 
longstanding assumptions which posited that post Brown v. Board of Education segregation 
was the result of de facto, individual actions by homeowners. The example of Phoenix 
demonstrates instead that state and local government remained heavily involved in the 
creation of racial imbalances but through less visible means.  
 
Historian Phillip VanderMeer wrote that ‘Phoenix was a place where average people could 
afford to purchase a good quality home.’388 Earlier chapters have demonstrated that any 
plausible definition of average, in this context, should be limited to mostly white citizens. For 
many Phoenix residents the quality of a home was contingent upon access to a good quality 
school of their choice. Yet, by the early 1970s, the quality and sustainability of many school 
districts, especially outlying ones, was threatened by the increasing costs of education 
provision. School districts derived most of their funding from a tax levy on property within 
the district. As school costs increased, and with it the burden on homeowners, politicians in 
the Arizona State Legislature felt compelled to intervene. In doing so, they demonstrated that 
the imperative of public officials, from members of school boards up to members of the 
Arizona Legislature and the Governor’s Office, was to ensure the costs and discomforts of life 
for white residents were minimized. Discussions of school finance reform were conducted in 
the same manner as those regarding school construction; not on the basis of need or 
deserving but to preserve the viability of the Phoenix way of life for white homeowners in a 
period of financial uncertainty. These parameters for public policy highlighted the difficulties 
that Mexican Americans had in realizing the new rights promised to them under the Great 
Society legislation.  
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 School Finance 
 
In the 1972 elections to the Arizona State Legislature, Republicans enhanced their majority in 
the House of Representatives by an additional four seats, taking their total to 38. In the 
Arizona State Senate, the balance remained the same, 18 Republicans and 12 Democrats.389 
The issue of school finance had been entirely absent from the election campaign yet soon 
after the election, the Republican speaker of the House, Stan Akers, declared his intention to 
call a special session on the matter. His announcement meant that school finance was one of 
the foremost issues in State politics once the 31st session of the Legislature opened in January 
1973. In recent years, politicians had avoided calling a special session and little reform had 
been achieved on the issue. Schools were funded from a levy against property within the 
school district based upon an assessment of valuation. This model often incentivised local 
boosters and politicians to attract commercial or industrial investment to a district to off-set 
the tax burden upon homeowners. But by the early 1970s, the cost of schooling was 
increasing while, under restrictions passed in 1967, school districts could increase the levy on 
property holders within a district by a maximum of 6 per cent per annum. This meant that 
homeowners were forced to find extra revenues to educate an increasing school age 
population. Even an increase of 6 per cent would barely sustain school budgets at a time when 
inflation was regularly at this level or higher. The model of school finance in Arizona also 
widened disparities between school districts. Low-income districts had fewer valuable 
properties, commercial lots or utilities from which to levy funds. In general, they raised less 
than wealthier, suburban school districts.390  
 
In the early 1970s a change in the method of collection threatened to cause a further increase 
in property taxes. Informal methods of assessment had held valuation rates at an artificially 
low rate. Tax bills had remained stable because assessors had undervalued properties using 
out of date information. This was set to change following the introduction of a computerized 
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valuation system. It would use the most recent information on the true market value of 
homes. Such a change meant that property owners in the state faced possible increases in 
their tax liabilities. Levies were based upon the spending budget of individual school districts. 
Even if tax rates were maintained at their current level, the increase in property taxes could 
double. The plan faced resistance, not least from 14 county assessors who stated they would 
continue to value properties based on appraisals from 1972, rather than on the computerized 
valuations from 1973. The state property valuation director believed that properties in 
Maricopa County were being valued at approximately 5 per cent below their market value.391 
Republicans had commanding majorities in both houses of the Legislature, which meant that 
it was incumbent upon them to propose measures to reform the structure of school taxation 
and avert the impending political conflict.  
 
The office of the Governor of Arizona has little executive authority, for its occupant cannot 
compel the State Representatives and State Senators to legislate on a particular issue. The 
Governor’s primary method for influencing the political agenda is through the bully pulpit. In 
a speech to open the new session of the State Legislature, an important event for the 
Governor to signify his political priorities, Jack Williams urged legislators to address the issues 
of taxation and school finance. Throughout a wide-ranging speech he made a consistent 
argument that legislators should pursue fiscal restraint and urged state legislators not to 
acquiesce to every demand for extra public spending. Williams explained that the success of 
the state in recent decades had been underpinned by the political and economic commitment 
of its political leaders to thrift. He believed that future prosperity was contingent upon 
adhering to those principles. ‘Let us not be ashamed’, he argued ‘if we do not spend all of the 
money we can collect from taxpayers. Let us remember that they too deserve 
consideration.’392 He began by identifying the policy priorities he hoped the Legislature would 
make progress on. This began with a recommendation that legislators introduce land use 
planning reform to ensure that Arizona remained ‘an attractive area in which to live and to 
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raise children.’ The state faced the consequences of ‘unplanned and unavoidable growth’. 
The governor then turned his attention to education. He noted the significant expansion of 
state spending on education between 1957 and 1967. During this period state expenditure 
had ‘increased 260 percent while our population increased only 47 percent.’ By the early 
1970s, 75 per cent of the tax revenues levied by the state government were spent on 
education. Five years earlier, a plan to restructure school finance had included provisions that 
enhanced the state government’s responsibility for providing education funding. It had also 
included property tax relief worth $67 million but Williams argued that this had been eroded 
by rising costs for school districts. The governor was concerned by the escalating cost to the 
state government and individual property owners. He believed that containing spending was 
an important priority not only for the state administration generally but also a particular 
priority for legislators deliberating on a new school finance system. Even so, the governor told 
legislators that ‘Something must be done’. He indicated that reducing the burden of taxation 
on property owners was the priority his administration wished to secure in the upcoming 
special session on taxation and school finance. But he also acknowledged that the situation 
was complex and the options limited. Proposals for reform had to contend with the delicate 
equilibrium of school governance in Arizona. ‘Local control and local responsibility’ he argued, 
‘should not be eroded by unwise tax legislation.’ Williams argued that the disparities in 
property taxation between districts were the result of haphazard methods of collection, not 
flawed design. In 1968 the Legislature had stated that rates of taxation must be calculated 
based upon a valuation of property according to 100 percent of its cash value. Some assessors 
had not adhered to the regulations and created ‘great inequities’ between districts. Some 
property owners now face ‘almost catastrophic increases’ when their property was re-
assessed.  
 
The Special Session began in January 1973 but it was not until the spring that the Republican 
leadership in the Legislature published their first proposals for reforming property taxation 
and school finances. The Arizona House Majority Leader Burton S. Barr (R-Phoenix), argued 
that urgent measures were necessary to mitigate ‘Arizona’s tax crisis’. His urgency, and the 
saliency of the matter was based mainly on the 63 per cent increase in property tax levies 
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since the 1968-69 fiscal year. Barr argued that without action, homeowners in Arizona faced 
a possible further 30 per cent increase in taxes during the current fiscal year.393 
 
The tax burden placed on homeowners by the existing system of school finance was the 
foremost criticism amongst Republican legislators but another strand of discontent focused 
on its inadequacy to provide the requisite level of funding for school districts. In February 
1973, the Arizona Tax Research Association (ATRA) presented its research on school finance 
to the Legislature. They noted that education costs had doubled in the previous six years while 
the reforms implemented in 1968 capped annual increases in property taxes at 6 per cent. 
Even the significant increases in financial support from the state government had failed to 
stem rising costs. In the same period, the level of average attendance in schools throughout 
the state had increased by 64,000 students, which amounted to approximately 18 per cent. 
ATRA highlighted that an additional 4,038 teachers had been employed, causing a 24 per cent 
increase in the workforce. Over the 6 year period since 1968, this level of growth had added 
$148 million to school costs.394 Collectively, this amounted to a significant, additional financial 
strain upon the school system that could not be sustained without urgent reform. Yet, the 
initial proposals from GOP lawmakers were intended to address a different problem – 
providing immediate, short term relief for home owners. One suggestion was to provide a 
$40 million rebate for 350,000 owner–occupied single family homes, to be funded from a 
surplus of federal revenue-sharing dollars that were available. The money was available as a 
single windfall and therefore not a reliable basis for establishing a continuing subsidy. The 
Republican leadership argued that the rebate was a temporary relief for homeowners whilst 
legislators introduced a new system of property taxation. Further proposals included a 
suggestion that property tax be frozen for a year whilst assessors ensured that new valuations 
were sought via a computerized method. A subsequent proposal increased the overall value 
of the rebate to $42.4 million. The Republican proposals would mitigate increases for 
homeowners in all 14 counties in Arizona. But in Maricopa County the rebate would amount 
to a 2 per cent tax cut, meaning that the average homeowner would be paying a lower rate 
of property tax than they had in 1972. More importantly, the Republicans proposed to 
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introduce a new class of property. The existing system had four bands, each with a separate 
level of tax. Railroads and mines were assessed at 60 per cent of their cash value; utilities at 
a rate of 40 per cent; apartments and stores were subject to a 25 per cent rate, and houses, 
farms and vacant land were taxed at 18 per cent. Burton Barr wanted the rebate to target 
specifically homeowners who faced an increased tax burden without also providing a subsidy 
to farmers and landowners.395 Other reforms were targeted at the methods of collection that 
had caused large increases in property taxes for homeowners. These were a consequence of 
inaccurate valuation data. Counties that conducted new assessments every five years held 
taxes below the market value in the intervening period but then inflicted sharp rises on 
homeowners following large-scale revaluations. This also created collection disparities 
between counties that maintained more accurate evaluation methods. The rebate proposals 
included a convoluted method of distribution as legislators constructed them in such a way 
as to avoid damaging the budgets of local school districts. Under the plan, homeowners would 
pay the county treasurer 25 per cent less than normal and the state government would send 
the differential figure which would then be passed onto school districts.396 
 
The Arizona Republic, often reflective of political opinion amongst conservative politicians in 
Arizona, did not agree with the legislative proposals. The Republic published an editorial in 
May 1973 counselling legislators to pause before significantly reducing or abolishing property 
tax. They did this for three reasons: Firstly, the Republic argued that it taxed unearned income, 
namely that of land speculators, who benefitted from increases to the value of their land but 
contributed little to the community. Second, any transfer of responsibility for funding schools 
would also be a removal of an important instrument of local control. Property taxes, they 
argued, were typically spent by local authorities that were in closest proximity to the 
electorate. Any reform that made schools more, or even totally, reliant on revenues collected 
by the state government would amount to a centralization of power. Finally, the cost of 
funding education would simply need to be found via another means.397  
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The special session on school finance reform was being conducted in a moment of political 
uncertainty as both state and federal courts heard cases that concerned the constitutionality 
of school funding formulas. The most notable, in the summer of 1973, concerned the United 
States Supreme Court’s deliberations in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 
At the same time, efforts to reform the school finance system were complicated by cases in 
the Arizona state courts. Initially, legal action had been brought by parents and students in 
the Roosevelt School District within Phoenix. One group of plaintiffs emphasised the unequal 
demands upon taxpayers that resulted from a system rooted in disparate property values. 
They argued that the methods of assessment across the 295 school districts created 
disparities that placed an unequal burden on taxpayers in poorer districts. Plaintiffs insisted 
that parents in low-income school districts were required to pay a higher level of tax than 
those in more affluent districts to achieve equivalent or lesser educational opportunities. The 
second group of plaintiffs consisted of students attending school in Roosevelt School District. 
Their argument focused on the notion that the system of school finance created disparities in 
education within the state and thus violated their constitutional rights. These propositions 
were similar to those being tested in the San Antonio case as well as in the Serrano v Priest 
case being heard at the same time in California.  
 
In 1972, when the case was first heard in the lower courts, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction filed a motion to have the case ruled ‘nonjudiciable’. Superior Court judges denied 
the motion. After hearing the case, the trial court did not agree that the plaintiff student had 
suffered injury in their right to an education. But they sided with the plaintiff parents on the 
basis that the system of school financing discriminated against them.398 Despite this, the 
lower court ruled that remedial action should be delayed until the special session on school 
finance in the autumn. The purpose of the special session was to redesign the structure of 
school financing in Arizona. The system that the lower court believed unconstitutional would 
likely no longer be in place before any corrective action was implemented. 399 
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The Superintendent of Public Instruction, Weldon Sofstall, appealed the case to the Arizona 
Supreme Court. In June 1973, as the Court began hearing the case, the Arizona Education 
Association (AEA), filed a brief on behalf on its membership, 18,000 teachers, in the hope that 
the Supreme Court would uphold the ruling in favour of the students in Roosevelt District. 
However, by the time Hollins reached the Arizona Supreme Court, the case had been further 
complicated by preparations for the special session. Arizona legislators had repealed all 
measures related to school finance to enable a new system to be constructed entirely clear 
of pre-existing obligations.  The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the repeal of school finance 
provisions reduced ‘the need for us to meet specific and detailed contentions of defects in 
the current school financing system’. A ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio, 
during the intervening period since the appeal, narrowed the scope of the litigation. 400 San 
Antonio considered methods used for funding public schools in Texas, based for the most part 
on property taxes similar to Arizona’s. As parts of Texas grew more unequal so too did the 
revenues that individual schools could raise to fund education provisions. A group of parents 
challenged the school funding system in Texas on the grounds that the disparities violated 
their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices ruled by a 5-4 margin that a state public school finance system that resulted in 
unequal levels of funding between districts was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment 
and that the equal protection clause did not enshrine a legal right to equal school funding 
across districts.401  
 
The Arizona Justices did, however, believe there was merit in addressing the plaintiff’s 
arguments. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the contentions of both groups of plaintiffs. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hays accepted that the Arizona constitution established 
education as a fundamental right for pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one. But this 
right was limited to assuring every student ‘a basic education’. His opinion cited the recent 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.  The Court 
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concluded that relative differences in education spending provided ‘no basis for finding an 
interference with fundamental rights’.402  
 
In Hollins, Chief Justice Hays departed from the recent rulings made by the high courts of 
other states. Similar to the Serrano v. Priest and Milliken v. Green rulings, Hays accepted that 
education was a fundamental right under the state constitution. But, he did not accept, as the 
courts in California and Michigan had, that school financing laws were unconstitutional under 
the Equal Protection Clause of either the Arizona or U.S. Constitution. The Arizona 
Constitution contained a more limited education mandate with which a school financing 
system must comply. Chief Justice Hays ruled that ‘A school financing system which meets 
the educational mandates of our constitution i.e., uniform, free, available to all persons aged 
six to twenty-one, and open a minimum of six months per year, need otherwise be only 
rational, reasonable and neither discriminatory nor capricious.’403 
 
With regards to the taxpayer plaintiffs’ case, Hays cited the recent San Antonio ruling. In that 
case the Supreme Court had upheld the system of school financing on the grounds that to 
rule it unconstitutional would nullify local taxes as a method of funding local services. To do 
so on the grounds that the burdens of such methods fall unevenly would transcend ‘the 
constitutional prerogative’ of the court.404 Hays argued that in the case of Arizona, the court 
‘found no magic in the fact that the school district taxes herein complained of are greater in 
some districts than others. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s summary judgement in 
favour of the taxpayer-plaintiffs is reversed.’405 Members of the Arizona legislature had 
followed the San Antonio case closely, even going so far as to draft emergency plans to 
assume 100 per cent of education costs in the event that the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 
ruling that made the state’s method of collection unconstitutional. However, now that both 
the Arizona Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court had dismissed arguments that would 
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have compelled legislators to intervene and create a more equitable distribution of resources, 
they were free to construct a funding system that accorded with their principles. 
 
The Special Session was scheduled to start in October 1973. By mid September the Republican 
leadership across both houses of the legislature announced three proposals for reforming the 
state’s system of school finance.  As with previous proposals, they demonstrated that the 
parameters of discussion were limited. The Republican majority stated that it had two 
objectives: reduce the reliance on local property taxes and establish a more equitable system 
of school finance. All three plans would increase the level of state funding for schools from 
the existing 46 per cent to 75 per cent, with an intention to deliver a significant reduction in 
property taxes. The House Majority Leader argued that this was necessary because school tax 
rates were forecast to rise by 140 per cent during the next five years. Any reduction in 
property taxes would need to be offset by increases in taxes collected by the state 
government, typically sales tax and levies on corporate enterprise. Such a move would change 
the relationship between schools and the educational bureaucracy. All of the plans sought to 
reduce the disparities between school districts, estimated in 1973 to be between $400 and 
$3000 per year, per pupil. The most drastic suggestion was to set an upper limit on the 
average per pupil spending in elementary and high schools. The budgets of school districts 
spending more than this figure would be frozen until the gap between wealthier and poorer 
districts was reduced. The Arizona Legislature would decide the percentage increase of the 
annual cost on an annual basis, depending on the rate of economic growth in Arizona. The 
other proposals would curtail spending in affluent districts but aimed to narrow the gap 
between poorer districts incrementally, over a period of two to five years.406  
 
Following the publication of their plans, Republican legislators held public consultations to 
hear the testimonies of education and tax experts. At one of these hearings, two education 
officials challenged the received wisdom that a reduction of the rate of local property tax was 
the most important priority for the special session. Dr. George Smith, Mesa Superintendent 
of schools, and Thomas Cunningham, a member of the Paradise Valley Board of Education, 
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argued that the rate of assessment, currently set at 18 percent, should be increased. Each of 
the proposals published by the Republican leadership stated their intention to cut the 
assessment rate by 3 percentage points. But doing so, Smith and Cunningham argued, would 
limit the amount of money a school district could raise by issuing bonds - the Arizona 
constitution limited the indebtedness of school districts to 10 per cent of its value. Any 
reduction in the rate of valuations could not, therefore, be off set by additional borrowing. 
For suburban districts like the ones Smith and Cunningham represented this imposed a 
significant restriction on the amount of borrowing a district could access to fund capital 
investments. Suburban school districts included mainly single family properties but lacked 
business or industrial lots from which to raise additional revenues.  
 
At the same hearing, Tom Beauchamp, the president of the Arizona Education Association, 
expressed his concern at the diminution of local control and the likelihood that education 
budgets would be increasingly exposed to political pressure. All proposals expanded the 
responsibilities of the state government for education and would thus require education 
officials to negotiate budgets with the state legislature. This, he argued could lead to a 
situation where ‘schools . . . must go back to the legislature each year, hat in hand, to beg for 
enough money to survive.’407 Other education officials questioned whether the shift in 
responsibility for funding education would result in the de facto loss of local control. The 
superintendent of Creighton School District in inner city Phoenix argued that increasing the 
state government’s portion for school financing to 75 per cent was incompatible with a true 
definition of local control. If legislators were given the power to ‘restrict and tightly control 
finance, you also take away from the local citizens the right to determine the curriculum 
offered, the type of professional teaching, the materials to be used and the performance 
standards expected of children.’ The Republican leadership’s plans, therefore, signified a 
more fundamental reorganization of school governance than many at the time recognized.408 
 
Democrats in the Arizona Senate produced alternative plans to raise revenues from different 
sources. To centralize school finance mechanisms would place an additional $96 million fiscal 
                                                        
407 Bernie Wynn, ‘2 Educators Call for Assessment Hike’, Arizona Republic, 25/09/1973. 
408 Bernie Wynn, ‘Hearing on School Finance’, Arizona Republic, 26/09/1973. 
167 
 
burden on the state government. The Democrats, wishing to avoid any rise in sales tax, 
instead proposed increased corporate taxes, personal income tax for higher earners, and 
taxes on real estate transactions. Democrats in the Arizona Senate prioritized the reduction 
of what they believed to be a regressive sales tax. Yet, the announcement of a distinctive 
Democratic plan inadvertently highlighted the large areas of partisan agreement and 
consensus between the two parties. That the state government should underwrite up to 75 
per cent of the costs of schooling was now accepted wisdom. To meet these costs, and to 
alleviate the burdens of local property taxes, state taxes must rise. Collectively, legislators 
began re-organizing the state’s system of school financing. The new arrangements would 
transform the citizen’s relationship with the state, the state’s method of levying taxation, and 
the structure of school governance. There were no competing liberal and conservative, 
Republican and Democrat interpretations of these policy issues. To be sure, political sport 
dictated that some members of the Arizona Legislature presented differences between their 
proposals as colossal when a closer read demonstrated them to be only marginal. One, more 
excitable, Democrat, James McNulty (D-Bisbee), used the Arizona Senate debate to describe 
Republican plans as ‘dangerous, vicious and almost subversive’. He proposed the state should 
provide only 66 per cent of school funding, as opposed to Republicans plans to provide 75 per 
cent, and merely attempt to precipitate ‘the lessening of inequalities among school districts’ 
rather than equalise payments. To read such rhetoric as serious philosophical difference is to 
miss the fundamental ways in which partisan political opinion had coalesced on school 
financing.409 
 
The Arizona Republic published an editorial that urged lawmakers to focus on what it believed 
to be ‘the central question of Arizona’s education financing.’ Political conflicts over the level 
of education appropriations had occurred every year. But, the Republic argued, not enough 
thought had been given to accounting measures. The governor had made a similar 
recommendation to the legislature a few days earlier. Little infrastructure existed to measure 
the effectiveness of ever-increasing funding levels for schooling. Establishing a mechanism for 
evaluating educational performance was the true challenge before the legislature. These 
problems were enhanced by the fractured structure of schooling across 290 school districts. 
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Though it would be a painful exercise, the editorial argued that ‘consolidation must be 
achieved.’410 Even if the Republic believed that school districts should be consolidated, one 
conflict during the special session highlighted how the debate about the future of school 
finance had become confined to a narrow discussion that privileged suburban interests. State 
Senator Delos Ellsworth, a Republican representing Mesa, an outlying town on the fringes of 
metropolitan Phoenix, introduced a ‘homestead’ clause for property owners. The provision 
would exempt $2,500 of a property’s valuation from taxation. The homestead exemption was 
introduced as a means of stymying a proposal to redistribute tax revenues between school 
districts. Members of the special session had considered a requirement that the state 
government collect revenues from districts with high valuation levels and then redistribute 
them to poorer districts.  The incident also demonstrates the ideological dexterity of Arizona 
Republicans beyond reducing the tax burden of suburban homeowners. Burton Barr, the 
Majority Leader in the Republican controlled House of Representatives, hoped that any 
homestead clause would be accompanied by a $1 statewide property tax. Barr argued that 
under the state’s structure of school financing the burden of increased property taxes would 
be paid primarily by utility companies.411 Twenty years earlier Arizona Republicans had asked 
homeowners to pay extra taxes. They did so to fund a tax cut in business rates in the hope of 
making the city more attractive in comparison with Sunbelt competitors. In the early 1970s, 
leading Arizona Republicans proposed the exact opposite. In the intervening years, a 
dogmatic adherence to such tenets was cited as an excuse for refusing to access federal funds 
to improve south Phoenix neighbourhoods and schools. Yet, such a departure from the 
political orthodoxy in the state was done not to support the most needy but to conciliate 
suburban homeowners.412 
 
Opposition from Educationalists 
 
The Arizona School Board Association sought to act as an organized lobby to influence the 
direction of school finance proposals. In the context of partisan consensus amongst state 
legislators, they represented the most forthright of the opposition, which was confined to a 
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vocal minority of academics, teachers, and parents. The Association published a monthly 
newsletter that served as a kind of trade journal for school board members in the state, 
providing notice of new developments in schooling and highlighting the public 
pronouncements of politicians.  Alongside this it featured detailed pieces that discussed 
current policy proposals and future directions in education. The journal served as a site of 
intellectual exchange between educationalists; some editions in particular carried guest 
publications from school board members in other states. It also informed members of the 
discussions and happenings at National School Board Association Conferences. The president 
of the Arizona School Board Association updated readers on the national educational context, 
highlighting the progress of court cases with potential implications for Arizonan schools or 
informing readers of the headwinds in Washington D.C.  
 
Once school finance became a prominent issue in Arizonan politics, the Association used the 
newsletter to comment on proposed changes. Although articles in the Arizona School Board 
Association journal argued for school finance reform, they approached the policy question 
with a different purpose to Republican politicians in the state Legislature. Public discourse in 
the lead up to the special session was coalescing around a strand of thought that posited the 
reduction in property liabilities as the main priority for politicians. Unsurprisingly educators 
writing in the journal stressed that the agenda for the special session should prioritize reform 
that enhanced the quality of education. The School Boards Association encouraged legislators 
to begin by establishing the first principles of ‘[w]hat educational programs and services will 
be funded in the state’s school finance plans and for whom will these programs be 
provided?’413 The Board also encouraged politicians to consider the big questions of federal 
versus local responsibility for eliminating educational disadvantages and the desirability of 
the state ensuring equalization across school districts.414   
 
In seeking to provide alternative school finance options, the association considered the 
models of other states as a blueprint for reform. In the May 1972 issue, the president of the 
association wrote to members to inform them of the Serrano vs. Priest case in California and 
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its implications for Arizona. The rates of property taxation varied as widely in Arizona as they 
did in California, which created difficulties for school authorities who sought to create an 
equitable distribution of revenue. The president of the association argued that reorganizing 
school districts as a means of ensuring a fairer distribution of wealth would be unstable. A 
fluctuation in property or industrial valuations would require constant shifting of district 
boundaries and the reassignment of students to alternative schools. The only alternative she 
foresaw was a centralized process ‘for collecting and distributing these tax resources of the 
state.’415 
 
In the year before the special session, the ASBA felt emboldened, its leadership believing it 
could influence the direction of policy. The president congratulated members after she 
believed they had successfully exerted influence over members of the state Legislature. One 
example occurred when the Arizona House of Representatives shelved a bill that would have 
changed the date of school board elections and ensured they occurred on the day of a general 
election. ‘You did it’ she wrote, since the lack of support for the bill ‘was largely due to the 
efforts you as board members made in talking to your Representatives and pointing out the 
dangers to public schools if such a change came about.’416 After being elected to the 
presidency of the Arizona School Board Association (ASBA), Katie Dusenberry wrote to 
members to urge them to take a more active role in the state’s politics. ‘This is “Legislative 
Time”’ she declared. ASBA members should use their ‘influence in suppressing or advocating 
various items of state and national legislation.’ The Association had recently expanded and 
their expertise enabled them to scrutinise a larger body of legislation. She encouraged school 
board members who might be uncomfortable participating in political activities to consider it 
a matter of civic duty to prevent bad policy being introduced into local schools. The ASBA 
published regular bulletins notifying members of relevant legislative proposals. Dusenberry 
also encouraged members to scrutinise education legislation and contact their local 
representatives. Those members who notified politicians of their opinions could act as 
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important counterweight to ‘vocal minority groups in Maricopa County that appear 
frequently at the Capitol.’417 
 
As the special session approached, the new president of the Arizona School Board 
Association, Everett Luther, wrote to members repeatedly to stress its importance. He stated 
that this was the ‘most important matter before every school board in the State of Arizona 
this fall’.418 Luther explained his concern about the 30-day special session. The previous 
legislature had removed ‘all of the present school financing programs and the slate is clean 
for an entirely new approach.’ But devising an entirely new system of school finance in a short 
period of time could lead to ‘hasty compromises’ and subsequent difficulties. ASBA provided 
members with policy briefings aimed at keeping board members informed about the 
proposed changes. This information would enable members to lobby their state 
representatives more ‘intelligently’.419 Luther hoped that ASBA would act as an advocacy 
network that could influence the drafting of school finance proposals and shape them 
according to the association’s priorities by lobbying State Legislators. Members ‘should know 
how to reach them in the event you receive a request from the School Board Association to 
contact your legislators on a particular matter. The importance of successfully bringing the 
influence of this network to bare, he argued, ‘cannot be overemphasized’.420  
 
On the eve of the special session, Lou Ell Kleinz, Executive Secretary of the Arizona School 
Boards Association, spoke at the Arizona Tax Conference. She spoke of the need to ensure a 
more equitable funding regime throughout the state. Kleinz believed that the funding 
structure at that time enabled significant disparities between districts. It was not uncommon, 
she argued, for some districts to have a tax rate of $1 per $100 or less and an expenditure of 
$1000 per pupil. Other districts had a tax rate of $5 per $100 but their expenditure per pupil 
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was only $600.421 Kleinz argued that the disparity was caused in part by the rules governing 
the assessment of a district’s tax value.  
 
This contrasted with the mood among Republican legislators, typified by a speech made by 
Sandra Day O’Connor, the Majority Leader in the Arizona Senate. O’Connor had indicated her 
priorities for the special session during an earlier speech to the same conference. Her 
foremost priority for the session was to limit the burden of taxation upon homeowners. She 
argued that if individual counties refused to reduce levels of property taxation then the State 
government should intervene. 422 Both Day O’Connor and Ell Kleinz proposed an enhanced 
role for the state in local education, contravening the longstanding consensus in Arizonan 
politics about the sanctity of local control. Yet, their rationale for doing so diverged. The 
School Boards Association argued that further state involvement was necessary to improve 
educational standards. The Arizona Senate Majority Leader proposed using similar methods 
but to ease the discomforts of increased property taxes on homeowners. 
 
Leading figures within the multiple educational bureaucracies, such as Carolyn Warner, 
expressed their opposition to Republican proposals. She and other members of the PUHS 
school board met the chairman of the Arizona Senate Education Committee in August 1973. 
As part of the proposed increase in the state government’s role in education funding, a 
greater effort would be made to equalize funding between districts. Similar to the recent 
court cases, the crux of these discussions was the educational mandate of the state. They 
rehearsed arguments about what constituted equality and the appropriate method by which 
it could be rendered through state intervention. For one group, the simple payment of equal 
sums to all school districts would meet the state’s responsibilities. Others such as Warner felt 
that an equal distribution of school finances would involve recognising the differing burdens 
that each district faced. Amongst the enrolment of inner city schools in Phoenix were children 
from low-income families and welfare recipients. They received subsidies from the school 
                                                        
421 Ibid. 
422 ‘School Board Members Attend State Tax Conference on School Finance’, Arizona School Board Association, 
(Aug – Sept 1973), Vol. 2, No. 5. Arizona State University Library, Local Government Collection. 
173 
 
district to pay for lunches, transportation and books. If the new system of school financing 
did not account for these additional burdens, then it would disadvantage PUHS.423  
 
Once the special session was in progress, education officials for the Phoenix Union High 
School System raised further objections to the proposed school finance changes. They used 
the pages of the district newsletter to address the claim that the costs of public schooling 
were out of control. The newsletter stated that PUHSS overall education costs, salaries, and 
maintenance had risen but at lower levels than the national average. Schools in the district 
had been required to provide new programs that placed additional strains on school budgets. 
One such example was bilingual education, which ‘requires a dollar outlay per student roughly 
three times that of a “regular” program.’ But district authorities argued that education was a 
public good that would eventually make a return on the fiscal investment. They conceded that 
taxation had risen to cover school costs but this was due to ‘a half-century lag in salaries’ and 
the ‘many additional services demanded by the public.’424   
 
A subsequent legislative bulletin was sent to parents about the school finance proposals 
before the Legislature. The purpose of the bulletin was ‘to keep parents and citizens informed 
of legislation being considered’, state the position of the PUHSD board’s position on the issue, 
and encourage parents to contact their political representatives to exert pressure. PUHSD 
indicated that its priorities were, amongst others, property tax relief for local residents and 
the equalization of basic education provision throughout the state. Similar to ASBA, District 
authorities argued that the burden of taxation should be reoriented away from individual 
property values onto ‘other revenue sources’. Such a proposal would centralise the collection 
of school revenues and require redistribution from the state government. To ensure that 
students are provided with the equal basic education they also insisted that this would require 
a new funding formula. They argued that the principle of equality required a general 
commitment to providing all students in the state with the same level of dollar funding. The 
present system provided schools in neighbouring districts with significantly different level of 
resources. But a secondary commitment would also be required. This involved a commitment 
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from the state government to provide more dollars for ‘exceptional or disadvantaged youth . 
. . who require a lower student-teacher ratio’.425 
 
Phoenix Union School District authorities stated that they could not endorse the school 
finance plans currently being considered by the Legislature. But the bulletin stated that if the 
proposals were modified it would re-evaluate its position. The bulletin encouraged parents to 
‘Be an active American’ by contacting local politicians to express their opinions on the school 
finance proposals.426 The ASBA and PUHSD board worked hard to organise parents and school 
board members in opposition to the school finance proposals. However, they did not exert 
any noticeable influence upon the legislative process. In February 1974 the president of the 
Association wrote of his regret that members had not been able to play the decisive role that 
he had envisioned they might. In a subsequent self-proclaimed ‘indictment of school board 
members’ the President explained, ‘we could do a better job’ of influencing state 
legislation.427 Yet, the opposition of ASBA and PUHSS officials highlighted the narrowness of 
the terms of debate in the special session. The notion that a new system of school finance 
should be constructed according to what is likely to provide the highest standard of education 
was marginalized. The Republican Party leadership dismissed the concerns of educators and 
depicted them as lobbyists for special interest groups. The special session instead displayed 
consensus about the importance of state intervention to alleviate the burden of taxation 
upon suburban homeowners. However different their intended ends, both sides agreed on 
the preferred means of expanding the role of the state. Such a proposal represented a 
departure from a belief in local control that had underpinned state education policy for 
generations.  
 
The special session on school finance was the longest in the state’s history. A year earlier, 
legislators had spoken of concluding a deal within a month. A new school finance regime was 
passed on 19 February 1974, 121 days after the opening of the session. The eventual act 
increased the proportion of aid provided by the state administration from 48 per cent to 68 
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per cent. In monetary terms the level of funding provided by the state administration was 
increased from $197 million to $328 million. Legislators also agreed to raise the state sales 
tax, in addition to increasing levies on corporations, liquor and cigarettes. They estimated that 
this would provide the $172 million in revenue that school districts required. One Republican 
in the Senate voted against the increase in sales tax but the measures were otherwise passed 
with partisan votes: 17-13 in the Senate, 34 – 24 in the House. 428  
 
Sandra Day O’Connor argued that the legislation would enable a significant reduction in 
homeowner’s tax bills for the next fiscal year. In Phoenix Elementary School District, the rate 
of property tax would fall from $3.82 per $100 of assessed valuation to $2.74. The Republican 
leadership in the state legislature estimated that this would reduce the tax liability for the 
owner of a home valued at $25,000 by $108 in Scottsdale, and $263 in Roosevelt Elementary 
District. Such reductions were made possible by a $40 million windfall from the federal 
revenue-sharing formula. Governor Jack Williams had counselled state legislators to be 
cautious in appropriating the money because it would be available for a single year only. 
Democratic opponents of the legislation believed that using the revenue-sharing rebate to 
temporarily reduce taxes was a major weakness of the bill. Craig Davids, the Minority Leader 
in the Arizona House of Representatives, argued that legislation represented ‘temporary tax 
relief at best and phony tax relief at worst.’ He speculated that tax rates would rise again after 
the 1974 election.429 Democratic critics in the Senate argued that the reforms represented a 
tax break for the wealthy. Sen. John Scott expressed his belief that the tax burden had merely 
been shifted from ‘the hard-pressed middle class, while the wealthy will again escape 
taxes.’430 
 
Schools in Phoenix 
 
Decisions about how schools were funded highlighted Arizonan politicians’ actions to 
preserve white advantages which in turn limited poorer districts’ ability to obtain an equitable 
allocation of resources. The effects of funding decisions were reinforced by decisions on the 
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locations of new schools. In 1972, Phoenix City Council Planning Department made an 
appraisal of the city’s need for new schools and published a series of guidelines for the future 
selection of school construction sites. The plan, titled Schools in Phoenix, audited the present 
state of the city’s schools and used population projections to establish new ‘concepts and 
guidelines’ for future school construction and administration.431The plan studied the needs 
of both elementary and high school systems in the Phoenix Planning Area. This covered 393 
square miles taking in the central, City of Phoenix portion of the Phoenix Metropolitan area. 
The study included 15 elementary districts: Alhambra, Balsz, Cartwright, Creighton, Fowler, 
Isaac, Laveen, Madison, Murphy, Osborn, Phoenix, Riverside, Roosevelt, Washington, and 
Wilson; the 2 high school districts of Phoenix Union and Glendale Union; and the 2 unified 
districts of Paradise Valley and Scottsdale. The intellectual blueprint for the manual was an 
earlier set of federal recommendations. In 1958 the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare published a guide to school site selection. The School Sites manual signified a break 
from the unambiguously segregationist language of the Federal Housing Association lending 
code. The manual instead expressed federal preferences for education to occur in suburban 
settings by explaining that building schools in areas with ‘high buildings’ should be 
discouraged or avoided ‘if at all possible’. Federal officials believed there to be ‘no 
justification’ for the selection of sites that were situated close to the ‘depressing and 
annoying, . . . irrations’ such as smoke, noise or crowded neighbourhoods. Urban 
neighbourhoods were depicted as unhealthy, unsafe for the education of children, and 
incompatible with their need for ‘clear air and sunshine.’432  These guidelines provided 
justification for municipal authorities to direct new school construction to outlying areas 
based upon an ideological preference, rather than an assessment of need or the distribution 
of the population. 
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In Schools in Phoenix, city officials adapted federal guidelines published in the School Sites 
guide, for local purposes. The seemingly innocuous guide to school construction was 
consistent with generations of Phoenix land use policy and an ideological lineage that 
privileged suburban space. Yet, Schools in Phoenix also sought to shape the composition of 
the inhabitants of these spaces, in particular it expressed the Council’s belief in the 
importance of schools to the formation of both neighbourhoods and communities. The plan 
described communities as often having ‘similar population characteristics with similar ethnic 
and economic groups clustering together.’433 Planners described schools as being the most 
important instrument in building communities but in order to do so they had to navigate the 
complex structure of school governance in the city. As a result, the report called for 
cooperation between school districts and the City of Phoenix planning department to ensure 
that the ‘best needs of school planning’ could be met. The long-standing commitment to local 
control meant that the responsibility for assessing the needs of individual school districts lay 
with the district administrators themselves. Although school districts were responsible for 
reaching a conclusion as to ‘the type, size and capacity of needed facilities’, their decision-
making power was more limited, nor were board members inclined to use the powers they 
had. One member of the Paradise Valley School Board wrote of how ‘[t]he illusion of local 
control is a myth that has little basis in reality’. They continued, to argue that decision-making 
responsibility, particularly in larger school systems, amounts to little more than approving 
decisions made by many administrative specialists hired for that purpose.’434 To what extent 
school board members could act in a truly impartial manner when the Planning Commission 
was responsible for developing a Comprehensive Plan for the city is also questionable. The 
Comprehensive Plan created the general environment for neighbourhood growth and 
population distribution, within which school districts made decisions about facilities. Yet, the 
City Council’s decision to issue guidance on the location of school construction, in spite of 
their role being only advisory, demonstrates the importance of schools to the Comprehensive 
Plan and patterns of residential development.435 
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Despite appearing as only a set of recommendations, Schools in Phoenix made explicit its 
objectives for the future planning of school facilities, in particular that its guidance should be 
used ‘as a general planning guide by school districts.’ It was particularly concerned with the 
role of schools in developing good residential neighbourhoods, to which the location of a 
school was considered ‘a vital part’. As the hub of a neighbourhood, the report stated, a 
‘properly located school can encourage desirable development.’436 Other criteria such as 
‘Changes in neighbourhood characteristics’ was cited as an important factor in the selection 
of future school locations. Drawing upon earlier federal guidelines, the planning commission 
tried to establish a link between the consideration of neighbourhood characteristics and 
common-sense suggestions for the selection of school sites such as: ‘population projections’, 
‘land use changes’ and ‘location of other community facilities’.437 These amounted to an effort 
similar to that discussed in a previous chapter, whereby the decision to locate new schools in 
outlying areas encouraged homeowners to relocate away from the urban core and, therefore, 
was not merely a response to private decisions by individuals. Instead, in their attempts to 
maintain the Phoenix way of life, Council officials used schools as an important instrument in 
ensuring continued homogeneity in suburban neighbourhoods and directed resources to 
support their expansion.  
 
In its audit of current school facilities, the Planning Commission considered the quality to be 
generally good but they highlighted that problems existed with older schools in inner city 
neighbourhoods. A further deficiency was identified in fast developing, new areas where 
adequate school construction had not kept pace. These patterns demonstrated how the 
relationship between school construction and suburban development was often complicated. 
In these instances, families who relocated to outlying neighbourhoods faced what historian 
Jack Dougherty called an ‘educational disincentive’.438 Conventional understanding posits 
that parents relocated to suburban neighbourhoods to access superior schools, although this 
was often the case, it was not always so. The system of school finance in Arizona further 
complicated the City of Phoenix Council’s effort to direct resources to the suburbs. School 
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districts were allocated a portion of funds by the state government according to their level of 
‘average daily attendance’. It was calculated by dividing the aggregate number of days 
attendance by the number of days in which teaching occurred at the school. This system 
penalised some school districts with recently expanding populations. Administrators for 
Washington Elementary District anticipated they would lose $385,537 in 1974-75 because 
400 recently build homes in the district were unoccupied.  A reduction of this kind would 
require the school district authorities to cut the salaries of school teachers.439 
 
The nature of inward migration to Phoenix had placed a disproportionate burden on schools, 
particularly as the growth of the city had been driven by the arrival of young families. This had 
caused the average age of the city’s population to fall to 24.7 years; 60 per cent of the new 
arrivals to Phoenix since 1960 were under 14 years of age.440 Ell Kleinz, Executive Secretary of 
the ASBA, highlighted the demographic and economic pressures upon Arizonan school 
districts. The state contained 56 school age children per 100 adults in comparison with a 
national average of 51 children. Between 1963 and 1973, public school enrolment in Arizona 
increased by 50 per cent, the national average was 18.1 per cent. In Arizona the birth rate 
was 21 per 1000 population per year.  The U.S. average was 17.3 births.441 Schools in Phoenix 
anticipated that future growth would occur in northern and western areas of the city. In 
particular in the Paradise Valley and Maryvale districts. The Planning Commission argued that 
this would represent a simple continuation of current trends, considering that a significant 
amount of affordable housing had been built in Maryvale during the immediate postwar 
years. This seemingly provided the most likely route for minorities to relocate from inner city 
neighbourhoods. Yet, by 1960, just 336 Mexican Americans and even fewer African Americans 
lived in this area of the city.442 John F. Long, a powerful real estate developer in Phoenix, had 
donated land to make the area more attractive to families,  who could avoid enrolling their 
children in urban schools.443 By the end of the 1970s, residents in the area spoke of their 
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desire to control ‘the character of the neighbourhood’.444 Mexican Americans in Phoenix who 
wanted to move into even modest outlying areas faced complex processes of discrimination. 
 
Changes in enrolment, 1960-1970 
 
District School Year 
1959 - 1960 
School Year  
1969 - 70 
Change 
Alhambra 7,253 9,336 +2,083 
Cartwright 4,009 10,146 +6,137 
Isaac 3,639 4,806 +1,167 
Laveen 311 1,312 +1,001 
Paradise Valley445 891 5,227 +4,386 
Phoenix Union 15,978 24,963 +8,985 
Roosevelt 6,650 9,512 +2,862 
Scottsdale 11,062 26,441 +15,379 
Washington 8,308 17,424 +9,116 
Table 1. Enrollment Trends, ‘Schools in Phoenix’, p. 32-33. 
 
Undoubtedly, outlying areas were the fastest growing areas in the metropolitan region. The 
trends recorded over the ten year period, 1959-1969, demonstrate the substantial growth of 
enrolment in Paradise Valley and Scottsdale, both on the periphery. The Cartwright district, 
which contained the Maryvale area, also experienced significant growth. So too did the north 
and northwestern schools in the Washington district. However, the growth of school 
enrolments in these areas should not obscure the relative stability, and in some cases 
expansion, of students attending inner city schools. This came on top of already over-crowded 
conditions. The District had been operating double sessions, in overcrowded classrooms, to 
cope with expanded levels of enrolment. Phoenix elementary district, which covered the 
densely populated areas immediately north of the Salt River, educated 1,138 fewer students 
in 1970 than it did in 1960. Yet, the district’s enrolment was still 9,858, one of the largest in 
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the metropolitan region. Inner city districts such as these had the oldest schools and the most 
pressing need for new facilities.446 
 
Data on future growth provided both the basis and justification for the long range planning 
of the city. The planning commission’s recommendations solidified the metropolitan 
landscape and the distribution of resources within it. Schools in Phoenix included the planning 
department’s projections for population and enrolment growth. This data informed their 
conclusions about the number of schools each district would require by 1980, and a further 
estimate of their needs by 1995. Planners recommended that school construction policy 
utilize a mechanism called advanced acquisition. This involved the identification and purchase 
of land in advance of pre-existing demand for a new school in spite of any existing need for 
new premises. At the time of the report, schools in Cartwright elementary district were 
operating at near full capacity. The planning commission estimated that the level of 
enrolment, 12,423 in 1970, would double within the decade. They argued that the ‘need is 
great to develop an advance acquisition program now, before development occurs.’ The 
commission argued that 6 new elementary schools and 2 junior high schools must be built 
immediately.447 The enrolment in Phoenix Elementary District was predicted to remain at a 
similar level for the 20 years but in Roosevelt District the situation was more pressing. Schools 
in this area were already educating 1000 students more than their stated capacity. To meet 
the demand eight schools conducted double sessions. 10,957 students were educated in 
Roosevelt schools during the 1971-1972 school year and the commission believed that 
enrolment would increase to 23,260 by 1980. They judged that two new schools were 
required immediately, with an additional need of 16 new schools before the end of the 
decade. Whereas the plan noted school building projects being undertaken in other districts, 
especially northern and western districts, no such plans existed for the largely deprived areas 
south of the river. Instead, they suggested that the school population increase should be 
accommodated through the expansion of existing sites. Schools in Phoenix indicated only that 
a ‘great deal of further planning must be done’ to ensure school infrastructure could 
withstand the anticipated increases in school age population. Both Cartwright elementary and 
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Roosevelt elementary were situated within Phoenix Union High School District. Schools in 
Phoenix anticipated that PUHSD would grow from 26,078 to 45,700 by 1980. The plan stated 
that the ‘district is experiencing growing demands in the Maryvale and South Phoenix areas’. 
A new high school was being opened to ‘take much of the pressure off Maryvale High School.’ 
No corresponding construction project was planned to alleviate the infrastructure demands 
on South Phoenix. Yet, more than simply deterring the construction of schools in areas with 
high levels of need, the planning commission’s projections for outlying areas established the 
justification for a large-scale construction program in places such as Paradise Valley. Schools 
in Phoenix highlighted that the limited number of schools in Paradise Valley were currently 
operating at close to their capacity. The proposals suggested one elementary school was 
required immediately and a further 8 schools were suggested for construction before 1980. 
This was in addition to the construction of an additional high school. Although the projected 
demands upon schools in Paradise Valley and Roosevelt elementary were similar, by 1995 
Roosevelt was estimated to require 18 new elementary schools; Paradise Valley was judged 
to require an additional 20 new schools. This response indicated different priorities based 
upon a preference for suburban development over the inner city.448 As a result, state 
resources flowed to school construction projects that conformed to these preferences and 
cultivated the model of Sunbelt living that boosters believed would attract industrial 
development. 
 
The planning commission’s intention to influence the nature of future school construction 
was hindered by several regulatory and governance procedures for which Schools in Phoenix 
proposed reforms. One problem was the cost of selecting vacant land in a pre-existing 
community, which could be expensive and sometimes came in to conflict ‘with other 
community interests’. Planners proposed a policy of advance acquisition because, according 
to the commission, it was more advantageous to purchase school sites in advance of demand. 
Advance acquisition enabled planners to ‘determine the character of a neighbourhood and 
create a proper residential environment.’ This accompanied a recommendation that ‘Good 
site evaluation procedures’ should include a consideration of ‘the social fabric and sentiments 
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of the area.’449 The commission suggested that state laws required strengthening to enable a 
fuller long-range acquisition program. Another hindrance to the Council’s plans was the 
reliance on local property taxation created a complicated landscape of school finance across 
the Phoenix metropolitan region.  The assessed valuation per district - incorporating private 
property, industrial and commercial land uses – increased at a consistently high rate during 
1965-70.450 But this translated into a disparate amount of resources per capita, even in 
neighbouring districts.  Cartwright district, which had the lowest level of per capita 
expenditure ($2,709), was located immediately north of Riverside district, which had the 
highest per capita expenditure ($40,580).451 School finance was further complicated by the 
variance in property tax rates levied by districts. Roosevelt district set property tax at $7.14 
per $100 in comparison with the rate of $1.38 per $100 for property owners in Riverside.452  
Districts were able to offset the burden on individual taxpayers by attracting and retaining 
industrial or commercial enterprise. Schools in Phoenix argued that equalization of school 
finances was necessary to reduce inequalities across the metropolitan region. It was not 
certain whether the disparities between school funding had ‘an effect on the quality of 
education.’ Nor did it believe that establishing an equal tax base between various school 
districts was possible. Instead, similar to the school finance reforms discussed in the Arizona 
Legislature, the plan argued that action was necessary to alleviate the burden of property 
taxation upon homeowners in districts that were without commercial or industrial enterprise.  
 
 The importance of Schools in Phoenix should not be underestimated. The report made 
expressly clear that taken in consideration with the General Plan for 1990, its 
recommendations should be considered the sole authority on the acquisition of sites for 
school construction. These sites were of central importance to the future development of 
Phoenix in accordance with the political economy envisioned by the City of Phoenix Council 
and the Charter Government Committee. The plan stated that ‘The school is the focal point 
of the neighborhood and should be planned with the neighborhood in mind’. The selection of 
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the right area for school construction was considered ‘so important that it should proceed 
from the basic premise that a school is an integral part of the neighbourhood.’453  
 
Schools in Phoenix was saturated with the kind of pro-suburban ideology that federal policy 
had promoted in earlier decades. The plan suggested new concepts for school construction. 
All of them perpetuated the arguments that sites with large amounts of acreage in low-
density areas were the only valid location for the education of children. It depicted inner city 
neighbourhoods as inadequate and polluted locations that were unfit for schooling. Such 
perceptions added bureaucratic authority to arguments encouraging the city’s resources to 
be directed to outlying neighbourhoods. Planners suggested that schools be constructed as 
education or school parks. This involved building either individual or multiple schools on a 
‘park-like site’. The accompanying drawings envisaged an idyllic setting that included large 
amounts of green space for sports. Planners accepted that a drawback of the model was its 
requirement for large amounts of open space. Yet the final conclusions of the plan 
recommended that future developments conform to this model. The planning commission 
indicated that it believed future growth in the metropolitan region would occur in the school 
districts of Paradise Valley, Washington, Cartwright, Roosevelt, Laveen; and in Gendale Union 




This chapter has argued that in order to understand the forces that determined the 
educational performance of Mexican American students it is necessary to look beyond the 
conventional educational framework. As a result, this chapter has shown that questions about 
the effectiveness of bilingual education and the significance of recognising the rights of 
language minorities, must be considered in a more holistic educational context. In Phoenix, 
educational opportunities were influenced by policies governing school finance and school 
construction, which did not receive widespread attention from contemporaries or historians, 
in comparison with the issues surrounding the curriculum or desegregation. Yet, they 
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occurred concurrently. During the early 1970s, the structure of school finance in the state 
required political action, but when politicians in the Arizona Legislature considered the issue 
they did not approach it from an instrumentalist perspective of providing the best conditions 
for the education of children. Debates about equalizing the disparities between richer and 
poorer areas, Anglo and non-white neighbourhoods, were subordinated to the priority of 
providing tax relief for homeowners. Many of the most vocal proponents of reforms to this 
effect were from suburban areas, on the fringes of the Phoenix metropolitan area. There was 
a political consensus among both Republican and Democratic politicians in favour of reducing 
the levies on homeowners, however much these actions might compromise the quality of 
education in the state, leaving only a vocal minority of educationalists to advocate for a 
system that focused upon educational need.  
 
The introduction of new guidelines for the selection of sites for the construction of new 
schools is further evidence of municipal leaders’ willingness to use the levers of state power 
in support of a pro-suburban ideology. Contemporary discourse of supposed white flight 
obscured the extent to which the Phoenix City Council was a catalyst for migration away from 
urban areas and the undermining of schools in these areas. The use of techniques such as 
advanced acquisition, to situate a school in a suburban area that did not have the resources 
to support it, demonstrate that school construction was not entirely determined by private 
homeowner decisions to relocate away from the inner city. In the case of Phoenix, the federal 
School Sites manual provided a justification for Council officials to solidify what had been 
informal policy throughout the postwar years. In doing so, local planners applied to local 
conditions in Phoenix the argument of federal officials in H.E.W., that the education of 
children in urban settings was unhealthy and detrimental to educational performance. The 
result was to undermine inner city schools, which retained stable levels of enrolment, and 
deprive them of much needed resources.  
 
Collectively, the issues of school finance and school construction show that education was 
more important to municipal politics and urban development than previously recognised. In 
Phoenix, decisions about where to situate schools were considered essential tools by planners 
trying to assert a distinctive model of development. This chapter, therefore, presents a 
circular politics in which development in Phoenix was influenced through the use of school 
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site selection and when the costs of living in those neighbourhoods became too high for 
inhabitants, politicians intervened on their behalf. This process occurred to the detriment of 
those living in the urban core, who were deprived of resources to improve over-crowded and 
under-resourced schools. School finance and school construction policies, therefore, were 
crucial to the remaking of inequality in Phoenix during the post-Civil Rights era by restricting 
the possible options of educational remedies and, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter, 





























Busing and Open Enrolment 
 
The introduction of bilingual education legislation by federal politicians was celebrated as an 
example of bipartisan collaboration. Earlier chapters have demonstrated the limits of that 
convergence at the state level in Arizona, and the limited opportunities for Latinos to access 
the language instruction programs. Rates of poverty in Phoenix remained well entrenched 
and were not alleviated by bilingual instruction for a multitude of reasons. One was the 
patterns of residential segregation, built over generations but reinforced in the early 1970s 
through a series of planning interventions by Phoenix City Council. To be sure, the actions of 
Phoenix City Council in the early 1970s did not make a previously egalitarian metropolis 
unequal. The city, and its schools, particularly those in the inner city were experiencing 
structural changes to both the level of their enrolment and the nature of their racial 
composition. In 1967, PUHS had an enrolment of 4,000, which halved in three years, although 
East High and North High had expanding student numbers.455 However, decisions about how 
schools were funded and where new ones were built directed public resources away from 
inner city schools and incentivised private real estate investment in outlying areas. The result 
of these actions was to entrench Mexican Americans in urban areas of Phoenix that contained 
substandard housing, limited employment opportunities and high rates of poverty. Urban 
development policy had implications for PUHSD as a whole but particularly for Phoenix Union 
High School (PUHS), which drew its enrolment from the attendance zone most densely 
populated with Mexican Americans. At the start of the 1970s, the number of Mexican 
Americans and African Americans attending PUHS was disproportionately high when 
compared with the city’s overall demographics.456 At a time when national discourse about 
desegregation remedies became politically charged and tinged with racial animus, education 
officials in Phoenix had to contend with the racial imbalances within the PUHSD.  
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Debates in Phoenix during the early 1970s occurred at a time when public discourse about 
desegregation focused upon the use of busing as a method of reducing racial imbalances in 
public schools. 457 Two of the major flashpoints were decisions by District Court Judges in 
North Carolina and Massachusetts to order the introduction of busing plans in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg County district and the Boston Public School system. Events such as these have 
been the focus of several historical accounts, which have tended to focus upon high profile 
clashes over desegregation, the sentiments of busing opponents, and instances of white 
popular resistance to the desegregation of schools with high concentrations of African 
American students. This makes Phoenix, a city with Mexican Americans as the largest non-
white group as well as African American and Native American populations, different from 
many of the school desegregation cases chronicled by historians. 458 Although historians have 
often made only cursory mentions of Latino experiences of busing, a handful of studies have 
examined the desegregation of school systems that included a large Latino enrolment.459 
Guadalupe San Miguel Jr. demonstrated how Latinos were classified as white and assigned to 
schools in Houston Independent High School District that contained large African American 
enrolments as a means of protecting white students from being bused.460 Yet, existing studies 
have not considered the effects of desegregation upon Latinos in a holistic manner, examining 
it alongside other educational or municipal policies, or considered its implications for the 
racial formation of Latinos. 
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Histories of both Arizona and Phoenix have overlooked political conflicts over school 
desegregation.461 But placing Phoenix within the historiography of desegregation indicates 
that the city shared some of the experiences of Northern and Western cities. Despite having 
a different demographic composition, Phoenix was sharply divided by race, yet public officials 
stressed that such polarization flowed from supposedly de facto segregation. Education 
officials in Phoenix were concerned that Phoenix could be subject to a desegregation plan 
similar to those imposed on other cities. Non-white high school students in the city were 
overwhelmingly concentrated into three inner city schools, whilst schools on the urban fringe 
contained almost entirely white enrolments. All of these schools were within a single, citywide 
high school district, which meant that students could be transferred between schools without 
the kind of violation of school district jurisdiction that was struck down in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Milliken v Bradley decision of 1974. As high-profile school desegregation cases were 
contested throughout the U.S. judicial system, there existed in Phoenix the conditions for a 
large-scale system of pupil transfers should the courts wish to impose it. Yet, busing was not 
seriously considered in Phoenix for several distinct reasons.  
 
Twenty years of Charter Government Committee domination of the city’s politics had 
entrenched opposition to government intervention, unless it was for the purpose of 
facilitating commerce, in local political culture. The continued supremacy of the CGC and like-
minded affiliates such as Arizona Republic publisher Eugene Pulliam, meant that addressing 
racial discrimination and segregation was not on the political agenda of city institutions. The 
anti-government political culture constrained public discourse and meant that busing or other 
meaningful policy interventions to reduce school segregation were simply not debated. 
Although non-white parents and organizations such as CPLC attempted to make school 
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segregation a salient political issue from the late 1960s, public officials intervened only to 
preserve white interests. In Phoenix, grassroots activism, on either side of the busing debate 
or the topic of school segregation, did not involve violent demonstrations of the kind that 
occurred in Little Rock, Boston, or New York, in large part because local policy makers had 
made acts of overt racial hostility redundant. The fusion of racial discrimination with 
economic exclusion, which enabled residents in suburban areas to accrue the advantages of 
wealth and housing, also absolved individuals in outlying areas and the political elite from 
blame. Instead, policymakers implemented an open enrolment scheme that removed 
attendance boundaries in PUHSD and provided students with the opportunity to attend any 
school in the district. This policy resembled the freedom of choice plans that emerged in 
southern states to circumvent desegregation. The result in Phoenix was to worsen the 
imbalances between PUHS, North High, East High, and schools in outlying areas. In turn, 
furthering the construction of Mexican Americans as a distinctive non-white race, excluded 
from the white racial polity.  
 
The chapter begins by arguing that despite ostensible urgency in addressing the level of racial 
imbalance in PUHSD, politicians and education officials pursued a deliberately sluggish 
approach to achieving racial balance. In part, this was due to antipathy towards the use of 
busing. Later sections examine the open schooling policy that the PUHSD board decided to 
implement instead of busing. Soon after it was evident that the open enrolment plan did not 
improve racial balance in PUHSD but officials persisted with the policy. This final section of 
this chapter shows the culmination of the policies pursued by Phoenix City Council regarding 
housing and urban development, regulations on school construction and state policy on 
school finance. By the end of the 1970s, their effects caused a crisis of urban schooling. The 
chapter ends with an account of the school closure crisis in PUHSD, which was resolved only 
by the intervention of a U.S. District Court Judge. The proceeding sections will argue that this 
crisis was wrought by a culmination of the forces described in previous chapters: urban 
development, school finance, school construction and a failure to enact meaningful attempts 








Politicians in Phoenix believed that the city had a distinctive approach to civil rights that 
demonstrated the benefits of desegregation by voluntary means. As we have seen, Sam 
Mardian Jr., then Mayor of Phoenix, articulated this perspective when the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights chose to hold public hearings in Phoenix in 1962. The Commission praised 
Phoenix as an example for other cities trying to integrate a large multi-racial population. 
Mardian portrayed Phoenix as a desert oasis of racial liberalism; an argument at odds with 
the reality of a city clearly demarcated by race and wealth.462 He spoke of restaurants in 
Phoenix that served locals ‘without regard to race or color’. Phoenix, he argued, was an 
example of a ‘voluntary nature of desegregation’ that was ‘much healthier than forced 
integration’.463 This idea was based upon the decision of political officials in Phoenix to 
desegregate its schools before the Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Schools had been 
formally segregated by race from 1909, when the Arizona Territorial Legislature enacted 
legislation that mandated formal segregation in public schools. Minority students continued 
to attend segregated institutions until a 1951 ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court, which 
ordered the state to desegregate its public schools. Yet, achieving change in the racial 
distribution of schools in Phoenix was slow. Phoenix Elementary School District contained 
three previously segregated schools. Afterwards, they were considered ‘Open’, but little 
changed. In 1967, minority students made up 99 per cent of these schools’ enrolments.464 
 
By the early 1970s, the structure of schooling in Phoenix entrenched significant disparities, 
both intra-district and inter-district. Contained within the city’s 13 elementary school districts 
were 96 individual schools. The city’s sole high school district was responsible for 10 high 
schools. This made Phoenix one of the only major cities in the U.S. not to have a unified school 
structure that administered education between Kindergarten and Grade 12. Activists and 
parents alike demanded that PUHSD reduce the levels of segregation throughout the area. As 
recently as 1967, PUHS had an enrolment of 2,930, which was comprised of 35 per cent Anglo, 
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20 per cent African American, and 43 per cent Mexican American. Within two years, the 
percentage of Anglo students had fallen to 7 per cent whilst the proportion of African 
Americans had risen to 30 per cent and Mexican Americans had risen to 55 per cent.465 This 
unequal distribution of minority students meant the enrolment at PUHS was now comprised 
almost entirely of Mexican and African Americans, whilst in contrast, Camelback High in north 
Phoenix was populated with mostly white pupils.466  At a meeting of the PUHSD Board in July 
1970, parents pressed for urgent action to reduce the concentration of white students at 
schools in North Phoenix. Ronnie Lopez, Executive Director of CPLC, argued that school 
segregation in Phoenix was ‘a very serious problem’. Leon Thompson, Democratic member of 
the Arizona House of Representatives, spoke of the need for urgent solutions to improve 
school integration ‘or it will be too late.’467 
 
Politicians’ and education officials’ belief in the supposed merits of a voluntary approach to 
desegregation persisted in the early 1970s, even as they worried that mandatory 
requirements could be imposed on PUHSD. As high profile cases involving school segregation 
and busing attracted national attention, PUHSD was forced to create contingency plans 
should they also be compelled to implement a desegregation plan. One example was the case 
of Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg County. The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) had pursued litigation in the Swann case on the basis that residential 
segregation in Charlotte was derived from official policies that had been administered and 
funded through both municipal and federal governments. They sought remedial measures 
from the supposedly de facto causes of school segregation, in contrast to previous cases of 
segregation derived from de jure practices. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on 1970 
after the Fourth Circuit District Court had earlier approved a desegregation plan that included 
the use of busing to achieve racial balance. The Supreme Court delivered its ruling on 20 April 
1970. The Court affirmed the District court plan for desegregating Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
schools. Writing the opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued that ‘the 
objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed 
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segregation.’ Yet, in later passages, he argued that judicial interventions should occur only in 
response to a constitutional violation and that intervention should be temporary.468 However, 
the most significant element of the ruling was the Court’s affirmation of the District Court 
judge’s plan and, in particular, the use of busing as a desegregation remedy. The Court’s 
decision indicated that urban-suburban remedies may be permissible in future cases. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district encompassed, within a single authority, both the urban 
neighbourhoods of Charlotte and the surrounding suburban areas of Mecklenburg County. 
The desegregation plan would involve two way busing between these neighbourhoods, in 
which African American students from urban neighbourhoods would be transported to 
suburban schools and white students would ride buses in the opposite direction. Yet, as 
Matthew Delmont has argued, the Court’s ruling was not uniformly positive for desegregation 
advocates because it stated that strict racial balance was not a constitutional right, 
undermining the future possibility of recourse for supposedly de facto segregation. The Court 
argued that ‘The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every 
school in the community must always reflect the racial composition of the system as a 
whole’.469  
 
Public officials in Phoenix continued to express antipathy towards busing. Dr. Howard 
Seymour, Superintendent of the District, told an audience of parents that he did not support 
the use of busing to achieve racial balance, ‘[a]rtificial integration contributes nothing but 
hard feelings all around’. He argued instead that ‘Voluntary exchanges between schools, such 
as we’ve had a couple times this year, are a fine thing for youngsters, but I doubt if anyone 
really feels comfortable in a forced situation.’470 
 
Seymour’s successor, Gerald DeGrow, expressed similar opinion after being appointed 
Superintendent of PUHSD in July 1971. Shortly after assuming the role, DeGrow said that he 
opposed ‘artificial’ busing because ‘you can’t take students from one pocket and start busing 
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them all over town . . . Integration has to be a gradual process.’471 After the retirement of Dr. 
Robert Shapiro, both candidates to fill his seat on the PUHSD Board also expressed antipathy 
towards the use of busing. Steve Jenkins an African American who had previously served in 
the Air Force, stated that he was ‘definitely against any form of involuntary busing and it 
should not ever come to pass in Phoenix.’ Rosendo Gutierrez, a civil engineer, expressed a 
similar view, ‘I am opposed to busing for the sake of integration. Busing should be to meet 
functional needs.’472 The Arizona Republic echoed a common argument for refusing to 
address the racial imbalance in PUHSD when it suggested was ‘the result of de facto 
segregation reflecting the housing patterns in a particular neighbourhood’.473 Yet, the Swann 
ruling, among other events, brought segregation to the forefront of public discourse in 
Phoenix and as the case proceeded through the courts, PUHSD school officials became 
increasingly concerned that a similar ruling could be handed down in Phoenix. Roy Wilkins, 
the NAACP’s national director addressed an audience in Phoenix and expressed his belief that 
the city should bus students to ensure racial integration in schools. He stated that Phoenix 
was ‘one of the few places outside of the South where you have a segregated school 
system’.474  
 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights decision to return to Phoenix in 1971 brought further 
scrutiny of race and racism in the city. In response to critical testimonies at the hearings, an 
editorial in the Arizona Republic challenged any suggestion that Phoenix was a ‘polarized city 
rampant with racial discrimination’. The Republic believed the city had ‘imperfections’, but 
the recent hearings had focused excessively on shortcomings and not enough on the state's 
‘pretty impressive moral commitment’ to enabling the equality of opportunity.475 Yet, when 
public discourse on desegregation in Phoenix occurred, it often focused on the city’s 
responsibilities to its small African American population. In particular, the Republic argued 
that the inability of African Americans to find good quality housing was not always due to 
racism. They cited other reasons such as the ‘fear of increased violent crime. Fear of devalued 
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property. Fear of change.’476 These discussions often avoided discussions about the effects of 
residential and school segregation upon Mexican Americans, despite impassioned exchanges 
at PUHSD Board meetings. 
 
The de facto explanation for school segregation was just one way in which Phoenix conformed 
to national patterns of civil rights discourse. In his recent study of busing across the U.S., 
Matthew Delmont argued that ‘As civil rights advocates continually pointed out, “busing” was 
a fake issue.’ School children had been transported to schools on buses, at public expense, 
for decades; this was nothing new. Hence, in northern cities, “busing” represented a 
‘palatable way to oppose desegregation without appealing to the explicitly racist sentiments 
they [Northern whites] preferred to associate with southerners.’477 In Phoenix, both 
proponents and opponents of busing made similar arguments in the spring of 1972. For 
example, the President of the Urban League, Vernon E. Jordan, told an audience in Phoenix 
that opposition to busing was a ‘phony issue’ used by whites who oppose civil rights. On 21 
May 1972, the Arizona Republic published an editorial in response. Their argument was similar 
to that which underpinned resistance to civil rights during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, in particular that ‘To oppose busing is not to oppose civil rights’. The editorial instead 
argued that busing was a waste of time, as students would be sat on a bus when they might 
otherwise be studying, and a waste of money, which could be spent on other education 
programs. The Republic argued that the depth of antipathy to busing throughout the U.S. 
inoculated opponents to the policy from accusations of racism because ‘there is too much 
anti-busing sentiment in the country to dismiss it as being anti-civil rights sentiment.’ In the 
paper’s view, it was the rights of those who objected to busing that were being violated:  
 
‘The majority has civil rights, too. […] One of those rights is to send their children to the nearest 
school. A corollary is the right to oppose making their children waste hours in buses when they 
could spend them in the classroom.’478  
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When President Nixon delivered a speech on 16 March 1972, about his opposition to busing, 
PUHSD officials tried to pass a motion endorsing the President’s position, others used it as an 
opportunity to re-iterate their opposition to the policy. Weldon Sofstall expressed his ‘100 
per cent’ agreement with the President’s recommendations. One member of the PUHSD 
believed that it should ‘go on record endorsing it.’479 However, Arizona House Representative 
Leon E. Thompson (D-Phoenix) argued that the political dispute over busing obscured the 
underlying problem with education in Arizona. He argued that ‘Blacks don’t want to be bused 
from one inferior quality school to another inferior quality school.’480 
The result of the sustained and deep rooted opposition to busing caused education officials 
to consider alternative policy remedies that could reduce racial imbalances in school 
enrolments. Gerald S. DeGrow, the Superintendent of PUHSD, suggested that an alternative 
to busing was the consolidation of school districts ‘into 3 or 4 combined school districts’. 
DeGrow argued that students attending segregated elementary schools faced difficulties 
when subsequently attending racially mixed high schools. He cited instances of student unrest 
at South Mountain High School as an example of this. The school contained a broadly 
balanced racial demographic and should have been a model of integration for the city.481 Yet, 
DeGrow’s point highlighted the limited options for policy makers in Phoenix. His proposal to 
combine school districts was not supported by other members of the Board and was not 
pursued any further.  
 
Whatever the merits of busing as a policy intervention, there was no consensus at the time 
as to its effectiveness and thus it was not properly considered an option in Phoenix. The 
supremacy of white city officials, visible in the continuous attempts to preserve white 
advantage accrued over generations, narrowed the range of available options and limited the 
scope of acceptable political discussion. Busing lay beyond the contours of contemporary 
Phoenix civil rights debate, even as leading education officials were aware of or willing to 
acknowledge the problem of segregation in schools. In its place, as a means of improving 
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Phoenix’s racial balance, the city turned to open schooling, which gave the option for 
individuals to choose the school they attended.  
 
As in the case of school finance, a small but vocal group of educators opposed the prevailing 
consensus within Phoenix against busing. At the Arizona Education Association’s (AEA) Annual 
Conference in 1972, delegates argued for a more interventionist approach to alleviate 
disparities in educational achievement between different racial groups. In line with this, a 
motion was passed which placed the AEA in opposition to any attempt to pass a federal 
amendment prohibiting busing and urged   policy makers not to dismiss the effectiveness of 
the program. Instead they argued that officials should consider ‘all possible options to find 
solutions to segregation’. Yet, delegates also accepted that ‘busing may or may not be the 
ultimate answer to racial segregation in the schools of every community.’ Even tacit support 
for busing represented a significant break from the political orthodoxy in Phoenix. Yet, 
support for the resolution was not unanimous; the resolution was fought on the floor of the 
convention with significant dissenting opinion.482 Without consensus on busing or another 
desegregation method, PUHSD instead turned to open schooling, a policy of removing 




Although all high schools within Phoenix were situated within PUHSD, the sole high school 
district, students’ choice of school was restricted before 1971. Students had to attend the 
high school nearest to where they lived, with no option of transferring to an alternative. As 
demonstrated in earlier chapters, the school that a student attended was therefore 
intrinsically linked to local housing markets and urban development policy. Parents at PUHS, 
the school with the highest level of racial imbalances and the worst educational performance, 
sought options for obtaining better education for their children, in particular access to North 
Phoenix school with a predominantly white enrolment.483 While challenging the PUHSD board 
for more resources, minority parents, especially those at PUHS, were, by 1969, supportive of 
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an open schooling policy. Under such a policy, PUHSD would remove the criterion that 
students must attend the school closest to their home and enable them instead to enrol in 
any high school within the PUHSD boundaries. A pilot scheme had enabled students at PUHS, 
East High, and North High to operate as open schools during the 1970-71 school year, 
providing they registered their interest before 17 August 1970. The PUHSD Board of Education 
had decided to implement the policy after PUHS citizens advisory committee had 
recommended it be introduced.484 One early endorsement of this idea came from the 
Mexican American Political Association (MAPA), a political activist group involved in 
organising protests at PUHS. They argued that open schooling offered a solution for parents 
dissatisfied with the existing school system. In 1970, Manny Orneles, Vice President of MAPA, 
speaking on behalf of the group, stated that, rather than continue to send their children to 
PUHS, ‘that parents should contact the administration and enter their children in either of 
these two schools [North High and East High].’485  
 
Crucially, Orneles urged PUHSD to introduce a provision to fund the cost of transporting 
students to their chosen high school, something they had opted against when the policy was 
introduced.486 This soon became an important point of contention about open schooling. 
Although the parents of minority children supported the PUHSD Board’s proposal to 
introduce open schooling, they were aware that without an accompanying policy of publicly 
funded transportation, it would be available to only a few students who lived in the inner-
city.487 The Board of PUHSD decided to overlook concerns from minority parents and 
implement the policy without providing transportation. In reality, this meant that many 
students had the illusion of choice concerning their schooling, but little agency to realise this 
without the resources to pay for daily travel. Shortly after the policy had been announced, 
150 inner-city residents pressed for free transportation for needy students at a public meeting 
of the PUHSD Board on 2 April 1970. Operation LEAP (Leadership and Education for the 
Advancement of Phoenix), an anti-poverty program organised by Phoenix City Council, had 
funded the transportation costs of 700 low income students at PUHS, South Mountain High 
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School and Carl Hayden High School. They had paid for return bus tickets for students from a 
federal grant of $6,000.488 Yet, one LEAP representative told the PUHSD Board at a public 
meeting that it could no longer fund the program. A coalition of speakers, including LEAP 
representatives, Chicanos Por La Causa, and other local activist groups, urged the Board to 
provide free or subsidized travel from public funds. This sentiment was echoed by parents at 
the meeting who argued that transportation was an urgent problem in the district and a 
central cause of the high dropout rate in Phoenix high schools. To parents, announcements 
concerning new teaching programs and pedagogical methods meant little if their children 
were unable to travel to the schoolhouse itself. At the meeting, parents asked the Board to 
reject a $20,000 budget proposal to pay travel money to teachers making home visits. Instead, 
the Superintendent of PUHSD Board told parents he would try to raise the required $10,000 
from business and service organizations, yet this money was ultimately not forthcoming.489  
 
PUHSD officials had a more nuanced view of funding transportation costs for students than 
simple, doctrinaire opposition. On the one hand, district officials were unwilling to support 
the transportation costs of students who intended to utilize the open enrolment policy. 
However, the district paid the costs of bus tickets for a small number of students from low 
income families, who lived more than two miles away from their high school, until the money 
ran out in April 1970. Board officials appealed to business and civic groups to donate money 
as a means of ensuring the program continued. The Arizona Republic even printed an appeal 
for donations.490  PUHSD eventually included the scheme as part of its 1970-71 budget, which 
required a rise in local property taxes of 42 cents per $100 of assessed property valuation.491 
Yet, when parents attended a Board meeting in April 1970 to demand a comprehensive school 
transportation policy, PUHSD officials responded that it would not be able to meet the 
financial cost of busing students to schools of their choice.492  Despite the protestations of 
parents at public meetings such as the above, the PUHSD Board remained unmoved in its 
commitment to open schooling and its unwillingness to pay for school travel.  
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During the summer of 1970, Mexican American parents challenged the PUHSD Board to 
implement measures to improve the racial balance of the city’s high schools. One avenue 
through which parents advocated change was the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) of 
PUHSD. These issues came to a head on 9 July 1970, when CAC presented its findings in a 
report commissioned by the PUHSD Board. CAC argued that ‘de facto segregation is the 
situation in the schools of the Phoenix Union High School District’. In response, they 
recommended that the Arizonan Board of Education establish a committee containing 
representatives from various racial minorities in Phoenix; the remit of the group would be to 
ensure that PUHSD complied with ‘both the spirit and the intent of recent laws and court 
rulings regarding the integration of schools.’ The Superintendent of PUHS and his staff 
endorsed the recommendation.493 
 
The CAC recommended that the Board remove school attendance districts, declare all PUHSD 
high schools to be open schools, and enable students to attend any school of their choice. 
They believed that introducing the measure in response to racial imbalances in the city’s 
schools but their support was contingent upon PUHSD funding the transportation costs 
associated with enrolling at a new school. In particular, they argued: 
 
‘in order to encourage racial balance in the school, transportation should be provided for those 
Mexican-American students and those Black students who live within the Phoenix Union High 
School attendance zone but wish to go to some other high school and for Anglo students who 
reside in other school attendance zones but want to attend Phoenix Union.’  
 
The PUHS Board stated that they considered this proposition ‘Highly desirable’.494 Indeed, the 
Superintendent of PUHS recommended that, for the 1970-71 school year, the policy be 
trialled in schools that were under-capacity, with the intention being to implement a 
comprehensive open schools policy in the subsequent academic year. CAC suggested that ‘the 
Board of Education place itself on record that beginning with 1971-72 school year, all schools 
in the Phoenix Union High School System will be open schools.’ They requested this 
                                                        





commitment because the Superintendent and his staff believed it was ‘a policy which makes 
possible the integration of schools’ and this was a higher priority than overcrowding. Yet, 
whilst they embraced the proposal generally, the PUHSD Board rejected the recommendation 
that public funds be allocated to enable students to attend schools of their choosing. The 
Board's decision caused Gary Klahr, Co-chairman of the committee, to withdraw his support 
for open schooling at the public meeting called to announce the Board’s new policy.495 These 
decisions highlight the challenges that minority groups faced when trying to precipitate 
change in public bodies. Two members of the Board, Dr. Robert C. Shapiro and Donald Jackson 
advised parents that election to the Board was the most effective means by which minority 
parents could bring about substantial change, rather than through direct action or civil unrest. 
Shapiro, Jackson, and Carolyn Warner told parents that if they entered more candidates for 
election, this would provide the greater representation of minority perspectives that the 
board needed.496 However well-intentioned their advice was, a small increase in 
representation did not change the prevailing political and educational orthodoxy in Phoenix 
and PUHSD. As a result, they were not able to relieve the conditions non-white students faced 
whilst studying in under-resourced inner city schools. 
 
The PUHSD Board gave its final approval of an open enrolment program for the district in 
March 1971, removing the attendance zones but without appropriating any money to fund 
transportation. State Senator Cloves Campbell questioned the value of the policy for minority 
children, many of whom attended school in the 23rd Arizona State Senate District. His 
constituency encompassed much of the inner-city and south Phoenix areas from which PUHS 
drew its enrolment and which were the most densely populated with minorities. He argued 
that although the measure appeared helpful to minority students, it would do little to cure 
‘de facto segregation.’  For those living in deprived areas of the city, ‘Local bus service has 
been tremendously curtailed, and the students’ parents cannot afford cars to transport them 
to schools they wish to attend.’497 Yet, even such representations by local political figures 
were ignored by the Board. 
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Although the problem of ‘de facto segregation’ in PUHSD was recognised by education 
officials and politicians, few meaningful remedies were proposed. In March 1971, Operation 
LEAP requested that PUHSD make achieving racial balance a formal priority for the district. 
Collectively, the PUHSD Board declined to do so, but the exact reasons for this varied. For 
Carolyn Warner, the Board tended to commit itself to objectives which it did not have the 
resources to achieve; the Board did not indeed have sufficient money to support substantial 
change aimed at achieving racial balance. However, another Board member argued that if 
federal monies were available for voluntary busing, then PUHSD would consider the option. 
Joshua Bursh, a member of LEAP who had raised the issue of racial balance initially, suggested 
that the Board’s behaviour indicated PUHSD leadership was not fully committed to the 
notion. ‘If racial balance were near the top of the district’s priorities,” he argued, “I’m sure 
there would be no problem deciding to spend the money for it.” Bursh's remarks correlated 
with the views of many minority parents of children at inner-city schools, who suspected that 
PUHSD used budgetary constraints to avoid implementing meaningful policies to improve 
racial balance. Such suspicions were fuelled by the fact that the district was paying for the 
transportation of approximately 600 students to attend vocational education classes not 
available at their usual school. LEAP also questioned the value of compensatory education 
programs at PUHS, when the school’s performance was inferior to that of other city high 
schools. The PUHSD Board emphasised the fact that 25 per cent more was spent per student 
at PUHS than at other district schools. Yet, for advocates of a meaningful attempt to achieve 
racial balance, additional funding alone was insufficient to overcome a demographic 
enrolment entirely out of sync with the metropolitan area. Whereas 75 per cent of students 
in the district were white, only 4.9 per cent of PUHS’ enrolment was Anglo.498 However 
welcome increased financial resources were for parents in the district, the problem of racial 




Even before the policy had been implemented, local education observers had raised concerns 
regarding the potential adverse effects open schooling would have on the balance of 
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enrolments in PUHSD schools. 499 Although there was empirical data which clearly showed 
that by the end of the 1970s open schooling had not had the desired effect, warning signs 
were apparent from an early stage. PUHSD board members chose not to act upon repeated 
studies and interventions from education officials who warned that the district was becoming 
more unequal as those who could utilised their opportunity to enroll in prestigious north 
Phoenix schools, whilst those lacking mobility were confined to inner city schools. This 
perspective was expressed in February 1974, when an advisory council of parents and 
administrators from throughout the PUHSD met to discuss bilingual provisions. One member 
of the meeting highlighted that ’79% of the Mexican-American population of the Phoenix 
Union High School District’ was concentrated in ‘four school attendance zones.’500 Mexican 
Americans were predominantly enrolled in PUHS, South Mountain High School, East High 
School, and Carl Hayden High School. Despite repeated warnings and mounting evidence, 
PUHSD board members repeatedly voted to maintain the policy, eventually ending it only at 
the behest of a U.S. District Court Judge. The decision to sustain open schooling highlighted 
the antipathy of officials towards desegregation and their unwillingness to intervene to 
reduce the plight of urban schools. 
 
Within five years of open schooling’s introduction, the aggregate flow of students away from 
PUHS and other inner-city schools towards facilities in north Phoenix was evident to 
education officials. This movement of students across attendance boundaries had significant, 
if unintended, implications for the racial composition of schools. A 1976 report by the Arizona 
State Government confirmed that schools with a high number of white students in their 
enrolment became more racially imbalanced in the five years following the introduction of 
open schools. Camelback High School in north Phoenix contained an overwhelmingly white 
enrolment at the beginning of the 1970s; under the open schooling policy, this white majority 
increased, as an additional 534 white students from outside the previous attendance 
boundaries joined the enrolment. Just 28 Spanish-surnamed American children were added 
to the school’s rolls. Unsurprisingly, volatility in student enrolment had the inverse effect at 
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schools with a high percentage of minority students. One example was North High School, 
which experienced 'sizeable gains of Black, American Indian, and Spanish Surnamed American 
students, but [had] considerable [sic] less holding power for Other White students.'501 In five 
years, North High lost 352 white students, with overall enrolment being maintained by 
additional minority students.502 Yet, despite clear indications that open schooling had not had 
the intended effect within PUHSD, education officials were unwilling to consider any actions 
to curtail or end the policy. At a PUHSD Board meeting to present the results of the study, 
Lloyd Colvin, the district’s Research and Planning Director, predicted that the level of white 
enrolment would fall from 65.9 per cent to 59.5 per cent. The remaining enrolment would 
comprise a higher proportion of minorities, who would be confined to inner-city schools. 
Members of the Board hoped that by acting, they could pre-empt the intervention of federal 
officials. One member, Ruth Finn, asked a committee of business and community leaders to 
consider the ways in which inner-city schools could be improved. She also argued that the 
PUHSD Board could not impose top-down measures to alleviate the unequal treatment of 
minorities in the city. ‘If we are going to do anything to build up our inner-city schools’ she 
argued, ‘we’re going to need some pretty heavy community help behind it’.503  
 
The longstanding reluctance of Phoenix City Council and education officials to expend the 
resources necessary to improve opportunities for residents of the inner-city and south 
Phoenix remained a feature of local politics throughout the 1970s. For example, in 1977, the 
PUHSD Board conducted a review of enrolment patterns since the introduction of open 
schooling. The district’s review highlighted the difficulty of reconciling racial integration and 
open schooling with other federal mandates, such as bilingual education. Carl Hayden High 
School in the southwest corner of Phoenix had an enlarged enrolment of Hispanic students. 
Between 1972-77, 718 white students had left the school to attend others within the city’s 
boundaries. Mexican Americans living outside of Carl Hayden’s conventional attendance 
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boundaries had replaced these students. The President of the PUHSD Board argued that this 
represented a significant problem and without action, the school could have come ‘to be 
known as our Hispanic school’. The open schooling policy had created an enrolment in which 
enrolment numbers fluctuated throughout the district. PUHS was teaching just ten per cent 
of the white students living within its previous attendance boundary. At East High School, one 
third of the enrolment travelled from other areas of the city; most of these students were 
minorities. There was also a continuation of the longstanding trend of resources flowing 
northwards. South Mountain High School situated south of the Salt River and comprised 
mostly of minority students, lost students from all demographics. In contrast, the 
overwhelmingly white Camelback High attracted many more students, so much so that 683 
of its enrolment lived in other areas.504 But the racialized patterns of residency were so deeply 
ingrained that, although the removal of open schooling would cause Camelback to lose 
students, it would not change its racial composition. The same was true of Maryvale. The 
imposition of pre-1971 attendance boundaries would increase the number of white students 
at North High without changing the overall level of enrolment. The cancellation of open 
enrolment would also increase both the enrolment and number of white students at Carl 
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(+24.8%) 
Table 2: Residency vs. Membership, Camelback. ‘Where Phoenix Union High School System 
Students Live and Attend School: 1976-77’, p. 14. 
 
In the 1972-73 school year, 14.2 per cent of students attended a school other than the one 
closest to their residence. Across the next five years, that number increased to 27 per cent. 
Of more concern for the Board was the overall decline of students attending schools within 
the district. There had been a four per cent decrease in the number of school age children 
living within the PUHSD boundaries, yet the number of students attending school had fallen 
207 
 
by 16 per cent.506 In the five years spanning the middle of the 1970s, the overall level of 
student enrolment had fallen. Five years after the introduction of open schooling in PUHSD, 
educational officials sought to measure its impact on school enrolment and so researchers at 
Arizona State University set about surveying students who had decided to transfer schools. 
They noted that enough evidence existed by 1977 to ‘conclude that the open enrolment 
program in the Phoenix Union High School System is not successfully serving to integrate the 
district.’ Their research demonstrated how the policy enabled parents with means to move 
their children away from inner-city schools with predominantly minority enrolments to 
outlying schools with mostly white enrolments.  The result was that minority students without 
the means to transfer became isolated in inner-city schools of inferior quality.507 
  
 White students Non-white students 
Residing in the District - 13% + 21% 
Attending school in the 
district 
- 22% + 4% 
Table 3: Residence and attendance pattern changes from 1972 to 1978 in the eleven high 
schools of the PUHSD. ‘Enrolment Data Pack’, p. 7. 
 
The researchers at ASU pointed to demographic changes that were altering the nature of 
PUHSD schools. Between 1972 and 1978, PUHSD high schools lost almost a quarter of its white 
enrolment. The movement of students created increasingly unbalanced schools in the inner-
city. By the end of the 1978 school year, PUHS, South Mountain, Carl Hayden, North High and 
East High all had a majority of students who were Mexican Americans or African American.508 
An accompanying report, in September 1978, also confirmed that open schooling was not 
working. In particular, it noted 'that the open enrolment program in the Phoenix Union High 
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School system is not successfully serving to integrate the district.'509 The report echoed 
sentiments expressed by other reports that the policy had enabled students from 'higher 
socio-economic levels' to leave schools with a large minority enrolment. The consequence 
was the isolation of minority students, who lacked the means to move, in schools populated 
overwhelmingly by other African American and Mexican children.510 They found similar 
patterns of increased student enrolment volatility within PUHSD and a reduction in the overall 
number of students studying at district schools. These reductions occurred at a time when 
the overall population of the city was expanding, but were nothing new; instead, they 
represented an acceleration of a trend that had begun in the mid-1960s. As Phoenix City 
Council encouraged development on the suburban fringe, families had begun moving their 
children out of the city's high schools, movements which altered the racial composition of 
schooling in Phoenix.  
 
By the middle of the decade, the problems with open enrolment that State Senator Cloves 
Campbell predicted in 1971 had come to fruition. The open schooling policy had not improved 
the racial balance of Phoenix high schools. Its introduction hastened enrolment patterns in 
which white students left inner city schools to enroll in schools in outlying areas of North 
Phoenix. Parents at PUHS who had lobbied for the change had inadvertently provided 
opponents of busing and other state intervention with a powerful argument to frustrate those 
initiatives. Throughout the 1970s, members of the City Council, the Arizona Legislature, and 
the editorial writers of the Arizona Republic invoked the open schooling policy as an example 
of why further action was not necessary. Open schooling became an extension of supposedly 
de facto segregation, a claim to racial innocence. If children could technically attend any 
school in the city, overpopulation of inner-city schools with minorities became merely an 
expression of pupils’ desires to attend their neighbourhood school. The result was to further 
imperil schools that remained in the inner-city and south Phoenix. In 1969, Lloyd Colvin had 
reported to the PUHSD Board that the enrolment of PUHS was 2,930 and that he anticipated 
the enrolment to remain at approximately 3,000 for the next five years.511 Yet, those 
predictions had proved to be wildly inaccurate, feeding the suggestion that PUHSD should 
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close some of its school sites. The question of closing PUHS first came before a meeting of the 
PUHSD Board as early as February 1971, just a month before the introduction of open 
schooling. On this occasion, the Board decided by three votes to two to keep the school 
open.512 
 
By 1973, discussions regarding the closure of PUHS assumed a more serious tone when Gerald 
S. DeGrow reported that enrolment at PUHS for the 1973-74 school year was predicted to fall 
to 1,500 students. DeGrow stated that the quality of education provided at PUHS had fallen 
to such an extent ‘that I would not want my children to go to that school’.513 He proposed 
four courses of action for the school. The first involved phasing out the school beginning ‘with 
the ninth grade in 1974-75’, whilst the second proposed dispersal of the student population 
at PUHS into other schools at the beginning of the 1974-75 school year. The third suggestion 
included plans to properly fund a comprehensive curriculum and to ensure the school 
remained open regardless of how much enrolment fell. The final option was to reverse the 
open schooling policy across the district and compel the 500 students who had left PUHS to 
return. DeGrow tried to dispel ever present suspicion that the city’s business elite exerted 
outsized influence on public policy, he stated that he had not been placed under pressure by 
‘the downtown business establishment to sell that facility’. DeGrow’s ruminations on the 
policy options facing PUHSD highlight that the Board understood that ending open schooling 
or pursuing alternative approaches to reducing racial imbalances existed. Their persistence 
with the policy demonstrates that these ends were lesser priorities for the Board than 
sustaining the advantages of the Anglo middle class. 514 Although open schooling was 
detrimental to enrolment demographics in many areas, the policy improved racial balance in 
some PUHSD high schools. Both East High School and West High School had a higher level of 
minority enrolment than they otherwise would have under the pre-1971 system of fixed 
attendance boundaries.515 Despite the hopes of district officials that this trend signified a 
sustainable change to the distribution of non-white students, it was a temporary state, as part 
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of trend of white students leaving and non-white students moving further north from the 
inner city. 
 
By the end of 1977, the PUHSD Board had indicated a greater willingness to address racial 
inequalities within its schools. At a meeting in November 1977, the DeGrow helped pass a 
resolution which committed the Board to achieving racial integration in the city’s 11 high 
schools. The Board’s resolution recognised that, in response to irrefutable evidence of 
worsening conditions, addressing racial imbalances in its schools had become an urgent 
priority. In comparison to the PUHSD leadership’s unwillingness to pass a similar resolution 
earlier in the decade, it represented progress, although the Board made only a vague 
commitment to programs ‘that will implement racial integration’. A vague resolution was easy 
to achieve by 1977; only an extreme minority were prepared to publicly oppose the abstract 
notion of integrated schooling. As in many other U.S. cities, it was the methods of achieving 
racial integration that caused contention. The decision of one Board member to oppose the 
resolution on the basis that he feared commitment to integration would involve busing 
indicated that the fear of desegregation methods that were considered invasive remained a 
powerful influence on PUHSD policy. 516 
 
Several months later, although significant evidence had been available for at least two years 
that the policy was increasing the isolation of racial minorities in a number of District high 
schools, PUHSD finally began to consider ending the open schooling system. In line with this, 
the PUHSD Board announced that it would vote on whether to continue the policy on 2 March 
1978. At a meeting a few weeks before the vote, a group of 12 parents challenged Board 
members on their plans to end the scheme. They complained that a return to neighbourhood 
attendance boundaries would increase the dropout rate and force families to relocate across 
the city. The parents also argued that the decline of high school enrolment in the inner-city 
was caused by inferior educational provision, not racial animosity. Other speakers stated their 
belief that open schooling had caused a drain of talent and resources away from inner-city 
and south Phoenix schools. Ruth Finn, a member of the PUHSD Board, disagreed. She argued 
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that open enrolment had increased segregation in the district. Although cautious about 
stating that reversing the open schooling policy would solve problems of racial imbalance in 
the city, she argued ‘I feel a great obligation not to continue a policy that is making things 
worse.’517 Yet despite her protestations, PUHSD voted to retain the open enrolment policy. 
The vote included a proposal to return to the pre-1971 attendance boundaries, with equal 
course offerings at all schools in the city. The Board was split two votes each; there was no 
decisive fifth vote as the seat of a recently deceased member remained vacant. Members of 
the Board who voted against the measure explained their actions using many of the same 
arguments previously expressed in response to efforts to remedy racial inequality in Phoenix 
schools. ‘The patrons have spoken loud and clear’ argued the President of the Board, V. A. 
Dunham, ‘they feel the closed policy would create a lot of dissent.’ The desires of Anglo 
parents to maintain the ability to send their children to a school of their choice were heard 
over the demands of African Americans and Mexican Americans who demanded a more equal 
education system. The other member of the Board who voted against the proposal urged the 
members to ‘immediately go into a plan for desegregation’ but gave little indication as to 
what that might include. Although disappointing for parents of children at inner city schools, 
the discussion showed that open schooling was subject to considerable public scepticism.518  
 
Without action from education officials, the problem of segregation worsened. The PUHSD 
Board predicted that racial imbalance in the city’s schools would further increase between 
1977 and 1982, whilst the level of white enrolment was forecast to decrease from 65.5 per 
cent to 59.1 per cent, leaving Mexican Americans and African Americans isolated in inner-city 
schools. The Board projections stated that the number of white students at Camelback High 
would drop from 93.2 to 90 per cent. But the changes in demographic composition were 
predicted to be most profound at schools already containing a significant minority enrolment. 
For example, in just five years, the number of white students at North High School was 
expected to fall from 43.8 to 27.2 per cent. 519  
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School closure crisis 
 
In July 1979, the PUHSD board created an integration panel to consider the district’s options 
for improving desegregation. Although some members of the board had signalled a greater 
willingness to discuss the topic, it was a fear that the U.S. Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare’s Office for Civil Rights would cite the District for discrimination against minority 
students, which caused them to create the panel, in the hope that it would avert action by 
the federal government. It contained 64 members, including three representatives from the 
11 school campuses in PUHSD, five students, and five teachers, with the remainder being 
selected by the school board to serve as delegates. However, some members of the panel 
perceived it to be a talking shop with little purpose other than to appear to be a serious effort 
at improving integration but with little scope for reaching definitive conclusions and 
recommendations. For example, Jane Boyd, a member of the panel, described it as ‘totally 
ineffectual’, and members of the panel ‘knew our purpose was to do nothing.’ Boyd was a 
member of the student balance subcommittee but believed that ‘[e]very time we talked 
about student balance they thought we meant busing. My committee definitely had a racist 
tone to it’.520  Further resistance came from others outside the panel such as Thomas 
Haddock, the Superintendent of Alhambra elementary district. He questioned the necessity 
of OCR’s inquiry, rehearsing old arguments about the causes of racial imbalances.521 Haddock 
explained that he was not aware of ‘anyplace in the metropolitan area where deliberate 
separation is true.’ The racial imbalance in school enrolments across the city was a 
consequence of ‘the housing boom of the ‘50s dictated how the districts grew up.’ Dan Levine, 
President of the Madison Elementary District Board, expressed similar sentiments when he 
argued, ‘There is no deliberate segregation in the districts, it just happened as the city 
grew’.522 
 
Despite being accused of fulfilling only a symbolic function, the creation of the panel, and the 
work it produced marked a new stage in the deliberations over desegregation and the future 
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of PUHSD schools. From the beginning of the 1978 school year, there were perennial 
questions about the viability of inner city schools and frequent proposals to close at least one 
site. In March 1979, the PUHSD board vote once again to continue to deliver classes at all of 
the current high school sites. The decision meant that although the closure of PUHS and other 
inner city school sites had seemed inevitable at some points during the 1970s, they had 
remained open despite falling enrolments and a student body that with each year contained 
an even more disproportionate number of non-white students. Although the PUHSD 
announcement in March 1979 appeared wholly positive news, it foreshadowed a series of 
decisions that culminated in an intervention from the U.S. District Court Judge, Valdemar 
Cordova, to prevent the creation of a 30 square mile area in Phoenix without a high school. 
In the March 1979 PUHSD board meeting, Superintendent Pat Henderson announced that all 
11 current sites would remain open during the next school year but district officials would 
initiate plans to close one or more schools for the 1980-81 academic year.523  
 
Fears about the future of inner city schools were heightened in November 1979 when, after 
ten months of deliberations, the Integration Panel made a series of recommendations that 
had profound implications for the future of PUHSD. The Panel’s final report argued that racial 
balance in the District would be best achieved by closing three high schools and distributing 
the enrollment across the remaining eight campuses, although they did not specify which of 
the schools should close. The Panel believed that this would have the additional effect of 
equalizing educational and curriculum opportunities throughout the district. On other 
matters, the Panel was unwilling to countenance action to improve the racial composition of 
Phoenix high schools. Despite longstanding concerns about the effects of open enrollment 
upon PUHSD, members of the Panel decided by a majority vote to recommend its 
continuation but with a voluntary busing scheme that was incentivised to encourage parents 
to send their children to schools outside their neighbourhood. Suggested incentives included 
free bus travel and the first option on courses at the new school they attended. Anyone willing 
to participate would be assigned to the nearest school with an imbalance of students with 
their race or ethnicity. Yet, these recommendations highlighted the enduring commitment 
from officials and lay-person members of the advisory panel, to sustain a policy of an open 
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enrolment policy that was central to the inequalities within PUHSD. There were, however, 
some dissenting opinions to the proposals.  
 
Mexican American parents were critical of the advisory group’s recommendations, 
particularly with regards to the implications for the availability of bilingual education classes. 
A spokesman for the Valle del Sol stated that the report did not respond ‘to the needs of the 
bilingual community’. They also stated that ‘[m]inority parents are concerned about the 
quality of education in the district and must be allowed to the system in a culturally relevant 
manner.’524 Non-white parents and community organizations were further enraged when the 
PUHSD Board highlighted four schools, which had the highest levels of non-white enrollment 
in the District, as the most likely sites to be closed. The Board used a ranking system based 
upon number of enrolled students, equal educational opportunity, operational costs, ethnic 
balance, geographic constraints, building quality and drop out rates. As a result, Phoenix 
Union, Carl Hayden, North High and South Mountain were highlighted as the most likely 
venues to close.525 One concern was the effect any decision to close inner city schools would 
have upon surrounding neighbourhoods. Arizona Rep. Art Hamilton (D-Phoenix) stated, ‘It 
would effectively kill all of south Phoenix and the vast majority of central Phoenix.’526 Another 
concern raised by Rep. Hamilton was that the closures would mean that in the event of any 
busing mandates from the Office for Civil Rights, the burden would fall disproportionately 
upon inner city students. He argued, ‘[t]here is no way I can accept busing in the south and 
central portions of the city and leave the north Phoenix neighbourhoods intact. It would be 
an outrage.’527 
 
After several consultation meetings, the PUHSD Board eventually reached a decision 
following a tense public meeting on 06 December 1979. By a 3-2 vote they decided to close 
PUHS, North High and West High. The two dissenting votes, President of the Board Mary Carr 
and Roger Hagadorn argued that although they believed that some schools in the District 
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must close, a decision to decommission both Phoenix Union and North would have too great 
an impact upon the inner city, arguing instead that East High should be closed. The Board also 
agreed to sell the PUHS campus to raise funds for the District.528 This decision was the 
culmination of a multitude of forces such as school finance reforms, decisions over 
metropolitan development, school site selection and desegregation remedies. Yet, the 
Board’s vote to close PUHS opened rather settled the fate of inner city schools. After it was 
announced, OCR threatened to investigate PUHSD, which caused the board to delay the 
implementation of a PUHS closure plan.529 These decisions were the first act in series of 
contested decisions that were ultimately settled by the U.S. District Court in 1982. 
 
PUHSD’s need to consider cost reduction measures and school closures was a consequence 
of a confluence of factors that included the city’s development model that had hollowed out 
the urban core, a political culture committed to low rates of taxation and an open enrolment 
policy that created significant inequalities amongst the district’s schools. The District board 
could not raise property taxes on homes within the district, its primary source of revenue, by 
more than 7 per cent each year. If PUHSD officials wished to raise additional sums, it was 
required by law to hold an override election to gain the consent of the electorate. But an 
override election could not provide unlimited additional revenue. The Arizona Legislature 
passed a law in 1980 that restricted override election revenues to a maximum of 10 per cent 
of a district’s budget, with an additional requirement that it be re-authorized by local tax 
payers every three years. Further limiting the options for PUHSD was the stipulation that any 
revenues derived from the sale of property could not be used for 12 months if the district had 
also sought funds through an override. Yet, the costs of declining enrolment in PUHSD did not 
fall equally upon its 11 schools because of open enrolment, although all schools were faced 
with the fixed costs of maintaining a school site. In 1971-72, PUHSD had 29,700 students 
enrolled in its schools, by the 1980-81 school year that had fallen to 20,600, which meant that 
District officials faced stark choices about the future of educational provision in the city and 
how to fund it.530  
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After the Arizona Legislature passed a measure that enabled PUHSD to hold a budget override 
election earlier than May, the District scheduled the election for 26 February 1980. The 
purpose was to obtain authorization to raise $3.37million through additional property taxes 
from households within the district, which District officials planned to use to keep all 11 high 
school campuses open for another year. The PUHSD Board was initially sceptical about 
holding the election as part of the school closure program, believing that it was unlikely to 
pass in a political climate that was increasingly hostile to tax increases and that even if it was 
successful, the additional taxes would only delay the closure program, not prevent it 
altogether. Despite this, the Board voted 3-2 to hold an override election to avoid 
implementing the school closures within months, instead hoping to phase the closure 
program so as to take full effect by August 1981.531 Once the Arizona Legislature removed the 
stipulation that elections must always be held in May, a date of 26 February 1980 was chosen. 
The decision of the PUHSD Board to seek an override election was deeply divisive amongst 
local residents and parents. On 3 February, the Citizens Advisory Council (CAC) of PUHSD 
decided against supporting the decision by a vote of 13-12, and by extension refused to 
formally endorse the $3.37million budget override proposal. At the CAC meeting, Rosendo 
Gutierrez, the chairman of a grassroots organization, Save Our Schools, which organised to 
keep inner city schools open and well resourced, argued that the school closure program 
would devastate urban neighbourhoods. Gutierrez argued closing PUHS, West and North 
would cause a mass exodus to outlying neighbourhoods, evidence of which was already 
visible in the number of properties in close vicinity to those schools being offered at prices 
that were below market rate.532 Despite these pleas, voters approved the override by a 
margin of 7,192 to 5,168 with high levels of support for the measure in areas that were served 
by schools earmarked for closure. Even so, this was a very low turnout from the 130,000 
eligible voters in the district. The result was to raise the necessary revenue to balance the 
PUHSD budget and secure a one year delay to the plans to close three high schools.533 After 
the election, local residents and politicians continued to argue that the closing of inner city 
would threaten the viability of inner city neighbourhoods and that PUHSD should reconsider 
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its decision. When Phoenix Union Elementary District opened four new schools, Arizona Sen. 
Alfredo Gutierrez used the occasion to argue that ‘[p]erhaps we can persuade them (Phoenix 
Union officials) by this effort that the central city should not be abandoned.’534 
 
Despite these representations, PUHSD’s financial situation remained dire and the prospects 
for continuing to operate 11 high school campuses was parlous. In January 1981, District 
Superintendent Pat Henderson revealed the accounts and projected budget for the next three 
years. He announced that PUHSD would have a budget shortfall of $4.6 million in the 1981-
82 school year, which was expected to rise to $8.2 million by 1983-84. Henderson told the 
Board that any spending reductions would only affect the budget, meaning that significant 
reductions would need to be found in future years as well as the $3 million cuts to next year. 
This was necessary, Henderson argued, because of the structural challenges created by 
declining enrolment in city schools whilst enrolments in suburban areas such as Deer Valley 
had expanded from 900 to 8,000 students within 10 years.535 The loss of each student cost 
PUHSD schools $1,800, which meant that when officials were faced with agreeing a budget 
for the 1981-82 school year they had to introduce a package of spending cuts and tax rises. 
One such saving was the closure of North High, decided earlier in year but in effect from that 
autumn.536 Alongside this, a 30-cent property tax raise was also introduced to fund 
construction projects over the next five years.537 
 
As PUHSD officials made plans for the 1982-83 school year, three board members: V.A. 
Dunham, Mary Carr and Don Kennedy, announced their preference for closing two schools as 
part of the district’s cost reduction package.538 However, suspicion began to build amongst 
residents of the inner city that part of the Board’s preference for closing PUHS was based 
upon the city’s plans to re-develop the area with shopping centres and condominiums rather 
than residential housing. Two years earlier, Phoenix City Council had agreed a set of proposals 
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called the Downtown Area Redevelopment and Improvement Plan, which challenged the 
viability of the area as a location for family residences, instead prioritizing commercial and 
high-density residential units. Pat Henderson, the PUHSD Superintendent, endorsed these 
sentiments and questioned whether ‘the downtown area is compatible with attracting 
families with children.’ He also suggested ‘that the downtown area will become a commerce 
center.’539 As a result, after the re-development was complete, the area would be designed 
for young professionals without families rather than the low density family units that had 
been prioritised for decades. Phoenix City Council’s Plan referred to the use of two school 
sites as locations for private redevelopment projects such as hotels. Although the executive 
assistant to Mayor of Phoenix, Margaret Hance, insisted that ‘[t]he Mayor and City Council . . 
. have not taken an active role in lobbying for or against school closures’, the perception of 
school officials and parents at PUHS was that the Council and business elite wanted to close 
the school in order to pursue development opportunities. Don Kennedy, governing board 
president of PUHS, expressed this most clearly when he stated ‘[t]he way anyone would read 
this (proposal), Union is in the way of economic progress.’540  
 
Later in October 1981, when the PUHSD Board had to take decisions about the educational 
provision offered at inner city sites, Mary Carr highlighted development concerns for choosing 
West High as the location for vocational education. She argued that ‘[t]here is substantial 
doubt that residential development will occur downtown . . .under present conditions’.541 The 
unlikelihood that residential lots would become available was an important reason for 
rejecting PUHS as a possible site for locating the vocational education centre. The board’s 
decision to consult private sector boosters enhanced the perception that the downtown 
business establishment exerted significant influence upon PUHSD policy. In particular, as 
board members considered the implications of closing inner city schools, they referenced the 
importance of Phoenix City Council plans to discourage future residential development in the 
inner city as justification for closing school sites. Once the PUHSD Board agreed to close PUHS, 
they listened to representations from the Phoenix 40, a group of influential private sector 
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boosters who urged the PUHSD to consult businessmen about the sale of school sites so as to 
comply with their development model for the inner city.542 
  
After several rancorous public meetings, the PUHSD board decided by 3 votes to 2 to close 
PUHS at the end of the 1981-82 school year. The Board took the vote at a meeting attended 
by over 200 parents and local residents. PUHSD officials hoped that closing PUHS would save 
$697,000, making a significant contribution to reducing the budget shortfall. The two 
members of the Board who voted to keep the school open, Mary Price and Georgie Goode, 
expressed concern that the decision would leave many inner city students without a 
convenient school site to attend. Immediately after the vote Price proposed a motion to close 
east High School and re-open North High to retain a site for inner city students.543 Yet, there 
was no majority on the Board for maintaining all existing sites in part because two 
longstanding board members had been elected on a platform that favoured the school 
closures program. This was a continuing trend as newer members of the Board such as Price 
and Goode sought to fulfil their promises to keep inner city schools open and clashed with 
longer-serving members who had made contrary commitments.544 Despite the Board’s 
composition, Price was able to prevail with her plan to close East High and re-open North High 
its place, as a high school offering a comprehensive curriculum. Although North would not 
have an attendance boundary and comply with the open enrolment policy, District officials 
indicated that students who had been displaced by the closures of PUHS and East High would 
be given first option on places. Carr hoped that ‘[t]his will put a school back into the inner city 
. . . it will be one that parents would send their kids to and put honor back into the inner 
city.’545 Yet, other such as Clovis Campbell, once a member of the Arizona Legislature 
representing the 23rd Senate District and by this time the president of the Maricopa County 
Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), argued 
that North High was not an inner city school.  
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Campbell believed that the inner city was an area that stretched from the Salt River to 
McDowell Road and contained three schools: South Mountain, Carl Hayden and PUHS. As a 
result, the NAACP was exploring legal options to challenge the PUHSD Board’s decision to 
close PUHS.546 There were even differing opinions about what constituted the inner city 
amongst PUHSD Board members, for example Georgie Goode argued that ‘[i]nner city has 
been used to describe the poor and underprivileged.’ Goode also explained that the notion 
of an inner city school had historically been malleable, in particular as soon as ‘North was 
perceived as an integrated school, it became an inner-city school.’547 Mary Carr expressed 
similar sentiments, ‘[i]n time, Central might be considered an inner city school because there 
is low-cost housing all around it . . . If you are looking for the inner city, you could consider 
going south from Camelback Road.’ Another PUHSD Board member, Mary Price, also 
suggested that the areas that are considered within the inner city was defined by the socio-
economic status of their inhabitants. She argued, ‘[e]conomically, I would say the inner city is 
defined as an area with people who do not have a choice to move away from the economic 
development to take advantage of educational options.’548 This public discourse amongst 
PUHSD board members and other public figures highlighted the deeply ingrained assumptions 
about the inner city as an entity defined less by a fixed set of geographical boundaries than 
an association with the poor and racial minorities. 
 
Whilst the decision to close PUHS and re-open North High angered the local branch of the 
NAACP, others were unhappy with the accompanying decision to close East High in its place. 
In February 1982, the parents of 20 students at East High filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District 
Court in order to obtain an injunction and prevent the closure of the school. Their claim 
argued that closing East High discriminated ‘against plaintiffs and other similarly situated on 
the basis of race, color, or ethnic origin and therefore violates [their] civil rights’. The lawsuit 
also argued that many students currently studying at East High would be unable to attend 
North High ‘for essentially racial reasons’, because of its need to serve inner city residents.549 
On 2 March 1982, a second suit was filed against PUHSD, on this occasion by parents of 
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students at PUHS on near identical grounds to that filed against the closure of East High.550 
One day later, despite the impending legal action, PUHSD Board members voted to put the 
sale of the PUHS campus to a ballot of voters within the district on 18 May. Yet, PUHSD’s plans 
to reduce the $6.5 million shortfall in its 1983-84 budget through the sale of PUHS were 
hampered by the negative response of two private appraisal firms. Both told the Board that 
that buildings on the PUHS campus were worthless and that any construction project on the 
site would be better served by demolishing the buildings. A valuation for the site, 
encompassing both the land and buildings was eventually fixed at $20 million.551 Other cost 
cutting measures included a plan to eliminate 170 job roles for the next school year, the 
majority of which were teachers, these layoffs were in addition to the 500 roles that had been 
cut since 1978.552 As the election approached, Mary Carr reminded voters of the severity of 
the budget crisis, ‘I don’t want to frighten anyone, but we’ve already closed minority schools 
in the inner city and on the east side. If it does not pass, we may have to close a majority 
school on the west side.’553 
 
Voters in PUHSD delivered a mixed verdict when asked to decide on the school closure 
program. Only 11,337 of a possible 151,810 registered voters participated in the election, 
which meant that turnout was just 7.7 percent. On the issue of closing PUHS, 6,179 voted in 
favour, 5,132 against, but voters did not approve the second option of converting the campus 
of West High into a vocational education campus. Unsurprisingly, opposition to the PUHS sale 
was strongest in the district affected and the surrounding inner city areas whilst the outlying 
areas of north Phoenix and the suburban Maryvale to the west of the city were most 
supportive of the closure. The inverse was true of the vocational education proposal, apart 
from the area surrounding West High. Voters in these areas opposed the PUHS sale by 818 
votes to 642 but registered strong opposition to the vocational education program with just 
420 Yes votes and 1,058 rejecting the proposal.554 These results left the district in a difficult 
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situation. Although it needed the money from selling the campus, the board was unwilling to 
close PUHS without re-distributing the 1,400 students that were undertaking vocational 
programs there. Board President Georgie Goode argued that the verdict from the electorate 
was ‘unclear to everyone’, although the electorate ‘were convinced that we needed money 
for the budget as we proposed.’555  
 
After negotiations between PUHSD officials and the two groups of parents suing to keep 
either PUHS or East High open failed, each case was heard in the U.S. District Court.556 The 
case brought against East High was heard in late June with a verdict delivered on 2 July 1982. 
After hearing the claim, U.S. Circuit Court Judge Charles H. Hardy denied a request from the 
plaintiffs to issue a preliminary injunction, which would have forced PUHSD to reopen East 
High School for the 1982-83 school year. Hardy determined ‘that the board’s decision to close 
East was rational’, and to grant the injunction would create a ‘chaotic situation’ in PUHSD 
because students had already been assigned to school for the next academic year.557 Although 
PUHSD officials expressed their relief at Hardy’s ruling, the case brought by parents of 
students at PUHS was outstanding and due to be heard in August 1982. As Hardy had affirmed 
the authority of a school district to take action it deemed necessary to resolve its budget 
deficit, local and political observers argued that his fellow Circuit Court Judge, Val Cordova, 
would issue a similar judgement.558  
 
The case came before the Court on 04 August 1982. During the proceedings, one PUHSD 
Board member, Don Kennedy, explained that he voted to close PUHS because of a persistent 
decline in educational standards, which meant that it was a ‘disservice’ to students. The 
parents of students who hoped Cordova would issue an injunction that halted its sale and 
ordered its re-opening, argued that sending their children to Central High caused significant 
financial hardship due to the transportation costs.559 The plaintiffs called Richard R. Valencia, 
an educational psychologist based at the University of California, Santa Cruz, as an expert 
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witness to testify in particular about the criteria by which PUHSD had used to select schools 
for closure. District officials had used eight criteria to measure the performance of schools, 
these included: the number of courses offered, student educational attainment, the number 
of ‘educationally handicapped’ students, test scores, the experience of teachers, and the ratio 
of teachers for each subject.560 Valencia argued that PUHSD’s decision to judge schools 
according to these criteria was discriminatory towards the inner city schools with high non-
white enrollments.561 Al Flores, the attorney representing the group of parents who brought 
the case, argued that because PUHS, North and East High all had large non-white enrolments, 
the ‘result of these closures is a one-way busing scheme’.562  
 
On 30 August, U.S. District Judge Valdemar Cordova sided with the plaintiffs and issued an 
injunction against the sale of the PUHS campus. He also ordered the District to reopen the 
school in time for the spring semester. Cordova wrote that the District’s maps indicated that 
a 30 square mile area of the inner city would be left without a high school. For this reason, he 
argued that the decision to close PUHS and sell the campus represented ‘the disembowelling 
of the inner city of Phoenix by removing therefrom all the secondary educational facilities 
which were easily accessible to minorities.’ Cordova argued that these processes were 
exclusively targeting minorities.563 Following the ruling, PUHSD officials developed alternative 
plans that would comply with the U.S. District Court Injunction without further undermining 
the District’s financial position. In October 1982, the Board proposed that PUHS be sold 
immediately with North High School reopened for the 1983 academic year. Although similar 
plans had been developed by the Board before, this iteration had been devised in consultation 
with the District’s attorney, J. William Brammer to ensure that it would comply with the court 
order. This was achieved by proposing new attendance boundaries, divided at Seventh Street, 
which re-distributed the population formerly served by PUHS to other schools. Fixed 
attendance boundaries would be re-imposed, ending the open enrolment policy 11 years 
after its introduction, and forcing students to enrol at the school closest to their home. A 
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caveat was inserted into the new attendance policy that allowed pupil transfers if they 
improved the racial balance of the eight high schools in the District. Al Flores, the attorney 
who represented the parents who brought the PUHS suit, conceded that the plans were likely 
to be accepted by Judge Cordova as complying with his order. Yet, he was enthusiastic about 
the decision to end open enrolment, which he argued ‘was clearly found to be discriminatory’ 
and had encouraged ‘white flight’.564 However, the 14 parents who filed the suit were not 
satisfied with PUHSD’s new proposals. After meeting with the board, they publicly rejected 
the plan to reopen North High on the grounds that they remained committed to saving 
PUHS.565 Despite their discontent, on 23 November 1982, U.S. District Judge Valdemar 
Cordova determined the plan to be ‘constitutional and legal’, vacated his ruling that reopened 
PUHS and accepted the Board’s proposals. Although the 14 parents who brought the suit 
remained unhappy with the decision to close PUHS, Cordova’s ruling ended their suit. It also 
ensured that North high would reopen and the open enrolment policy, which by 1982 was 




Phoenix faced questions about how to ensure greater racial balance at the same time as other 
metropolitan regions throughout the U.S. and despite having a different racial composition 
to Charlotte, Atlanta or Detroit, the city exhibited a similar approach. PUHSD officials 
demonstrated a deep antipathy towards the use of busing, a policy that was beyond the 
accepted boundaries of political debate in the city. Although this resistance did not 
degenerate into violence as in Boston, it was strong enough to exclude all but the least 
intrusive desegregation remedies. Historians have typically understood President Nixon’s 
appeal to anti-busing sentiments as an appeal to former Democratic Party voters in southern 
states but this chapter has shown its resonance in Phoenix. The opposition to a meaningful 
attempt at reducing racial inequality and Phoenix’s similarities to other Sunbelt locations 
suggest that although city officials portrayed it as a modern city, distinguished from other 
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sunbelt locations with histories of racial conflict, this concept of modernity did not include a 
commitment to racial liberalism. As earlier sections of this chapter has shown, the federal 
Office for Civil Rights considered Phoenix to have some of the worst instances of educational 
segregation in the country. When city and education officials acted it was only when they 
feared intervention from the courts or federal officials. This chapter has therefore shown that 
the national political crisis over busing also affected Phoenix and in doing so it has also 
demonstrated that these conflicts were not limited to districts comprised of whites and 
African Americans or districts where long-established working class white communities 
resisted integration with adjacent African American populations. Although public discourse 
about busing in Phoenix sometimes focused upon remedial measures for African Americans, 
it was Mexican Americans who formed the largest non-white group and discussions about 
segregation were based upon their concentration in inner city schools.  
 
As PUHSD officials would not countenance the use of busing but could have been compelled 
to implement one had the Courts intervened, they introduced a policy of open schooling 
instead. The adverse effects of the policy were evident within two years of its introduction, 
but officials persisted with it because of the political power of north Phoenix neighbourhoods 
and the policy’s additional utility as an apparent desegregation remedy. By the end of the 
1970s, open enrollment had accelerated the trend of mostly white students leaving inner city 
schools for those on the suburban fringe, whilst the proportion of non-white students 
increased at PUHS, East High and North High. The effects of the policy were not only to change 
the composition of PUHSD schools but, as some education officials noted, to change the 
notion of the inner city itself. As white students left and some non-white students enrolled in 
North High, it became known as an inner city school, highlighting the association of space in 
Phoenix with racial characteristics.  
 
This chapter, and this thesis, end with the school closure crisis in Phoenix during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. As previous sections have shown, the crisis was a culmination of public policy 
decisions about urban development, school finance, school construction, and desegregation. 
As PUHSD board members consulted about plans to close inner city schools, the development 
preferences of business elites in the city influenced the decision-making process. In doing so, 
this chapter has highlighted a closer relationship between private sector elites, education 
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provision and development policy. These decisions were made between 1979 and 1982, a 
generation after the coterie of businessmen who shaped postwar Phoenix were most 
powerful. But the institutions they crafted continued to shape local politics and it was only 
during the school closure crisis that a previously assumed link became apparent. That the 
issue of segregation in Phoenix required the intervention of a federal court judge in the 
summer of 1982 to prevent the ‘disembowelling’ of the inner city demonstrates with 
particular clarity that although the civil rights opportunities granted to Mexican Americans in 
1968 promised much, the experience of Phoenix over the subsequent 14 years indicated that 





















                                                        






In 2001, researchers at Arizona State University surveyed the state of education in Arizona, 
concluding that ‘Far too many of Arizona’s Latinos drop out of high school or fail to obtain the 
sound basic education needed for more advanced study.’568 Another report, published 10 
years later by the same University, argued that ‘[i]n terms of educational attainment and 
achievement, the situation has not changed much in the last decade.’569 These were the same 
issues raised by federal politicians who advocated the introduction of bilingual education 
during the 1960s. Why then has the attainment gap between Latinos and their white peers 
persisted despite the mid-century interventions of federal politicians? This thesis has argued 
that an evaluation of the introduction of bilingual education and its effectiveness, has to 
examine the conditions that shaped the educational context in which the policy was 
delivered. In the case of Phoenix, this included the longer history of restrictions upon Spanish 
use, opposition from state politicians and municipal development policies that created an 
unequal metropolis. The foremost contribution of this thesis is to situate the policy history of 
bilingual education into an urban history context to analyse the range of actions, both state 
and non-state, that caused higher rates of poverty and educational underperformance among 
Latinos. With this in mind, the previous chapters have shown that the signature civil rights 
accomplishment for Latinos could not surmount the range of discriminatory practices that 
circumscribed opportunities for Latino students.  
 
The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 had been one part of the Great Society programs that 
sought to eliminate poverty. Although historians have examined the origins and 
implementation of the policy at the federal level, studies of the policy’s effects at the state 
and local level are limited. This thesis has shown that the experiences of Arizona complicate 
perceptions that the policy enjoyed bipartisan support, particularly since Arizonan politicians 
and policymakers did not make significant efforts to incorporate the agenda into state and 
local politics. Politicians took up the issue reluctantly and throughout the legislative process 
                                                        
568 Five Shoes Waiting to Drop: On Arizona’s Future, Morrison Institute for Public policy, Arizona State 
University, October 2001, pp. 1 -50. p. 16. 
569 Tom R. Rex, The Latino Population in Arizona: Growth, Characteristics, and Outlook – with a focus on Latino 
Education, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, September 2011, pp. 1 – 42. p2. 
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tried to limit the scope of bilingual education programs wherever possible. Despite this, 
Arizona had a well-established bilingual program by the early 1980s. Yet it was not sufficient 
to overcome both the depth and range of discrimination that circumscribed the lives of 
Latinos and confined them to under resourced inner- city neighbourhoods. Therefore, the 
main contribution of this thesis is to show that political opposition was not the only means by 
which Latino political demands were stymied. In particular, bilingual education programs did 
not reduce poverty and increase educational attainment because of a series of development 
and other school related policies that compromised the viability of urban schools. Although 
bilingual education represented symbolic progress against an Anglo majority that had 
restricted the use of Spanish, it was introduced at a time when the Comprehensive Plan, 
school sites, and open enrolments policies were enacted to much greater effect. In 
combination, these policies show the difficulty of pursuing educational equality when the 
quality of instruction and the levels of attainment are subject to a wide range of external 
influences.  
 
In recent years, scholars have identified a web of state and non-state actions that created 
metropolitan regions divided both racially and economically. These practices were developed 
during the 1940s and 1950s but, as has been discussed, municipal leaders in Phoenix updated 
them for the post-civil rights era. In Phoenix, a series of interventions from the City Council 
re-affirmed a development model and way of life that was threatened by population growth 
and demands by non-white inhabitants for equality. The publication of the Comprehensive 
Plan in 1971 is therefore a critical juncture at which future possibilities of a more equitable 
urban landscape, and as a result schools, were extinguished. Inherent in the Plan was a desire 
above all else to attend to the wishes of white homeowners with a preference for suburban 
living over the needs of inner- city neighbourhoods with high levels of poverty. Decisions to 
prioritise development in outlying areas and restrict the density of construction throughout 
the city, but particularly in the areas adjacent to the inner city, limited the options for non-
white inhabitants and directed resources away from urban neighbourhoods. The result was 
to solidify patterns of racial inequality that confined non-white residents to the poorest and 
most dilapidated neighbourhoods, causing a replication of these conditions in the final 




The actions that this study identified in Phoenix contribute to an emerging body of literature 
defined by recent works such as Ansley Erickson’s Making the Unequal Metropolis and Emily 
Strauss’s Death of a Suburban Dream. These works have demonstrated not only the influence 
of urban development upon schools but also the importance of schools to urban 
development. As shown in previous chapters, PCC’s use of planning methods that were less 
visible than conventional policy levers add to a growing body of literature that demonstrates 
the importance of looking beyond the conventional framework of racially exclusive policies. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, racially restrictive covenants and overtly prejudicial redlining policies 
were used to maintain racially homogenous neighbourhoods. By the 1970s, these had been 
replaced by tools of covert discrimination but they were no less visceral in effect. For example, 
ostensibly race neutral guidelines about the selection of new school sites were used to shape 
development priorities, housing markets and by extension, maintain racially imbalanced 
neighbourhoods. There was a remarkable consistency in the methods used by the Council’s 
Planning Department to ensure that schools were constructed away from the inner city to 
those identified by Ansley Erickson in Nashville, Tennessee. In Nashville, planners were 
influenced by federal guidelines on school site selection, which they laundered into local 
guidelines that prioritised space and idyllic surroundings over educational need. The 
similarities between Phoenix and other areas suggest the significance of these trends was not 
limited to a single region. But in Phoenix the combined effect of development plans, school 
site guidelines and the state’s school finance laws was to limit the effectiveness of bilingual 
education and undermine the modern society envisioned by the Great Society programs.  
 
The actions of Council officials in conjunction with non-state actors also had more lasting 
consequences, as shown by the PUHSD school closure crisis. By the end of the 1970s, inner 
city neighbourhoods that had been undermined by the Comprehensive Plan and other 
planning initiatives, became increasingly racially isolated and struggled to finance local 
schools. As segregation increased at PUHS, East High and North High, and the District’s 
financial shortfall worsened, education officials resorted to closing inner city schools. These 
decisions were caused by a combined effect of planning policies that directed new schools to 
the suburban periphery and school finance reforms that favoured suburban neighbourhoods, 
both of which were made on the basis of ideological preference rather than need. The open 
enrolment program, which began in 1971, acted as a catalyst for trends of white students 
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leaving the inner city and reducing the enrolment at PUHS and altering its composition to one 
that was overwhelmingly non-white. The principal cause of these events was a series of public 
policy decisions, not just private homeowner choices about relocating to the suburbs.  
 
Phoenix boosters exerted significant efforts in the post-war years to portray the city as a 
modern metropolitan centre that was distinctive from the urban North and racially divided 
South. As the preceding chapters have shown, many of the discriminatory practices identified 
in places such as Chicago, Boston, Atlanta and Charlotte, were also utilised in Phoenix. The 
seemingly modern way of life that boosters promoted to entice people to relocate from the 
urban North and Midwest was premised upon offsetting the costs upon areas of the inner city 
that contained large non-white populations. That politicians in Phoenix discriminated against 
non-white inhabitants in many of the same ways that municipal leaders in other Sunbelt 
metropolises did shows that the marketing of the city as a tolerant desert oasis contained 
little substance.  
 
These policies were enacted by municipal politicians and officials acting under the auspices 
of the Charter Government Committee, but with close associations with the GOP. During the 
1950s, Barry Goldwater had progressed from the CGC to becoming a GOP candidate in 
Arizona. Republican Governor Jack Williams had followed a similar path, having been the CGC 
Mayor of Phoenix during 1956-60. As Barone and Ujifusa argued in 1981, ‘Phoenix is politically 
conservative. No other major metropolitan area in the country has consistently voted so 
heavily Republican.’570 It was, therefore, Republican and Republican-aligned politicians who 
were responsible for implementing policies that entrenched inequality in Phoenix during the 
post-civil rights era. In combination, the chapters of this thesis challenge the argument of 
Michaela Ann Larkin that GOP politicians in Phoenix and Arizona more broadly 
accommodated Mexican Americans and their political demands.571 While there is evidence 
that they sought the votes of Mexican Americans during election campaigns, the 
development model pursued in Phoenix relied upon the exploitation of non-white residents 
                                                        
570 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1982, p. 38. 
571 Micaela Anne Larkin, ‘Southwestern Strategy: Mexican Americans and Republican Politics in the Arizona 
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of the inner city. Mexican American voices were absent from important decisions that shaped 
the future of the city and once key spokesmen articulated their perspectives about equitable 
land use they were overlooked.  
 
This thesis is the first comprehensive attempt to integrate the experiences of Mexican 
Americans into a history of Sunbelt metropolitan development. In Phoenix, Mexican 
Americans were the largest non-white group, followed by small populations of African 
Americans, Asian Americans and Indian Americans. Although this thesis focuses upon the uses 
of state power that shaped how race was made for Mexican Americans, it has identified some 
new interpretations about the experiences of Mexican Americans in the Sunbelt. The 
introduction of bilingual education represented an important moment of progress when 
considered within a longer context of restrictions upon the use of Spanish. Bilingual education 
also created space for greater recognition of Mexican American history and culture within 
schools, something that had been contested in previous generations. Yet, this thesis has also 
demonstrated that there were differing opinions within Mexican American communities and 
often vocal dissent to an emerging Chicano politics. This was evident in discussions prior to 
the introduction of bilingual education but also amongst those who became disillusioned or 
critical of its effects once implemented.  
 
Even for those who supported it, any freedom the Bilingual Education Act offered Mexican 
Americans to define their identities occurred at the same time as the development policies 
described above fortified the link between race and space. As was shown in the final chapter, 
by the early 1980s, urban neighbourhoods and schools became synonymous with non-white, 
particularly Mexican American inhabitants. By the time of the school closure crisis, inner city 
neighbourhoods struggled to remain economically viable areas that provided enough good 
quality housing, schools and employment opportunities to retain residents. Mexican 
Americans in Phoenix were, therefore, subject to the type of policies that historians have 
observed in other Sunbelt locations, used to discriminate against African Americans. The 
effect in Phoenix was to define Mexican Americans who resided in these areas as a distinct 




A proportion of Mexican Americans escaped these racializing processes and obtained a 
middle-class lifestyle in outlying neighbourhoods, but this should not be understood as being 
equidistant between the binary of white and non-white statuses. Instead, in the period this 
thesis examines, Mexican Americans occupied a complex and fluid position in society, in part 
subject to the kind of discriminatory practices that other non-white inhabitants suffered but 
on occasion able to avoid the worst excesses of racism. Despite the opportunities for some 
Mexican Americans such as Eugene Marin to prosper in these conditions, for the majority of 
Mexican Americans living in Phoenix, the GOP had enacted public policies that made 
economic and racial equality harder to attain. Yet, this thesis is not a comprehensive account 
of Mexican Americans in Phoenix and there is scope for further studies to examine the 
experiences both locally and in the Sunbelt generally. Although previous chapters provide an 
indication of how Mexican Americans challenged the discriminatory practices they faced, 
there is clearly scope for further study. These chapters have also focused upon a small 
selection of Mexican American public figures, but more needs to be known about the 
everyday experiences within Phoenix and how life flourished in the barrios of south Phoenix 
despite the effects of segregation. 
 
This thesis has argued that evaluating the condition of Mexican Americans locally, regionally, 
and nationally needs to be approached from numerous perspectives. Placed in a longer 
historical context, the period of 1968 - 1982 appears as a period of progress for Latinos where 
an important civil rights demand was established and consolidated. It was situated after a 
time when Mexican Americans suffered overt exclusion and discrimination but before the re-
emergence of intense debates about culture and identity that have since defined 
contemporary U.S. politics. The content of debates about Latinos, Spanish language use, 
assimilation and immigration coarsened in the late 1980s. This new era began with the 
emergence of English as the Official Language debates, initially in the U.S. Congress in 1981, 
but then as a series of ballot initiatives from 1986 onwards in states such as Arizona, California 
and others. From this point onwards, conflict over Spanish language use became a recurrent 
conflict in U.S. political culture, in particular during 1997-2000 when several states including 
Arizona passed ballot initiatives that outlawed its use. In the context of an abrasive partisan 
conflict that has defined U.S. politics since 1994, the bipartisan federal support of bilingual 
education to address the Latino attainment gap and rates of poverty appears restrained. Yet, 
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evaluating bilingual education within a longer trajectory of U.S. history highlights that its 
incorporation into the polity was the exception to a trend of hostility towards Latinos. The 
late century retrenchment of Latino rights and the alarm in conservative politics about the 
growing visibility and electoral influence of Latinos was in keeping with an earlier, pre-1968 
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